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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 1966 primary campaign for governor of California, candidate Ronald 
Reagan revealed what he called the Republican Party’s eleventh commandment: “Thou 
shall not speak ill of any fellow Republican.”1 The rule implicitly acknowledges that 
Republicans have policy disagreements and political rivalries but insists that those 
disagreements and rivalries be suppressed, or at least not be expressed in a disparaging 
manner that might undermine GOP unity. Reagan was speaking less than two years after 
bitter verbal attacks between Rockefeller moderates and Goldwater conservatives rent the 
party and contributed to its landslide loss in the 1964 presidential election. He was 
hoping to prevent a similar internecine battle and election debacle in California. The 
point of the eleventh commandment was obvious: Republicans shouldn’t let their 
differences get in the way of their political cohesion. In sociological terms, it expresses a 
pragmatic rather than a dogmatic view of Republican collective identity, one that 
tolerates a certain degree of difference within the party. 
This dissertation examines a Jewish version of the Republican eleventh 
commandment that has been around for 2,000 years — the prohibition against lashon ha-
ra (the evil tongue). My thesis is that lashon ha-ra is not merely an ethical concept 
governing interpersonal relations. Its primary function is to mediate what Reuven 
Kimelman calls “the peculiar problematic” of Jewish unity — the fundamental tension 
between the ideal of a universal Jewish commonwealth whose members are united in 
                                                
1 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 150. Although Reagan was 
the first to speak publicly about the eleventh commandment, he credits the concept and wording to 
California Republican Party Chairman Gaylord Parkinson.  
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belief and practice and the messy reality that Jewish people comprise a number of 
divergent and sometimes contentious groups and societies.2 Does Jewish unity demand 
that autonomy and deviancy be eliminated in order to attain the ideal? Or does it require 
that individuality and difference be tolerated in order to preserve the reality? While it is 
simplistic to think of the issue in such stark, either-or terms, it is my contention that the 
general approach of any Jew or group of Jew to this tension will be reflected to some 
extent in their attitudes toward the prohibition against lashon ha-ra.  
Like the Republican eleventh commandment, the prohibition against lashon ha-ra 
is a prescriptive response to discourse seen as a threat to Jewish social cohesion. But even 
as it seeks to preserve cohesion, the prohibition inevitably establishes boundaries and 
divides. Prohibiting Jews from speaking badly about one another involves defining who 
is a Jew, which excises or marginalizes those who do not fit the definition. Thus, 
regardless of how broadly or narrowly the prohibition against lashon ha-ra is conceived, 
it is deeply implicated in delimiting Jewish social identity and regulating power relations 
among Jews. Depending how narrowly the protected group is defined, some notions of 
lashon ha-ra can even be seen as fostering division rather than cohesion.3  
To explore these issues, this project examines the treatment of lashon ha-ra in 
rabbinic texts representing two very different socio-historical contexts. Part I looks at 
contested notions of lashon ha-ra in the ancient rabbinic writings in which the concept 
first appears. Part II looks at how the inherent tension of the concept plays out in Sefer 
                                                
2 Reuven Kimelman, “Judaism and Pluralism,” Modern Judaism 7, no. 2 (May, 1987): 131.  
    
3 We see this effect with the GOP’s eleventh commandment. Though conservative Republicans still 
venerate Reagan and cite his rule as an article of faith, many use the pejorative acronym RINO (Republican 
in Name Only) to marginalize those in the party who are viewed as too moderate. RINO signifies someone 
who is no longer a real Republicans and so is not protected by Reagan’s rule. For some Republicans the 
urge to enforce ideological conformity and exert authority within the party supersedes the eleventh 
commandment.  
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Chafetz Chaim, a comprehensive legal code on lashon ha-ra compiled in nineteenth-
century Lithuania by Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan. 
 My hermeneutical method is not orthodox in a theoretical sense but rather is an 
example of what Lévi-Strauss called “intellectual bricolage” — a pragmatic approach 
that borrows “tools” from different theories and is based on the view that human societies 
and activities are too complex to be explained neatly by a single conceptual framework.4 
On the one hand, for example, I follow social constructivist theory, which holds that 
because knowledge is created collectively by society and culture, the meaning of a text is 
variable and depends on the specific socio-historical context in which it is read. In this 
study, I am trying to situate the texts in the socio-historical milieus in which they arose. 
On the other hand, I am open to the structuralist view that certain overarching patterns of 
meaning can be discerned from the interpretation of texts from different socio-historical 
contexts. I will argue for example, that notions of lashon ha-ra emphasizing its danger 
and the gravity of the sin tend to arise during periods of social crisis or instability or 
among those who feel politically or socially vulnerable. 
 Neither of these determinations can be achieved perfectly, of course, because 
interpreters are to some extent limited by their own social “situatedness” — in my case, a 
white, middle-aged, married Jewish-American former newspaper journalist turned 
academic writing in the post-modern era. This problem is especially difficult when the 
interpreter is dealing with historical texts that are far removed in time, place and language 
from his or her own circumstances. However, as Stanley Fish argues, while the intended 
meaning of a historical text may not be determinative, neither is it totally inaccessible. 
                                                
4 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, trans. Doreen Weightman and John Weightman (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1966), 17-22. 
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That we cannot understand the rabbis or Kagan perfectly in their own context does not 
mean that we cannot understand them at all in their own context. In that sense, I would 
describe myself as a positivist. 
Before delving into the texts, I want to make two further qualifications. First, 
Kimelman refers to the problem of Jewish unity “peculiar.” The Jewish situation is 
unique, he explains, because Jewish unity involves both theological and social factors. 
Thus differences among Jews represent not only a social threat but also a “theological 
scandal.”5 Regardless of whether the issue of Jewish unity was ever unique in this way, I 
would argue that in an era in which multiple social identities are common, the same 
tension exists today within many groups and societies. There are venerated ideals as well 
as social factors at the heart of the tension that Reagan’s eleventh commandment tries to 
address as well as debates in this country and Europe about the impact of multi-
culturalism. In other words, while I am exploring a Jewish concept that deals with the 
problem of collective identity and social unity, I do not believe the problem itself can be 
described as peculiarly Jewish. Therefore, my title refers only to the problem of Jewish 
unity.  
Finally, I want to stress that in focusing on the social forces and historical 
circumstances that helped shape Kagan’s and the early rabbis’ approach to the issue of 
lashon hara, I am not denying or minimizing their exegetical or ethical motivations. The 
texts are a religious response to scripture and reflect a genuine desire to elucidate its 
                                                
5 Kimelman, “Judaism and Pluralism,” 131. 
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meaning. I intend only to give “extra-textual” factors their due by showing how the early 
rabbis and Kagan read sacred texts “through the lens of their life experiences.”6
                                                
6 Richard Kalmin, The Sage in Jewish Society of Late Antiquity (London and New York: Routledge, 
1999), 20-21. 
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 AMONG THE ANCIENT RABBIS 
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Introduction 
 The Mishnah’s lone reference to lashon ha-ra is an aside that comes near the end 
of a discussion of the penalties for several civil and criminal offenses. The editors are 
struck by the fact that in Deuteronomy 22 a husband who falsely accuses his wife of 
having not been a virgin when they married is punished more severely than a man who 
actually rapes or seduces an unmarried woman.1 In a brief digression, the Mishnah 
observes: 
 
Thus he who speaks [evil] with his mouth suffers more than he who 
commits a[n evil] deed. For so we find that the judgment was sealed 
against our forefathers in the wilderness only by reason of lashon ha-ra. 
As it says, “They tested me these ten times. . . .”2   
 
 From the standpoint of philosophical ethics, this digression acknowledges the 
power of the spoken word, pre-dating by almost two millennia J. L. Austin’s speech-act 
theory: Words don’t just say, they do.3 In this context, lashon ha-ra can be understood as 
a broad category of speech about others that includes not just slander but any remarks 
that are demeaning or otherwise harmful. In its contemporary usage, this is what the term 
often signifies. This study, however, is based on the premise that lashon ha-ra is not 
merely an ancient rebuttal to the idea expressed in that modern children’s refrain about 
                                                
1 The husband who defames his wife in this way must pay her father 100 shekels in silver (Deuteronomy 
22:19) while the man who rapes a maiden must pay her father 50 shekels in silver (Deuteronomy 22: 28). 
The Mishnah’s redactors do not consider that, in addition to their fines, the lying husband is flogged and 
the rapist must marry the woman he attacked. 
   
2 M. Arakhin 3:5, from Herbert Danby, trans., The Mishnah (London: Oxford University Press, 1933). The 
Biblical reference is to Numbers 14: 22, the story of the spies who returned from a scouting mission and 
gave a negative report about the land of Canaan. 
 
3 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, eds., 2nd ed., (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), 1-11. The idea that words “do” predates the rabbis in Jewish thought. It is 
evident in the Biblical formula for divine creation — “God said . . . and there was . . . ” It is also reflected 
in the Hebrew word davar, which means both “word” and “thing.” 
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the difference between sticks and stones on the one hand and words on the other. In 
prescribing what Jews may say or believe about one another, the concept of lashon ha-ra 
also mediates the problem of Jewish unity and is bound up in issues involving Jewish 
collective identity and power relations. 
 The first chapter of this section is taken up with a close-reading analysis of 
passages in the Babylonian Talmud (Bavli) and the Jerusalem Talmud (Yerushalmi) that 
discuss or refer to lashon ha-ra. This analysis shows that the concept was contested along 
four axes: the relative gravity of the offense, whether the offense primarily pertained to 
the harmful effect of the speech or the malicious intent of the speaker, whether it 
pertained to public or private speech, and finally the relative culpability of the 
listener/believer. These disagreements reveal two broad tendencies among the rabbis — 
one that sought to limit potentially harmful or divisive rhetoric and another that was more 
tolerant of it. The former is reflected in broader notions of what lashon ha-ra entails that 
are more restrictive of polemical speech. The latter is reflected in narrower notions that 
are less restrictive.  
 In the second chapter I argue that the contested notions of lashon ha-ra reveal 
tensions among the early rabbis along both ideological and sociological line. The rabbinic 
aversion to the rhetoric of slander associated with late Second Temple-era sectarianism 
was in tension with their urge to engage in polemics in order to establish their version of 
Judaism over those of religious competitors, both within the rabbinic movement and 
without. The desire to preserve the autonomy of small groups and individuals within the 
nascent rabbinic movement was in tension with the urge to consolidate and exert 
authority. I will also argue that these tensions played out differently in Roman Palestine 
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and Sassanian Babylonia, which helps explains why narrower, less restrictive notions of 
lashon ha-ra are muted in the Yerushalmi but find fuller voice in the Bavli. 
 I want to be clear, however, that the early notions of lashon ha-ra cannot be 
explained simply in terms of the different circumstances of rabbis in Babylonia and 
Palestine. My thesis is that Talmudic notions of lashon ha-ra reflect the dialectical 
tension identified by Kimelman regarding Jewish unity and collective identity. How the 
early rabbis responded to this issue depended on their socio-historical circumstances. 
Those who viewed Jewish society as especially vulnerable and/or who had less power 
within Jewish society were more concerned about and advocated greater restrictions on 
divisive, authoritarian rhetoric. The opposite was true of those who felt more secure 
and/or powerful. However, while one side of the dialectic might have dominated in a 
specific socio-historical context, the other was not necessarily mute. For this reason, there 
is always a certain tension associated with the concept of lashon ha-ra. Among the early 
rabbis, the various notions of lashon ha-ra embedded in the Talmuds reflect an 
ambivalence about a concept aimed at limiting polemical social discourse within a group 
for which such discourse played an important role in determining identity, status and 
authority.  
  My reading of the early rabbis is guided by the view that the redacted Talmudic 
texts, though providing only limited historical information about specific individuals and 
events, reveal more about the rabbis’ motivations and their social, political and cultural 
milieu. As Catherine Hezser puts it, what the texts tell us about the rabbis is general and 
paradigmatic rather than specific and individual.4 My analysis also follows Hezser’s view 
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that “in general, with regard to both traditional material and redactions, disagreement 
outweighs agreement.”5 Rabbinic tradition tends to portray the ancient sages as arriving 
at a consensus through an organized system of debate, and also as enforcing that 
consensus through a unified administrative structure. However, this post-Talmudic view 
of the rabbis is prescriptive, not descriptive. The contending traditions recorded in the 
Bavli and Yerushalmi reveal that throughout much of the Mishnaic-Talmudic period the 
rabbis were an unorganized, relatively powerless network of individuals and small groups 
who had many unresolved differences in belief and practice. 
  Before proceeding, I want to offer some explanations and qualifications. First, for 
each ruling or teaching cited in my analysis, I identify the rabbi to whom it is attributed, 
with his generation and locality in parentheses.6 For example, (T2) signifies a second-
generation tanna, (PA1) a first-generation Palestinian amora, and (BA3) a third-
generation Babylonian amora. We can’t assume, of course, that all the attributions are 
accurate. But because some are relevant to my argument, I have included all of them for 
the sake of consistency.7 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Catherine Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine (Atlanta: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1997), 155. See also the Introduction to Kalmin, The Sage in Jewish Society of Late Antiquity, 1-
24, and Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism (Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 29-30. Boyarin argues that we should read the rabbinic texts as a 
historian reads fiction — not for what they tell us about the characters or events they purport to record but 
for what they tell us about the authors, their motivations, social practices and cultural constructions.  
 
5 Hezser, Social Structure, 241.  
 
6 For this purpose I use H.L. Strack and Günter Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and the Midrash. 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). 
 
7 The tannaim (teachers) were rabbis who lived in Palestine from roughly 70-200 CE. Their opinions are 
recorded in the Mishnah and the Tosefta. The amoraim (repeaters) were rabbis who lived from about 200-
500 CE, some in Palestine and others in Babylonia. Their discussions and opinions on the Mishnah are 
recorded in the two Talmuds. Only the opinions of Palestinian amoraim appear in the Yerushalmi while the 
Balvli includes those of both Babylonian and Palestinian amoraim.   
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 Second, the rabbinic texts are not monographs. By interpreting a passage in terms 
of what it says about lashon ha-ra, I do not mean to imply that it is not also concerned 
with — perhaps even primarily concerned with — other matters. And finally, while I 
examine the contested aspects of lashon ha-ra separately, we should not think of them as 
either discrete or unrelated. For example, some of the passages in the Bavli that portray 
lashon ha-ra as public speech are also part of what I call the shem ra tradition that 
characterize it as lying or making false statements with malicious intent. Therefore, I will 
occasionally refer to some passages already cited in another context or to passages that 
will be explored more fully later. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE AXES OF DISAGREEMENT 
 
The gravity of the sin 
 Leaving aside for the moment questions about what lashon ha-ra entails, I want to 
begin by examining rabbinic attitudes about the gravity of the sin. To do this, I have 
identified passages in the Bavli and the Yerushalmi that do at least one of the following: 
discuss the consequences of lashon ha-ra, identify divine punishments for it, or compare 
its consequences or punishments to those of other sins. I contend these passages reveal 
two traditions — one that portrays lashon ha-ra as an especially grave sin and another 
that questions or qualifies this view.    
 The Mishnah passage, for example, depicts lashon ha-ra as a terrible sin, and not 
just because it infers that evil speech is more pernicious than an analogous evil act. It 
refers to the incident in Numbers in which the spies sent by Moses to scout Canaan 
deliver a pessimistic report, sparking panic and rebellion among the Israelites. The 
Biblical passage does not use the phrase lashon ha-ra; it says the spies spread dibat ha-
aretz (calumnies about the land).1 The Mishnah infers not only that the people’s 
willingness to believe the spies’ report (and by implication, the report itself) constituted 
lashon ha-ra but also that this offense prompted God to bar the generation that left Egypt 
from entering Canaan. To the Mishnah’s redactors, for whom the loss of the land was still 
a relatively recent and traumatic event, such a punishment would have been viewed as 
                                                
1 Numbers 13:32. 
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quite severe. Thus, aside from whatever else it says about lashon ha-ra, the Mishnah 
emphasizes the gravity of the offense.    
 There are a number of passages in both Talmuds that do likewise:  
 • The lone discussion of lashon ha-ra in the Yerushalmi begins in Pe’ah 1:1.18 
with an un-attributed teaching declaring that the sins of idolatry, illicit sexual relations, 
murder and lashon ha-ra correspond to the four supreme virtues identified in the 
Mishnah passage on which it comments. Those virtues are honoring one’s parents, doing 
righteous deeds, promoting peace between a man and his chaver (colleague or 
companion) and studying Torah. Just as the Mishnah declares the righteousness of Torah 
study equal to the combined righteousness of the first three virtues, so Pe’ah 1:1.18 
declares the sinfulness of lashon ha-ra equal to the combined sinfulness of the first three 
offenses. Thus lashon ha-ra is not only a greater evil than any of the three cardinal sins, it 
is also the negative analog of Torah study, the paramount rabbinic value. B. Arakhin 15b 
includes a parallel baraita2 attributed to the academy of R. Yishmael (T3). Unlike the 
Yerushalmi’s version, it makes no analogy to the four virtues because it is part of the 
commentary on a different Mishnah passage. Still, because it equates the sinfulness of 
lashon ha-ra to that of the three cardinal sins combined, this teaching belongs to the 
tradition that emphasizes its gravity.3    
 • Two teachings in b. Arakhin 15b, both attributed to R. Yochanan (PA2) 
speaking in the name of R. Yose ben Zimra (PA1), also emphasize the gravity of lashon 
                                                
2 A baraita (outside) is a teaching attributed to a tanna that is not included in the Mishnah. Because 
tannaim were highly esteemed, baraitot carried special significance in discussions among amoraim.  
 
3 Parallels also appear in Tosefta Pe’ah 1:2 and in The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan 40.120, both 
works of Roman Palestine. The latter includes several other references to lashon hara and uses hyperbole 
to emphasize its gravity. See Jonathan Wyn Schofer, The Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics, 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 137.  
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ha-ra. The first identifies the punishment for it as the skin disease called tzaraas, which 
is often linked to serious offenses that provoke extreme divine anger. The second equates 
lashon ha-ra to the ultimate sin of denying God. A parallel version of the second teaching 
appears in y. Pe’ah 1:1.20, where it is attributed to R. Yose (PA3) speaking in the name 
of R. Yochanan (PA2).  
 • An un-attributed teaching in y. Pe’ah 1:1.26 contends that lashon ha-ra kills three 
— the one who speaks it, the one who believes it (ha-m’kablo — the one who receives or 
accepts it) and the one about whom it is spoken. A parallel version in b. Arakhin 15b is 
attributed to unnamed Palestinian sources. 
 • Three teachings on lashon ha-ra in b. Arakhin 15b are attributed to Reish Lakish 
(PA2). The first is a play on words linking the laws regarding tzaraas to motzi shem ra 
(creating an evil name, the sin of the husband in Deuteronomy 22). The second depicts 
lashon ha-ra as irrational and self-destructive by comparing one who speaks it to a 
poisonous snake. Unlike the lion or the wolf, the snake kills without motive and often to 
its own detriment. The third teaching declares that the speaker of lashon ha-ra “piles up 
sins unto heaven.” 
 • Three teachings in b. Sotah 35a elaborate on the divine punishment meted out to 
the spies.4 The first is attributed to R. Shimon Lakish (Reish Lakish, PA2) who says that 
the spies suffered a distinctive death appropriate for their offense. The second, attributed 
to R. Chanina bar Pappa (PA3), is a grotesque description of that distinctive death: Their 
tongues became swollen and elongated, hanging down to their waists, with maggots 
moving back and forth between their mouths and their navels. The third, attributed to R. 
                                                
4 According to Numbers 14:10, they were struck down by an unnamed plague. 
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Nachman bar Yitzchak (BA4), identifies the punishment as askerah, a croup-like disease 
that inflamed the airways and resulted in a slow, agonizing death by strangulation.5   
All but one of the teachings above, even those that appear only in the Bavli, are 
attributed to Palestinian rabbis. By contrast, we find only a few passages in the Bavli 
attributed to Babylonian rabbis that describe or imply especially harsh punishments for 
lashon ha-ra. In b. Arakhin 15b, three teachings attributed to Rav Chisda (BA3) in the 
name of exilarch Mar Ukva (BA1) declare that the speaker of lashon ha-ra should be 
stoned, that “[God] and he cannot dwell together in the world,” and that he is punished 
twice, first by God in this world and then by the ministering angels of gehinnom in the 
world to come.6 A teaching in b. Shabbat 56b attributed to Rav Yehuda (BA2) in the 
name of Rav (BA1) contends that had David not believed lashon ha-ra, the kingdom of 
Israel would not have been divided and the people would not have worshiped idols and 
been exiled.  
 Both the Bavli and the Yerushalmi also include teachings that emphasize the 
tongue’s destructive power or, like the Mishnah, portray evil speech as more harmful 
than analogous evil acts. While these teachings themselves do not use the term lashon ha-
ra, the editors cite them in their discussion of the concept, thereby emphasizing its 
gravity. 
 For example, Pe’ah 1:1.27, the last clause in the Yerushalmi’s discussion of 
lashon ha-ra, begins with an un-attributed teaching comparing the tongue to an arrow and 
                                                
5 B. Berachot 8a describes askerah as the worst of the 903 types of death ordained by God, so there can be 
no doubt that identifying it as the plague that killed the spies emphasizes the gravity of their offense. 
 
6 Gehinnom, a valley outside Jersusalem, is identified in the Bible as a site of child sacrifice. In rabbinic 
literature it became the destination of the wicked in the afterlife, not to be confused with sheol, a Biblical 
name for the abode of the dead that has a more neutral connotation.  
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the wounds it creates to broom-wood coals. Like an arrow, the tongue can strike 
anonymously from afar whereas other weapons can kill only at close range. And like 
broom-wood coals, which continue to burn even after they have been doused, wounds 
inflicted by the tongue resist amelioration.7 The clause ends with a teaching attributed to 
R. Samuel bar Nachman (PA3) which poses and answers four questions about the snake. 
Why does its tongue constantly dart in and out? (As a reminder that its tongue caused its 
downfall in Eden, the teaching says.) Why, unlike the lion or the wolf, does the snake bite 
without provocation or purpose? (Because God commanded that it do so as part of its 
punishment for the sin in Eden.)8 Why do its victims feel pain in all their limbs when 
only one limb is bitten? (Because when the “master of the tongue” speaks in one place he 
can kill those in distant locations.) Why is the snake found around fences? (Because in 
Eden it caused the fence around sin to be broken.)  
  Running counter to the tradition emphasizing the gravity of lashon ha-ra is 
another that either mitigates its severe punishments or associates them with other 
offenses, thereby diminishing the uniquely sinful status of the offense. While it would be 
a mistake to read these teachings as an attempt to trivialize lashon ha-ra, they do 
undercut the competing tradition’s sometimes hyperbolic descriptions of its gravity. For 
example, the longest discussion of lashon ha-ra in the Bavli begins in Arakhin 15a by 
                                                
 
7 The proof text is Psalms 120: 3-4: “What can you profit, what can you gain O deceitful tongue? A 
warrior’s sharpened arrows, with hot broom-wood coals.” In b. Arakhin 15b, a teaching attributed to R. 
Yochanan (PA2) uses the same proof text to portray the tongue (which speaks) as more powerful, 
destructive and difficult to control than any of the other limbs (which act or do). This teaching echoes the 
Mishnah’s assertion that words can be more harmful than deeds, and its use in the discussion of lashon ha-
ra reinforces the gravity of the offense.  
 
8 Compare this to the version in the Balvi attributed to Reish Lakish (PA2), which likens lashon ha-ra to 
the snake’s irrational strike. In any case, the teaching appears to be of Palestinian origin and is used in both 
the Bavli and Yerushalmi in a context that emphasizes the gravity of lashon ha-ra.  
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questioning whether the severe punishment meted out to the wandering Israelites can be 
attributed solely to lashon ha-ra. The editors cite a teaching attributed to Rav Hamnuna 
(BA3). It contends that God does not exact punishment until a person has committed his 
or her “full measure” of sins. This teaching itself does not specifically mention the spies 
or the sin associated with them, but the editors employ it in this discussion to suggest that 
lashon ha-ra was merely the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. This argument 
— that the punishment meted out to the people was not solely for believing lashon ha-ra 
but rather for a string of offenses that happened to culminate with lashon ha-ra — tends 
to subvert the notion of its singular gravity.  
 In response the editors cite a teaching attributed to Reish Lakish (PA2) that plays 
on the wording of God’s angry accusation in Numbers 14: 22 — y’nasu oti zeh eser 
p’amim.  The usual translation of this passage is, “They tested me these ten (or many) 
times.” But Reish Lakish’s teaching turns on the usual meaning of zeh, insisting that the 
people were punished specifically for  “this,” meaning the incident involving the spies. 
Like the teaching attributed to R. Hamnuna, this one does not use the phrase lashon ha-
ra. Still, it unequivocally supports the notion that the sin associated with the spies was so 
egregious that it alone resulted in the edict barring the generation that fled Egypt from 
entering the land. In juxtaposing this teaching and the accumulation-of-sins argument, the 
editors acknowledge competing traditions regarding the gravity of the offense associated 
with the spies. 
 There is evidence that these passages do not simply reflect a late Babylonian 
dispute or even an unequivocal editorial endorsement of the second opinion, as is 
sometimes the case in such point-counter point constructions. A subsequent clause in b. 
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Arakhin 15 a-b cites a baraita attributed to R. Yehuda (T3) that identifies the ten offenses 
committed by the wandering Israelites. Though it too does not use the term lashon ha-ra, 
this teaching echoes the argument that the severe divine decree against the people is 
explained by the aggregate of their sins, not by any one of them. Not only is its 
attribution to R. Yehuda evidence of an early tannaitic tradition de-emphasizing the 
seriousness of the sin associated with the spies, but also its use even after the issue 
ostensibly has been settled indicates a lingering ambivalence on the part of the Bavli’s 
redactors about the relative gravity of lashon ha-ra.  
 The counter-tradition regarding the gravity of lashon ha-ra appears in another 
clause in b. Arakhin 15a. It begins with a baraita attributed to R. Elazar ben Parta (T2) 
that contends that the spies’ fate is evidence of “the terrible power of lashon ha-ra.”  If 
one who defames trees and stones is punished so severely, it says, then “how much 
greater [is the punishment] for one who defames a chaver.”9 Clearly this teaching belongs 
to the tradition emphasizing the gravity of lashon ha-ra. 
 It is followed immediately by a teaching attributed to R. Chanina bar Pappa 
(PA3). While agreeing that the spies did indeed “utter a terrible thing,” it argues that they 
did not speak against the land but against God: They expressed doubt about God’s power 
to deliver the Israelites safely into a hostile territory. Changing the subject of the spies’ 
remarks from inanimate sticks and stones to God reverses the implication of the previous 
teaching. Read as an intertext and applying the same rabbinic rule of argumentation, the 
second teaching implies that we might expect the person who defames a chaver to be 
punished less severely than the spies who spoke against the one true God. Thus while it 
                                                
9 This teaching is also found in The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan, indicating that it is of Palestinian 
origin. It employs a type of a fortiori argument the rabbis called kal v’chomer (light and heavy).   
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ratchets up the gravity of the spies’ offense, it has the effect of de-emphasizing the 
gravity of lashon ha-ra.  
 To settle the issue, the editors cite a teaching attributed to Rabbah (BA3) speaking 
in the name of Reish Lakish (PA2). It quotes Numbers 14: 37: “Those who spread such 
calumnies about the land died in a plague by the will of the Lord.” This scripture is proof, 
the teaching concludes, that the spies sinned by slandering the Promised Land, not by 
committing blasphemy. Underlying this discussion about whether the spies slandered 
God or the land, however, is the more important issue regarding the gravity of lashon ha-
ra.10      
 Another disagreement about the punishment for lashon ha-ra arises in b. Arakhin 
16a, where a teaching attributed to R. Anani bar Sasson (BA3) asserts that lashon ha-ra 
is one of eight sins for which a specific part of the priestly garb atones.11 The editors note 
that this teaching conflicts with others that link lashon ha-ra to tzaraas. According to R. 
Anani, the severe divine punishment of tzaraas is preempted by the atoning power of the 
priestly garb.   
 We should not conclude, of course, that this teaching trivializes lashon ha-ra. 
Naming it as one of the sins for which the priestly garb atones indicates a special concern 
about improper speech.12 But by mitigating the severe punishment for lashon ha-ra, it 
portrays the offense as relatively less consequential than does the tradition that cites 
                                                
10 As we will see below, the teaching by Reish Lakish also relates to the question of whether lashon hara 
pertains to public or private speech. 
 
11 Specifically, the me’ilim atone for lashon ha-ra. It is appropriate that the sound of these small gold bells 
along the hem of the priestly vest atones for “emitting the sound” of evil speech. This teaching also appears 
in b. Zevachim 88b. 
 
12 The other sins for which various parts of the priestly garb atone are bloodshed, sexual immorality, 
arrogance, evil thoughts, injustice, idolatry and immodesty. Taken as a whole, they comprise the antithesis 
of what the rabbis considered the ideal moral character.   
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tzaraas as the punishment for lashon ha-ra. This is clearly how the Bavli’s editors see it, 
for they resolve the contradiction by ruling that the priestly garb atones only for lashon 
ha-ra that is ineffective — that is, does not demean or otherwise harm someone. On the 
other hand, the speaker whose words result in actual harm will be afflicted with the 
punishment of tzaraas.   
 The tradition de-emphasizing the gravity of lashon ha-ra is not as apparent in the 
Yerushalmi. As I will argue later, this can be explained by the different social and 
political circumstances of rabbis in Palestine and Babylonia, particularly at the time of 
the Yerushalmi’s redaction. Even so, there is evidence that this tendency is not 
exclusively Babylonian. As noted above, the teaching in the Bavli questioning whether 
the divine punishment meted out to the wandering Israelites can be attributed solely to the 
incident of the spies appears to have tannaitic origins. Likewise, the teaching that the 
spies spoke against God, not the land, is attributed to a third-generation Palestinian 
amora. 
  There also is evidence of the counter-tradition among Palestinians in the 
Yerushalmi itself. In y. Pe’ah 1:1.13, a teaching attributed to R. Samuel bar Nachman 
(PA3) speaking in the name of R. Jonathan (PA1) argues that it is permissible to speak 
lashon ha-ra against a ba’al machloket — someone who routinely cause public disputes 
or controversies. Its scriptural proof text is the story beginning in 1 Kings 1:14 in which 
Nathan and Bathsheba inform the aging King David that one of his sons, Adonijah, is 
trying to usurp the throne that David had promised to Solomon, his son by Bathsheba. 
Not only does this teaching diminish the gravity of lashon ha-ra by citing an exemption, 
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but also in this case the exemption pertains to speech about those who disturb social order 
by resisting divinely established authority.       
 We find a similar exemption in b. Mo-ed Katan 16a that explicily applies to 
speech about those who resist rabbinic authority. In considering a situation in which a 
defendant responds disrespectfully to an agent of the beit din (rabbinic court) bearing a 
summons to appear before it, the editors rule that the agent can bring this negative report 
to the court without fear of speaking lishna bisha (the Aramaic synonym for lashon ha-
ra). As proof they cite the incident in Numbers 16: 12-15 in which Moses is told about 
the defiant and insulting refusal of Dathan and Aviram to appear before him to answer 
charges that they were collaborating in Korach’s insurrection. The implication of this 
discussion is clear: The prohibition against making a derogatory or harmful report is 
outweighed by the need to preserve the authority of the rabbinic court to enforce religious 
law.13 
 We should also consider a clause in b. Arakhin 15b. While it does not use the 
term lashon ha-ra, it is inserted into a long discussion of the issue. It begins with an 
exegesis of Proverbs 18:21 attributed to R. Chama (PA2): “Death and life are in the hand 
of the tongue.” Chama’s teaching is taken up with a hyperbolic description of the 
tongue’s destructive power reminiscent of the passages in the Yerushalmi mentioned 
above. Citing several proof texts, it describes the tongue as more deadly than the hand — 
although both can kill from close range, the tongue can also kill anonymously from afar 
like an arrow. Yet even this comparison does not adequately describe the tongue’s deadly 
                                                
13 Unlike the spies’ report to the Israelites in the Bible, the agent’s report to the beit din is true. And 
because it implies that his remarks might be considered lishna bisha under different circumstances, this 
passage indicates that lashon ha-ra pertains to truthful speech. However, because the primary purpose of 
this teaching is to carve out an exemption to protect rabbinic authority, I have discussed it in the section 
dealing with the gravity of the offense.  
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power. While the arrow has a killing range of 40 to 50 cubits, the tongue can strike from 
any distance, no matter how great. The clause ends on a different note, however. 
Wondering why the biblical verse refers to both death and life, the editors explain: to 
support the teaching of Rava (BA4), who said, “He who desires life can attain it through 
the tongue and he who desires death can attain it through the tongue.”          
 While their intent is to emphasize the power of the spoken word, the Bavli’s 
editors have done so by stitching together two teachings that are in tension with each 
other. The first is Palestinian. It emphasizes the tongue’s destructive power by focusing 
solely on its potential to harm or kill. The second is Babylonian. It subtly qualifies that 
view by giving equal weight to the tongue’s potential to sustain life.    
 A similar tension is at the heart of a lengthy discussion in b. Shabbat 33a that 
begins with R. Elazar’s (T4) assertion that askerah occurs “on account of lashon ha-ra.” 
As we have seen, teachings that describe askerah as the punishment meted out to the 
spies are part of the tradition emphasizing the gravity of lashon ha-ra. But the editors 
immediately express doubt about whether lashon ha-ra could be the sole cause for such a 
terrible disease. Did R. Elazar mean that askerah occurs “[only] on account of lashon ha-
ra,” they wonder, or did he mean “even on account of lashon hara?”  
 To settle the issue the editors cite a baraita in which three tannaim discuss why 
the deadly disease culminates with symptoms affecting the mouth. R. Judah contends that 
askerah occurs on account of lashon ha-ra. He argues that the course of the disease 
reflects the fact that the offense becomes a fait accompli only when the mouth utters the 
evil words. R. Elazar — the very same R. Elazar to whom the teaching under discussion 
is attributed — links askerah to the sin of eating non-kosher food. Because the mouth 
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consumes improper food, it is the appropriate site of the disease’s terrible end stage.14 R. 
Shimon ben Yochai associates askerah with still another sin — neglecting Torah study. 
The disease ends in the mouth because it is the mouth that fails to articulate words of 
Torah. After a long discussion about why those who are not required to study Torah also 
get askerah (they interfere with or prevent Torah study by those of whom it is required), 
the editors conclude that the disease is indeed caused “even by lashon ha-ra.” In effect 
they find that lashon ha-ra is not the sole or even primary cause of this terrible 
punishment. Neglecting Torah study is.   
 Certainly this story should be read primarily as an effort to elevate the importance 
of Torah study. And as in other examples of this tradition, it would be a mistake to 
assume that the teachings attributed to Shimon and Elazar were meant to trivialize lashon 
ha-ra. Indeed the editors’ conclusion that the punishment for lashon ha-ra is the same as 
that for neglecting Torah study dovetails with the aforementioned Palestinian teaching 
that portrays the former as the negative analog of the latter.     
 Nevertheless, this clause, like the one that wrestles with the issue of whether the 
tongue is a source of life or death, recognizes a certain tension between lashon ha-ra (evil 
speech) and neglect of Torah study (evil silence). Avoiding one wrong sometimes leads 
to the other. By insisting that lashon ha-ra causes askerah, R. Judah’ s teaching 
emphasizes the importance of avoiding evil speech. By ruling that neglect of Torah study 
causes askerah, R. Shimon’s emphasizes the importance of avoiding evil silence. The 
                                                
14 The editors, believing this is not a sufficiently serious offense to warrant such a terrible punishment, 
interject themselves into the debate and assert that R. Elazar must have meant to say that askerah is the 
punishment for eating food that has not been properly tithed. The effect is to dismiss this explanation and 
focus the debate on the other two possible causes: lashon hara (speaking) and neglect of Torah study (not 
speaking).  
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editors’ determination that neglect of Torah study is the main cause of askerah gives 
primacy to the imperative of Torah study — rabbinic discourse.  
 
Malicious intent vs. harmful effect 
 To begin the examination of rabbinic notions of the nature of lashon ha-ra, let’s 
return to the Mishnah and the Biblical example it cites. Numbers 13:32 tells us that the 
spies yotzi-u debat ha-aretz (spread a calumny about the land), specifically that it 
destroyed those who lived there and was filled with fearsome giants to whom the Israelite 
scouts seemed as insignificant as grasshoppers. The Mishnah associates this paradigmatic 
example of lashon ha-ra with the offense of the husband in Deuteronomy 22 who, having 
grown tired of his wife, seeks to rid himself of her by falsely accusing her of having been 
sexually promiscuous before marriage, a capital offense. He is said to sam la alilot 
d’varim v’hotzi aliha shem ra (make up stories about her and create an evil name for her). 
According to the Mishnah, then, lashon ha-ra is slander. Not only are the reports clearly 
demeaning or harmful but also the speakers lie, making clear their malicious intent.15  
 In this section I will identify three broad Talmudic traditions regarding these 
elements. One follows the Mishnah in portraying lashon ha-ra as factually false speech 
that is not just demeaning or harmful but also malicious. Another depicts it as speech 
that, while true or at least factually neutral, is still malicious as well as unambiguously 
                                                
15 While contemporary readers might view the spies’ report as an honest, well-intended but mistaken 
opinion rather than a malicious lie, that is not the sense of the Biblical Hebrew or how the rabbis would 
have understood it. See Tanakh, 2nd ed., (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1999), Genesis 37: 
2, Numbers 13: 32 and 14: 36-37, Jeremiah 20: 10, Ezekiel 36: 3, Psalms 31: 13, and Proverbs 10:18 and 
25:10. Dibah is translated variously as calumny, an evil report, slander, derision, infamy and the 
whispering of plotters or informers. In each case it refers to malicious speech that intentionally defames, 
discredits or endangers someone. In most cases it also connotes a lie or false belief. See also Marcus 
Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Bavli, Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature (Peabody 
MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2005), 276. In early rabbinic literature, dibah signifies an evil report or 
calumny.  
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demeaning or harmful. Still another tradition portrays lashon ha-ra as speech that seems 
innocuous in content or intent (or both) yet is harmful or potentially harmful in its effect. 
Of course, the latter traditions should not be read as disputing the idea that slander is a 
sin. Rather, by focusing on the potential effect of speech that is not patently false or 
malicious, they portray lashon ha-ra as a category of speech different from — or at least 
broader than — slander. In that sense they can be said to more strictly regulate speech.  
 I will also present evidence that, in general, these stricter, expansive notions of 
lashon ha-ra are more predominant in the Yerushalmi, and that even when they appear in 
the Bavli, they are usually associated with Palestinian rabbis. What’s more, the Bavli not 
only gives greater voice to the narrower notion of lashon ha-ra as slander but also 
includes teachings that question or resist the broader notions.  
 We have already seen several teachings in the Bavli that, like the Mishnah, 
portray lashon ha-ra as slander by associating it with motzi shem ra, the sin of the 
husband in Deuteronomy 22. The most compelling example is the baraita in b. Arakhin 
15a attributed to R. Elazar ben Parta (T2) that describes the punishment meted out to the 
spies as evidence of the “the terrible power of lashon ha-ra,” If one who defames (ha-
motzi shem ra) sticks and stones is punished so severely, it says, how much more harshly 
would one be punished for defaming (ha-motzi shem ra) one’s colleague. Here the 
quintessential example of lashon ha-ra — the spies’ report about the land — is described 
with the Hebrew phrase associated with the slanderous accusations of the husband in 
Deuteronomy. Indeed this teaching appears to treat the concepts of lashon ha-ra and 
motzi shem ra as synonyms.   
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  A number of other teachings in the Bavli, while they do not use the phrase motzi 
shem ra, also portray lashon ha-ra as speaking falsely and maliciously. We have already 
looked at the teaching in b. Shabbat 33a supporting the view that askerah results from 
lashon hara. It cites Psalms 63:12 as a proof text — “the mouths of liars will be stopped 
(yisakher).” By making a pun on the punishments of askerah and yisakher, this teaching 
links the offenses with which they are associated, lashon ha-ra and lying. The editors 
attribute this teaching to Rava (BA4), although they note that some claim it came from R. 
Yehoshua ben Levi (PA1).  
 A teaching in b. Pesachim 87b attributed to R. Yochanan (PA2) contends that 
Jeroboam, one of Israel’s most notorious kings, nevertheless deserved some merit 
because he did not accept lashon ha-ra. It cites the story in Amos 7:11 in which 
Amaziah, the high priest, sends a report to Jeroboam accusing Amos of conspiring 
against the king and prophesying that he will be overthrown and “die by the sword.” 
Amaziah’s report, which portrays the prophet as a traitorous critic of the king, is 
unambiguously malicious, derogatory and harmful. What’s more, the rabbis would have 
understood Amaziah’s report to be false: In Amos 7:9, the prophet tells him only that the 
house of Jeroboam eventually will fall, not that the king himself will lose the throne and 
die violently.16  
 In b. Sanhedrin 103a, a teaching attributed to Rav Chisda (BA3) says there are 
four kinds of sinners that do not receive the divine presence — scoffers, liars, flatterers 
                                                
16 Hersh Goldwurm, gen. ed., Talmud Bavli, Schottenstein ed., (Brooklyn: Masorah Publications, 1997-
2001), Pesachim 87b, note 30. In addition, 1 Kings 15 says that God kept his promise to preserve Jeroboam 
on the throne of Israel for the sake of David, and 2 Chronicles 13:20 says that while Jeroboam suffered 
serious military defeats during his reign, he was never overthrown. He was “struck down” by the hand of 
God, not by the swords of men. 
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and those who speak lashon ha-ra. While it doesn’t describe lashon hara or give an 
example, this teaching does imply something about its nature by grouping it with other 
kinds of speech that are malicious, intentionally false or deceptive, or both. 
 We also should consider a dispute in b. Sotah 35a that begins with a teaching 
attributed to Rava (BA4) characterizing the spies’ report not as a false statement of fact 
but rather as a misinterpretation.17 Everywhere the spies went, it says, a Canaanite leader 
would die. They saw this as evidence that the land “devours its people.” However, God 
had caused the deaths so that the Canaanites would be too pre-occupied to notice the 
spies or interfere with their mission. According to Rava, God “intended it (the Canaanite 
deaths) for good but they (the spies) interpreted it for bad.”  
 This is followed by an opposing view attributed to Rav Mesharshia (BA4), who 
notes that the spies not only said that they felt like “grasshoppers” (that is, insignificant) 
in comparison to the nephilim, the giant inhabitants of Canaan, but also added, “And so 
we were in their eyes.” This proves the spies were liars, Mesharshia concludes, because 
while they undoubtedly knew their own thoughts, they could not have known what the 
nephilim were thinking. The editors resolve the dispute in favor of Rava: The spies were 
not lying. While hiding in cedar trees, they overheard the Canaanites speaking about 
“men who are like grasshoppers in the trees.”  
 This discussion is not about whether to rehabilitate the spies by portraying them 
as misguided rather than ill intentioned. Regardless of whether the spies lied or 
misinterpreted the evidence, the rabbis would have viewed a negative report about the 
land that God had promised to the Israelites as patently malicious and sinful. Instead I 
                                                
17 Although this passage does not mention lashon ha-ra explicitly, it follows another that does. And in 
addressing the nature of the spies’ sin, it clearly has implications for the meaning of lashon ha-ra.  
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would argue that this disagreement has implications for what kind of speech constitutes 
lashon ha-ra, the spies’ offense. In Rava’s view, one can commit lashon ha-ra not only 
by lying but also by expressing a malicious opinion or belief. Mesharshia’s teaching 
represents a narrower view that lashon ha-ra involves lying about the facts. Regardless of 
what we think of the editors’ somewhat contrived decision in favor of Rava, 
Mesharshia’s opinion is evidence of a Babylonian tradition that not only identified lashon 
hara as slander but also contested efforts to broaden its meaning.  
 By contrast, the shem ra teachings are absent from the Yerushalmi, and only one 
of its eleven clauses dealing with lashon ha-ra explicitly portrays it as a lie or false 
statement. Y. Pe’ah 1:1.19 seeks to identify the unspecified “evil reports” Joseph makes 
about his brothers in Genesis 37:2.18 The clause consists of three explanations, each 
attributed to a different third-generation tanna and followed by an exegesis attributed to 
R. Judah b. Pazzi (PA4).19  
 According to the first explanation, Joseph told his father that his brothers had torn 
the flesh from a living animal and eaten it. R. Judah’s exegesis cites Genesis 37:31 —  
“they ritually slaughtered a he-goat and dipped his coat in its blood.” Not only does this 
Biblical passage “testify on their behalf (i.e. prove that Joseph’s report is false),” so does 
a subsequent event in Joseph’s life: Because he falsely accused his brothers of tearing the 
flesh from live animals, his father was duped into believing he was torn apart by wild 
                                                
18 The scriptural text is confusing. It says, “And Joseph brought their evil reports to their father,” implying 
that he was repeating to Jacob the slanderous comments his brothers were making about each other. It is 
more commonly read as “Joseph brought evil reports about them to their father.” At any rate, whether he 
originated the reports or merely repeated them, he was guilty of slander. 
 
19 The term lashon ha-ra does not appear in this clause. Instead it uses the same word — dibah — 
associated with the spies’ slanderous report about the land. Thus we cannot use it to ascribe a notion of 
lashon ha-ra as slander to either the third-generation tannaitic descriptions of Joseph’s reports or the 
fourth-generation amoraic exegesis, only to the redactors who inserted the teachings into the discussion of 
lashon ha-ra.  
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beasts. Likewise, because Joseph falsely accused his brothers of treating their father’s 
handmaidens like slaves, he himself was sold into slavery. And because he falsely 
accused his brothers of “casting their eyes” on local girls, Joseph became the object of 
unwanted sexual advances from Potiphar’s wife.  
 This example notwithstanding, the predominant view in the Yerushalmi is that 
lashon ha-ra is not a lie but rather truthful — or at least factually neutral speech — that 
nevertheless clearly denigrates or endangers someone. It is often portrayed as the 
malicious report of an informant or traitor to an authority figure. For example, a teaching 
in y. Pe’ah 1:1.25 attributed to R. Abba b. Kahana (PA3) contends that King David’s 
generation, though it refrained from idol worship, was preoccupied with deadly wars on 
account of informants. It then describes the Biblical characters Do-eg and Achitophel as 
having been “eager for lashon ha-ra.” Do-eg was chief herdsman for King Saul during 
the period when the king became convinced that David was plotting a coup against him. 
In 1 Samuel 22:9-10, Saul complains to his courtiers that no one will tell him who is 
abetting his nemesis. Do-eg steps forward to inform the king that David recently visited 
the high priest Achimelech, who provided him with food and arms.20 We know from 1 
Samuel 21:4-10 that this report reflects actual events that Do-eg had recently witnessed.    
  Achitophel was a trusted advisor who betrayed King David by allying himself 
with Absalom, David’s traitorous son, and urging him to launch an immediate attack 
against his father. The editors certainly would have been aware that 2 Samuel 17 portrays 
Achitophel as councilor par excellence and describes his advice to Absalom as tovah 
                                                
20 Achimelech’s aid was significant in a symbolic sense: The food he provided David and his men was 
consecrated show bread and the weapon was the sword of Goliath, which had been stored at Nob, where 
Achimelech officiated. 
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(good, in the sense of being strategically sound). Indeed, that’s why God has to intervene 
and cause Absalom to reject it. So the malicious reports of Do-eg and Achitophel are both 
true, the former in the factual sense and the latter in the strategic sense.21   
 We should also recall the teaching in y. Pe’ah 1:1.23 that explains the 
circumstances under which lashon ha-ra is permissible. The scriptural proof text is the 
Biblical story in which Bathsheba and Nathan warn King David of Adonijah’s plot to 
usurp the throne. What makes their negative report permissible — what distinguishes it 
from those of Do-eg and Achitophel — is that it serves a righteous purpose. They are 
trying to prevent Adonijah from obstructing the divine plan for the transfer of authority 
over the people of Israel. Nevertheless, all three teachings depict lashon ha-ra as truthful 
reports to a figure of authority that are unambiguously derogatory or harmful and clearly 
intended to discredit or endanger the subject. 
 That is not the case in a pair of stories in y. Pe’ah 1:1.24, the first of which is 
about a group of Jewish linen workers who are summoned by authorities for mandatory 
labor at an imperial linen works. Absent from the group is one bar Chovetz. During a 
discussion about what they should eat, one member of the group suggests chov’tzin.22 
The innocuous comment calls attention to the fact that bar Chovetz is missing, prompting 
                                                
21 It can be argued that while Do-eg did not lie, he mislead Saul by omitting a key fact — that David had 
secured aid from Achimelech under false pretenses. (David told the priest that Saul had sent him on an 
urgent secret meeting, leaving him no time to gather food and arms.) For a number of alternative readings, 
see Joseph Lozovyy, Saul, Do-eg, Nabal and the “Son of Jesse”: Readings in I Samuel 16-25 (Ph.D diss., 
University of Edinburgh, 2006), 32-34 and 129 ff. Do-eg saw Achimelech provide aid to David but did not 
hear the conversation between them. Thus he told the truth as he saw it. Alternatively, he overheard the 
conversation but recognized it as a ruse to give the priest cover for aiding David. In this scenario, Do-eg 
omitted misleading information in order make the truth clear. In any case, the issue is ambiguous. Some 
rabbinic texts describe Do-eg’s report as truthful and others as misleading. They are unanimous, however, 
in portraying it as malicious and sinful.  
       
22 Although chov’tzin obviously refers to a kind of food, the word’s meaning is obscure. Roger Brooks 
translates it as “something beaten” and Heinrich Guggenheimer as “cheese.” Some traditional rabbinic 
sources identify it as a legume.  
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authorities to send for him. According to the Yerushalmi’s editors, R. Yochanan (PA2) 
described this as an example of lashon hara spoken b’hatznei’a (western Aramaic for “in 
private”). Given that the speaker addresses his remarks to a group of tradesmen in a 
public setting, the usual translation of b‘hatznei’a seems inappropriate. Roger Brooks 
suggests that in this context it should be read as “indirectly” or “by innuendo.”23   
 The second story involves a city councilor in Sepphoris named Yochanan (not the 
renowned Palestinian amora mentioned earlier) who fails to show up at a city council 
meeting as required. One person in attendance remarks, “Let us visit Rav Yochanan 
today,” thereby alerting those in charge of the assembly to his absence. According to the 
editors, Reish Lakish (PA2) described this as lashon hara b’zedek. Again, however, the 
common meaning of b’zedek  — “justly” or “in righteousness” — doesn’t seem to fit the 
circumstances. Brooks translates it as “explicitly.” In contrast to the speaker in the first 
story, this one refers to Yochanan by name. Others suggest “in false righteousness.” 
Although the speaker piously suggests that he and his companions at the meeting do a 
good deed — visit Yochanan — his real intent is to call attention to their colleague’s 
absence.24 
 In any case, falseness — at least in the factual sense — is not an element in these 
examples of lashon ha-ra.25 More important, the content of the remarks is not obviously 
                                                
 
23 Roger Brooks, trans., Yerushalmi Pe’ah. The Talmud of the Land of Israel: A Preliminary Translation 
and Explanation, vol. 2 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 66.  
 
24 Ibid., 67, note 110. The second interpretation is supported by what can be read as a false compliment: 
The story introduces Yochanan without an honorific but the speaker, apparently feigning deference or 
being sarcastic, refers to him as “Rav Yochanan.” 
 
25 One might argue that the speakers are “false” in the sense that they have disguised their malicious intent 
behind seemingly innocuous statements. Even that reading, however, would reflect a different — or at least 
 32 
negative and the intent of the speakers is not unambiguously malicious. Indeed the point 
of these teachings seems to be that even apparently benign speech can be lashon ha-ra if 
it has the effect of discrediting or endangering someone. This reading is reinforced by a 
cryptic passage introducing the two stories. R. Yochanan is asked what qualifies as 
lashon ha-ra. His response: ha-omro v-ha-yodo. Literally, this means “the one who 
speaks it and the one who knows it.” Given the context of the stories that follow, Brooks 
suggests, “The one who says it [so that] someone knows it.”26 Though the remarks seem 
innocuous and the speakers’ intentions are unclear, the words nevertheless result in harm 
to bar Chovetz and Yochanan. Their effect qualifies them as lashon ha-ra. This notion is 
broader and more restrictive of speech than those that portray lashon ha-ra as patently 
malicious and harmful comments, regardless of whether they are true or false.   
 Notions of lashon ha-ra as truthful or innocuous speech are also found in the 
Bavli, but most of them are attributed to or associated with Palestinian rabbis, and many 
are disputed or qualified. In b. Sotah 35a, during an extended discussion about the 
incident of the spies, the editors note that before lying about the land they reported a truth 
about it — that it flowed with milk and honey. To explain this, the editors cite a teaching 
attributed to R. Yochanan (PA2) speaking in the name of R. Meir (T3): “Lashon ha-ra 
                                                                                                                                            
broader — notion of lashon hara than the tradition that portrays it as a clearly derogatory and malicious 
statement that misrepresents the facts.  
 
26 Brooks, Yerushalmi Pe’ah, 66. Guggenheimer translates Yochanan’s statement as “the one who speaks it 
and the one who accepts it,” but this is problematic. When referring to those who believe lashon hara, the 
rabbinic texts use the root kuf-bet-lamed (to accept or receive), never yud-dalet-ayin (to know, recognize or 
find out). What’s more, the stories that follow clearly focus on the sin of the speaker, not those who accept 
it. 
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which has no truth at its beginning will not endure in the end.”27 Yochanon’s statement is 
ambiguous, but it seems to portray lashon ha-ra as a malicious admixture of truth and 
falseness, the former aimed at making the latter believable.28    
 In b. Pesachim 118a, a teaching attributed to Rav Sheishet (PA3) speaking in the 
name of R. Elazar (T3) identifies three kinds of people who should be “thrown to the 
dogs” — those who speak lashon ha-ra, those who accept lashon ha-ra and those who 
bear false witness. Though we can’t be sure this teaching intends to portray lashon ha-ra 
as truthful or factually neutral speech, it does distinguish lashon ha-ra from false 
testimony while still implying malicious intent.29 
 The Bavli explicitly depicts lashon hara as truthful speech in an un-attributed 
two-part story in Bava Batra 164b. In the first part, Rabbi (Judah ha-Nasi, T4, the 
purported codifier of the Mishnah) expresses displeasure with the preparation of a sealed 
document. When his son, R. Shimon, tells him that the scribe Yehuda Chayata prepared 
it, Rabbi rebukes him for speaking lashon ha-ra. In the second part, Rabbi is pleased 
about the penmanship of a section of scripture he has just read. When R. Shimon tells 
him that Yehuda Chayata copied it, his father again warns him not to speak lashon ha-ra. 
There is no suggestion that R. Shimon is lying or mistaken in either exchange. Indeed the 
reader assumes that his remarks are truthful, accurate and, at least in the second instance 
                                                
27 The verb is mitkayeim. It normally means to live or exist but is better translated here as “endures.” See 
Isidore Epstein, supervising ed., The Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 35a, Quincentenary ed. (London: The 
Soncino Press, 1978), 171.  
 
28 Ibid. See also Goldwurm, Talmud Bavli, Sotah 35a. 
 
29 This teaching, which appears in b. Makhut 23a in another context, also deals with the relative culpability 
of the listener/believer.  
 34 
and possibly the first, not even malicious. Yet the story portrays both of the statements, 
one derogatory and the other laudatory, as lashon ha-ra.  
 To explain how even an innocuous or positive truthful comment about someone 
can be lashon ha-ra, the editors cite a teaching attributed to Rav Dimi, a fourth 
generation Babylonian amora who, according to the literature, traveled extensively in 
Palestine: “A person should never speak about his friend’s good qualities, for this may 
lead to comments about his bad qualities.”30 Again, the assumption is that such 
statements about a friend’s good qualities are true and not malicious. It is their 
unintended consequences (or, in this case, potential consequences) that determine 
whether they are lashon ha-ra.    
  Like the Yerushalmi’s two-part story about bar Chovetz and Yochanon, this 
teaching represents a tradition that sought to expand the concept of lashon ha-ra to 
include remarks that, although apparently benign in their content and/or intent, were 
potentially demeaning or harmful in their effect. However ethically and politically astute 
this view, it does not go unchallenged in the Bavli. In b. Arakhin 15b the editors discuss 
“what constitutes lishna bisha.” They first cite Rava (BA4) speaking in the name of 
Rabbah (BA3), who gives an example: telling someone “there is a fire in so-and-so’s 
house.” Rava seems to be arguing that this innocuous and presumably true statement 
might cause some people to conclude that so-and-so is a glutton because he always has 
food cooking in his home. Or it might cause some people to infer that so-and-so is a 
                                                
30 Rav Dimi’s teaching also appears in b. Arakhin 16a as part of the Bavli’s long discussion about lashon 
ha-ra. It’s not clear if the compliment is forbidden because it might evoke a negative comment from a 
listener or because it might cause the speaker himself to add a negative qualifying comment.  
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wealthy and especially gracious host who can be taken advantage of.31 Rava’s noted 
rival, Abaye (BA4), objects: The speaker is merely stating a neutral fact. How can this be 
lishna bisha?  
 The editors resolve the dispute by modifying Rava’s example. The speaker must 
“produce (verbalize) lishna bisha” by saying, “Where else can one find a fire but in so-
and-so’s house where there is [always] meat and fish.” In other words, a truthful 
statement of fact is lashon ha-ra only when the malicious intent and potentially 
derogatory or harmful content is explicit, or at least can be reasonably inferred.    
 Regardless of what we think about the resolution of this debate, it appears that the 
editors were trying to reconcile traditions that disagreed about the extent to which 
seemingly innocuous remarks qualified as lashon ha-ra. Rava’s opinion represents a 
broader notion of lashon hara that seeks to proscribe speech even if it is not overtly 
negative or malicious. The tradition represented by Abaye resists — or at least finds 
problematic — the idea that these kinds of comments constitute such a serious sin. 
According to this argument, speech should be restricted only if it is clearly 
demeaning/harmful and malicious.32 
 The editors express similar reservations in response to a two-part clause in b. 
Bava Batra 164b immediately following the story about Rabbi and his son. The first 
teaching, attributed to Rav Amram (BA3) in the name of Rav (BA1), contends that there 
are three sins which everyone commits “every day” — having sinful thoughts, failing to 
                                                
31 Goldwurm, Talmud Bavli, Arakhin 15b, notes 58-61. 
 
32 It is also possible that this clause pertains to another of the contested aspects of lashon ha-ra — the 
culpability of the listener/believer. Rava’s position emphasizes the responsibility of the speaker. Abaye’s 
implies that the speaker should not be held responsible for the unintended inferences or actions of the 
listener/believer.  
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pray earnestly and speaking lashon ha-ra. A supporting teaching attributed to Rav 
Yehuda (T3) contends that most people are guilty of thievery, a minority of sexual 
immorality and everyone of lashon ha-ra. The editors are fully aware of what’s at stake 
in such teachings. How can such a terrible sin be universal and ubiquitous, they wonder. 
They conclude that Rav Amram and Rav Yehuda must have been referring not to lashon 
ha-ra but rather to avak lashon ha-ra (literally, the dust of lashon ha-ra).  
 This is the only reference to avak lashon ha-ra in the Bavli. It refers not only to 
the ubiquitous but unidentified speech acts mentioned by Rav Amram and Rav Yehuda 
but also to the routine and benign comments cited in the preceding passage involving 
Rabbi and Rav Dimi. In the view of the Bavli’s editors, speech that is not obviously 
malicious or harmful appears to constitute a less serious sub-category of lashon hara. 
This editorial comment, like the resolution of the debate between Rava and Abaye, 
represents a nod to a tradition that contests the extent to which lashon hara pertains to 
truthful speech, especially innocuous or positive remarks that are not clearly malicious. 
  We can contrast this view with that in y. Peah 1:1.22, which consists of two 
teachings, each beginning with the phrase, “Come and see how kasheh (severe) is avak 
lashon hara (the consequences of lashon hara) that even scripture records divrei badai 
(false words or lies) in order to preserve peace . . .”33  
 The first teaching, attributed to R. Hanina (PA2), is based on Genesis 18:12-13. 
When God informs Sarah that she will have a son, she laughs skeptically, noting that she 
is past her child-bearing years and Abraham is an old man. But in recounting Sarah’s 
                                                
33 Brooks, Yerushalmi Pe’ah, p. 65. He translates the line as: “Come and see how terrible is the dust kicked 
up by an act of slander. For the following verses of scripture must resort to a white lie in order to preserve 
peace. . .”  Slander is problematic here, however, because it connotes a lie while the point of the clause is 
that sometimes one must lie in order to avoid the consequences of telling the whole truth or remaining 
silent.       
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comments during a conversation with Abraham, God omits the fact that she doubted her 
husband’s virility. According to this teaching, God fudged the truth so that Abraham 
would not resent or become angry with his wife. 
 The second teaching, attributed to Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel (T3), cites Genesis 
50: 16-17. After the death of their father, Joseph’s brothers worry that their powerful 
sibling might now be emboldened to take revenge on them. To preserve their 
rapprochement with Joseph, they send a message to him in Egypt claiming — falsely — 
that their father’s dying wish was for him to forgive his brothers.  
 Clearly this clause belongs to the tradition that emphasizes the gravity of lashon 
hara. It also identifies the dire consequence of the offense — the disruption of peaceful 
relations among close companions. But we should take note of a key difference between 
the first teaching and its parallels, none of which use the phrase lashon ha-ra. Instead 
they begin, “Come and see how important it is to bring about peace.”34 Read as an 
intertext to these parallels, Pe’ah 1:1.22 does more than just emphasize the gravity of 
lashon hara and the importance of preserving peaceful relations. In arguing that one must 
lie, or at least withhold the full truth, in order to avoid the dire consequences of lashon 
hara, this clause implies that being false is not an essential element of the offense. Indeed 
the point seems to be that in these cases, telling the whole truth (or remaining silent) 
would have been a terrible sin. Whereas in the Bavli, avak lashon ha-ra is a less serious 
category of sinful speech that encompasses routine or unintentionally harmful remarks, in 
                                                
 
34 Brooks, Yersushalmi  Pe’ah, p. 65, notes 108 and 109. The parallels to the first teaching are in b. Yev. 
65b, b. B.M. 87a, Gen. Rab. 48: 18, Lev. Rab. 9: 9 and Num. Rab. 11: 7. Parallels to the second are in Gen. 
Rab. 100: 8 and Deut. Rab. 5: 15.  
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the Yerushalmi the term signifies speech acts that are so sinful that one must lie or tell 
only a partial truth in order to avoid them.    
 
Public speech or private speech 
 There is another similarity between the two Biblical incidents cited in the 
Mishnah about lashon ha-ra. Numbers 13:26 tells us that the spies made their report not 
just to Moses and Aaron but to “the whole Israelite people” in what was clearly some 
kind of formal gathering. The Mishnah makes an analogy between the incident of the 
spies and the hypothetical case in Deuteronomy 22 of the husband who accuses his wife 
of having not been a virgin when they married. Like the spies, the husband commits his 
sin in a public forum: His accusation is brought before a court, where his wife’s parents 
have an opportunity to present evidence — the stained linens from the marriage bed — 
proving that their daughter was a virgin on her wedding night. In the Mishnah’s view, 
then, lashon ha-ra involves a public speech act — words spoken in an official or public 
setting with the understanding that they will be widely disseminated and discussed. In the 
Bavli, this notion is reflected in the tradition that uses the term shem ra and thereby 
follows the Mishnah in linking lashon ha-ra to the unambiguously false public 
accusations of the husband in Deuteronomy.  
 Another tradition in the Bavli, however, depicts lashon ha-ra as a sin that occurs 
out of public view. It uses Psalms 101:5 as a proof text: “He who speaks evil about his 
neighbor ba-seiter (in secret), him I will cut down.” We have already mentioned, for 
example, three teachings attributed to Rav Chisda (BA3) that emphasize the gravity of 
lashon ha-ra. Two of them cite Psalms 101:5 as a proof text, thereby depicting it as a 
 39 
private or surreptitious sin.35 In b. Ta’anit 7B, a teaching attributed to R. Shimon ben Pazi 
(PA3) uses a different proof text for the same effect. In arguing that rain is withheld 
“only because of those who speak lashon ha-ra,“ it cites Proverbs 25:23: “A north wind 
produces rain, and l’shon sater (a hidden tongue or secret speech) a glowering face.” 
 We can also include in this tradition the teaching in b. Arakhin 15b attributed to 
R. Yochanan (PA2) that identifies tzaraas as the punishment for lashon ha-ra. It does so 
by citing Psalms 101:5 and playing on the words tzaraas and atzmitz (cut down).  It is 
noteworthy that this teaching is followed immediately by another attributed to R. 
Yochanan’s nemesis, Reish Lakish (PA2), which also makes a pun. But as we saw in the 
first section, this pun plays on the words tzaraas and motzi shem ra, the public speech of 
the husband in Deuteronomy. Thus, while both belong to the tradition emphasizing the 
gravity of lashon ha-ra, the teachings attributed by the Bavli to these famous Palestinian 
rivals use puns to stake out competing notions about what the offense entails. The first, 
by citing Pslams 101:5, is part of the ba-seiter tradition that depicts lashon ha-ra as secret 
or private speech. The second belongs to the shem ra tradition that portrays it as public 
speech. 
 Although the shem ra and ba-seiter traditions are absent from the Yerushalmi, the 
examples and descriptions it offers of lashon ha-ra nevertheless vary in regard to whether 
the offense involves public or private speech. The Biblical incidents referenced in y. 
Pe’ah 1:1.25 are unambiguously public speech acts. When Do-eg makes his report to 
Saul, the king is standing on a ridge, spear in hand, “with all his courtiers in attendance 
upon him.” And not only did Achitophel advise “Absalom and the elders of Israel” to 
attack David immediately, his advice, like the spies’ report, was conveyed to “all the 
                                                
35 One of Rav Chisda’s teachings also appears in b. Sotah 5A. 
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people of Israel.” Compare these settings to the one in y. Pe’ah 1:1.23, the passage that 
explains the circumstances under which lashon ha-ra is permissible. The scriptural proof 
text (1 Kings 1: 14-32) indicates not only that the incident occurred in the private setting 
of King David’s bedchamber but that Bathsheba and Nathan made their reports to the 
aging King separately so they would be more effective.36   
 Y. Pe’ah 1:1.21 begins with a teaching attributed to Rabbi Ishmael (T2) that 
equates lashon hara to r’chilut (gossip or tale bearing).37 It depicts lashon ha-ra not as 
words spoken in a public setting or official forum but rather as private, unofficial 
exchanges between individuals. This view is re-enforced by a supporting teaching 
attributed to Rabbi Nehemiah (T3). Making a double pun, it warns against being a rocheil 
(peddler) who “carries devarim (things or words) from this person to that person and 
devarim from that person to this person.” The singular subjects and verbs explicitly 
depict these as private, one-on-one exchanges.  
 As the examples here and in the previous sections indicate, the Yerushalmi 
typically portrays lashon ha-ra as one person speaking to another about a third person (or 
persons). Sometimes these exchanges occur in a public setting, sometimes in private. The 
question we must consider is how significant the public/private distinctions were to 
Palestinian rabbis. While we can’t go so far as to conclude that they were merely 
incidental — as I have noted, many of the shem ra and ba-seiter teachings found in the 
Bavli are attributed to Palestinian sources — it does seem justified to conclude that the 
public/private issue was less important to the editors of Yerushalmi than to the editors of 
                                                
36 Abishag, David’s Shunammite concubine, was attending him, but this hardly qualifies the remarks as 
public. 
 
37 The proof text is Levitcus. 19: 16: “Do not walk around rachil (gossiping or tale bearing) among your 
people.” 
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the Bavli. The former never specifically address it while the latter not only juxtapose the 
shem ra and ba-seiter traditions, they attempt to resolve the tension between them just as 
they do the conflict regarding the gravity of lashon ha-ra.  
 Immediately after the clause in b. Arakhin 16a that reconciles the contradiction 
about whether tzaraas or the priestly garb atones for lashon ha-ra, the redactors of the 
Bavli raise another difficulty. They cite a pair of baraitas that argue that the burning of 
incense by the high priest atones for lashon ha-ra. One of them, attributed to the academy 
of R. Yishmael (T3), reasons: “Let something offered ba-chashai (in secret or private) 
atone for a sin that is committed ba-chashai.”38 The problem, of course, is that we have 
just learned that the priestly garb atones for lashon ha-ra. The editors reconcile this 
contradiction by explaining that the burning of incense by the high priest in the seclusion 
of the holy of holies atones for lashon ha-ra spoken b’tzinah (eastern Aramaic: in 
private) while the priestly garb atones for lashon ha-ra spoken b’parhesia (eastern 
Aramaic: in public). In doing so, they confirm the existence of competing notions about 
whether lashon ha-ra pertains to public or private speech.  
 We should also note that lashon ha-ra b’zinah has a different meaning here than 
its western Aramaic equivalent does in the Yersuhalmi. The Bavli’s editors use the term 
to distinguish sinful words spoken in private or secret from those spoken in public. On 
the other hand, the remark in y. Pe’ah 1:1.24 described as lashon ha-ra b’hatznei’a 
occurs in a public setting and is heard by many people. The Yerushalmi uses the term to 
denote a public speech act in which the speaker’s malicious intent, the harmful content of 
his remarks or both are private in the sense that they are not explicit.         
                                                
38 These two baraitas also appear word for word in b. Yoma 44a during a discussion about the procedures 
for the burning of the incense and its atoning power. 
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The culpability of the listener/believer 
  Thus far we have looked at similarities between the two Biblical incidents 
referred to in the Mishnah dealing with lashon ha-ra. Now I would like to consider an 
important difference. The sin of the husband in Deuteronomy involves speaking while the 
sin of the Israelites involves listening and believing. On an ethical level, one might 
consider this an astute observation about the relationship between the speaker and the 
listener/believer. A person cannot be persuaded to believe something derogatory or 
harmful about another unless it is first expressed. And harmful words spoken about 
another will not be effective unless someone listens to and believes them. Because it 
focuses on the punishment of the people rather than the spies, the Mishnah appears to 
emphasize the culpability of those who, as the rabbis typically put it, m’kabeil (accept or 
receive) lashon ha-ra.39  
 A number of passages in the Talmuds acknowledge the role of listener/believer in 
the sin of lashon ha-ra. The brief description of lashon ha-ra in the teaching attributed to 
R. Yochanan (PA2) that introduces y. Pe’ah 1:1.24  — “speaking so that another knows” 
— recognizes the roles of the speaker and the listener. So too does the aforementioned 
teaching attributed to Yochanan in b. Sotah 35a — lashon ha-ra which does not begin 
with an element of truth will not endure in the end. The same idea is implicit in the ruling 
by the editors of the Bavli that tzaraas atones for lashon hara that is effective — that is, 
believed by someone — while the priestly garments atone for lashon ha-ra that is 
                                                
39 The Hebrew word with the root kuf-bet-lamed is usually translated as “receive” or “accept” and implies 
some agency on the part of the person who hears lashon ha-ra. Obviously this includes believing it. In 
some cases it might also include listening to lashon ha-ra, in the sense of considering it. For this reason I 
refer to the listener/believer.  
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ineffective. Still, these teachings do not follow the Mishnah in explicitly imputing 
culpability to the listener/believer.  
 There is, however, a Talmudic tradition that does. In arguing that anyone who 
speaks or accepts lashon ha-ra should be thrown to the dogs, the teaching in b. Pesachim 
118a attributed to Rav Sheishet (PA3) implies that the speaker and listener/believer are 
equally complicit in the sin. Similarly, an un-attributed teaching in y. Pe’ah 1:1.26 
explains why lashon ha-ra is called “the three-[pronged weapon]” — because it kills not 
just the speaker and the person who is spoken about, but also the one who accepts it.40 
Here again the speaker and listener/believer seem to be equally complicit in that they 
share the same fate. Also part of the tradition emphasizing the culpability of the 
listener/believer are the aforementioned teachings that cite the dire consequences of King 
David’s acceptance of lashon ha-ra and the beneficial consequences of King Jeroboam’s 
refusal to do so.41 It is noteworthy that only one of these four teachings has a Babylonian 
source — and that source, Rav (BA1), is said to have spent years training in Palestine. 
We should not think of this tradition as opposing the view that speaking lashon ha-ra is a 
sin. Rather, it represents an expansive notion of lashon ha-ra that extends culpability to 
the listener/believer as well as the speaker.  
 There is a counter-tradition, however, that finds this view problematic. 
Significantly, it appears only in the Bavli, although some of the sources are Palestinian. A 
lengthy clause in b. Shabbat 56a-b, for example, discusses an incident in 2 Samuel 16 in 
which King David, who has fled Jerusalem during the rebellion of his son Absalom, is 
                                                
40 As noted above, a parallel attributed to unnamed Palestinian sources appears in b. Arakhin 15b. 
 
41 The first, in Shabbat 56b, is attributed to Rav Yehuda (BA2) in the name of Rav (BA1). The second, in 
Pesachim 87b, is attributed to R. Yochanan (PA2).  
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approached by the servant of Saul’s grandson, Mephiboshet. When David asks about 
Mephiboshet, the servant responds that his master remains in Jerusalem in anticipation of 
being restored to his grandfather’s throne. The implication is that Mephiboshet is disloyal 
to David, or at least eager to see him deposed. 
 A ruling attributed to Rav (BA1) argues that David’s response to the servant — 
“everything that belongs to Mephiboshet now belongs to you” — proves that he believed 
this derogatory report and was, therefore, guilty of accepting lashon ha-ra. But that view 
is disputed in a teaching attributed to Samuel (BA1), who argues that David did not 
violate the prohibition against lashon ha-ra because he had previously observed  
“recognizable signs” — that is, independent evidence — of Mephiboshet’s disloyalty.42  
  The key to understanding this discussion is that the anonymous editors are 
unambiguous in portraying Mephiboshet as a bad character who was disloyal not just to 
David but also to God. In other words, they leave no doubt that the servant’s report was 
true. The issue at stake, then, is whether believing such a truthful derogatory report is 
sinful. (In this respect, it also has implications for the issue of whether lashon ha-ra 
pertains to truthful speech.) Rav’s teaching that David accepted lashon ha-ra represents a 
strict view of the listener/believer’s culpability in that it characterizes accepting a 
negative report as lashon ha-ra regardless of the circumstances. Samuel’s teaching that 
David did not accept lashon ha-ra mitigates the listener’s culpability by taking into 
account factors such as independent evidence and the trustworthiness of the speaker. 
 Here we should recall the disagreement in b. Arakhin 15b between Rava and 
Abaye (both BA4) about whether an innocuous true statement — “There is a fire in so-
                                                
42 According to this view, David’s independent knowledge was confirmed when he returned to Jerusalem. 
Instead of joyfully welcoming the king’s return, Mephiboshet appeared before him looking unkempt and 
then became disrespectful upon hearing that the king had given way his property. 
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and-so’s house” — constitutes lashon ha-ra. Like the dispute in b. Shabbat 56 a-b, this 
one juxtaposes expansive and narrow notions of lashon ha-ra, only here they are 
presented in respect to the speaker. In describing a neutral statement of fact as lashon ha-
ra, the teaching attributed to Rava emphasizes the speaker’s responsibility for the bad 
effects of even innocuous true statements. The teaching attributed to Abaye, however, 
seeks to mitigate the speaker’s responsibility by arguing that other factors — intent, 
content and facticity — must be considered. 
 The most explicit effort to mitigate the sin of the listener/believer is in b. Niddah 
61a, which includes a baraita that mentions “the pit into which Ishmael threw all the 
bodies of those he killed b’yad (through) Gedaliah.” The reference is to Jeremiah 41: 9, 
the story of Gedaliah ben Achikam, who was appointed by King Nebuchadnezzar to 
govern the Jews who remained in the Holy Land after the destruction of the first Temple. 
Gedaliah refused to believe a warning from Yochanon ben Kareiach that Ishmael ben 
Netaniah intended to assassinate him. Subsequently Ishmael killed Gedaliah and more 
than 100 others, and then threw their bodies into a large pit. 
 The Bavli’s editors wonder: Why does scripture blame Gedaliah for the mass 
murder? Answering their own question, they explain: “Since he should have heeded 
Yochanon (ben Kareiach’s) advice but did not, it is as though he killed them.” 
Furthermore, they note, this incident supports a teaching by Rava (BA4): “Lishna bisha 
— although one should not accept it, one should be mindful of it.” This teaching 
distinguishes between believing that a negative report is true and suspecting that it might 
be.  
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 The editors then relate an un-attributed story that traces this principle back to an 
important tanna, R. Tarfon. When a group of reputed murderers comes to Tarfon and ask 
that he hide them from authorities, the rabbi faces a dilemma. If he believes the reports 
that these Jews are murderers and doesn’t hide them, then authorities might find and 
execute them. But if he refuses to believe the reports and hides them, then he might be 
committing the sin of protecting murderers. (In the process, he also might open himself 
and others up to government charges that they abetted criminals.) Citing the same 
principle later taught by Rava, Tarfon opts to suspect that the reports are true and tells the 
men to hide themselves.  
 Of course, the distinction between believing and merely suspecting is open to 
debate — and has been the subject of much rabbinic commentary. Regardless of where 
the line is drawn, however, this passage represents a tradition that contends that one may, 
at least under certain circumstances, listen to and act on derogatory information about 
fellow Jews. By doing so, it mitigates the culpability of the listener/believer.
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CHAPTER II 
 
RABBINIC NOTIONS OF LASHON HA-RA 
 IN SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
Competing ideological motivations 
 I begin this chapter by examining the contested notions of lashon ha-ra discussed 
above in the context of two competing ideological motivations among the early rabbis. 
The first was their desire to repudiate sectarian rhetoric, which they associated with the 
Great Revolt of 66 CE and the ensuing Roman persecutions. The second was their desire 
to establish a stable Jewish identity in a post-Temple world in which Jewish identity was 
highly variable and uncertain.   
 We should be careful not to overstate the extent of Jewish sectarianism at the end 
of the Second-Temple era. As others have observed, Josephus is our primary source on 
the subject, and his assessment is ambiguous. In Jewish Antiquities he emphasizes the 
differences and animus among various Jewish sects before and during the Great Revolt. 
In Against Apion, however, he writes of the “remarkable unity” of Jewish society, 
describing it as having “perfect uniformity in habits and customs.” Although the latter is 
an apologetic that no doubt exaggerates Jewish conformity and solidarity, it indicates that 
Jews retained a sense of solidarity even in the face of the sectarian rivalries described in 
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the former.1 To the extent that this was true, it was likely due to the fact that as much as 
95 percent of the Jewish population of Palestine was not affiliated with a sect.2  
 Still, because the sects were comprised mainly of Jewish society’s religious and 
political elite, their influence far exceeded their numbers, and sectarianism “set the tone 
of Jewish life as a whole” in the period leading up to the war with Rome.3 The Great 
Revolt cannot be explained simply in terms of a persistent Jewish longing for 
independence aggravated by Roman oppression. Beginning in 63 BCE, when Pompey’s 
army marched into Jerusalem and ended the monarchy in response to a Jewish civil war, 
Rome’s increasing intrusion into Palestinian affairs over the next century was to a great 
extent the result of social and political unrest incubated in an atmosphere of Jewish 
sectarianism. The rebellion of 66 CE was at times as much a war among Jews as a war 
between Jews and Romans.  
 One characteristic of late Second Temple-era sectarianism was what Luke 
Johnson calls the hellenistic rhetoric of slander. Adherents of rival philosophical 
traditions employed “stereotyped polemics” to identify their opponents and stake out 
truth claims. These invectives were intended not so much to present facts as to establish 
boundaries between Us and Them — those who advocated the correct way of thinking 
and living and those who advocated incorrect ways. Many Jews perceived Judaism as a 
philosophy in this sense, arguing not just with non-Jews but also among themselves about 
                                                
1 Daniel Boyarin, Borderlines (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 53. The direct quotes 
from Josephus are his translations. 
 
2 Albert L. Baumgarten, “Ancient Jewish Sectarianism,” Judaism 47, no. 4 (1998): 387. 
 
3 Ibid. 
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its nature, values and worth. So it is not surprising that in promoting and defending their 
ideas about Judaism, Jews engaged in the rhetoric of slander.4  
  Philo, Josephus and the author of the Book of Wisdom (of Solomon) were among 
the Hellenized diaspora Jews who employed it against both gentiles and other Jews.5 And 
while textual material is scarce, we also have evidence of such rhetoric within the Jewish 
society of Palestine. In the sectarian documents found at Qumran, for example, “the rule 
of thumb is that you cannot say enough bad things about outsiders.”6 The so-called 
Community Rule (1QS) refers to other Jews as “men of the lot of Satan” whose lives are 
marked by “greed and slackness . . . wickedness and lies, haughtiness and pride, falseness 
and deceit, cruelty and abundant evil . . .” The Qumran War Scroll (1QM) describes these 
wicked Jews as “the ungodly of the covenant” and counts them among the forces of evil 
— the Sons of Darkness — with whom their righteous community will do battle in the 
imminent apocalypse.7   
 There is also evidence of the rhetoric of slander among Jews in the New 
Testament disputes between Jesus and his followers and their adversaries. In John’s 
account of the great controversy in Jerusalem during the Feast of Tabernacles, for 
example, Jesus the Essene rebuts the Pharisees’ claim that they are the descendants of 
Abraham, saying, “Your father is the devil and you choose to carry out your father’s 
                                                
4 Luke T. Johnson, “The New Testament’s Anti-Jewish Slander and the Conventions of Ancient Polemic,” 
Journal of Biblical Literature, 108, no. 3 (1989): 429-430 and 434.  
 
5 Ibid., 434-437. As Johnson observes, Josephus castigates Justus of Tiberias, a Jew who reviewed Jewish 
Wars, as “a charlatan, a demagogue and a deceiver.” He also describes the Sicarii, a murderous Jewish sect, 
as “impostors and brigands . . . slaves, the dregs of society, and the bastard scum of the nation,” and he 
refers to the Zealots, another Jewish sect, as “iron-hearted men” who were “blinded by fate” and would 
inevitably suffer divine punishment for profaning the Temple.   
 
6 Ibid., 439. 
 
7 Ibid., 439-440. The translations are Johnson’s.  
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desires. He was a murderer from the beginning and is not rooted in the truth.” In 
response, the Pharisees mock Jesus, saying, “Are we not right in saying that you are a 
Samaritan; and that you are possessed.”8 
 Whether this exchange actually occurred is beside the point. The account is 
important for what it tells us about Jewish sectarian rhetoric in the first century. Those 
hearing or reading it are not likely to have thought that Jesus really believed the Pharisees 
were Satan’s offspring or that the Pharisees really believed this trouble-making Essene 
was a demonic Samaritan. (They had, in fact, just acknowledged that he was a Galilean.) 
Instead, this is an example of  “the time-honored practice of name-calling.”9 The 
invectives that Jesus and his antagonists hurl at one another are tropes intended to 
marginalize or exclude their Jewish opponents as deviant and aligned with evil.  
 A well-known story in b. Gittin 55b-56a provides insight into how some rabbis 
viewed sectarianism and the rhetoric associated with it. The story purports to explain how 
the destruction of the Second Temple came about  “as a result of a Kamza and a bar 
Kamza.” The former is a friend of a prominent Jerusalemite and the latter his enemy. The 
man plans a party to which his servant mistakenly invites bar Kamza instead of Kamza. 
Upon seeing his enemy at the party, the host becomes incensed, accuses him of “telling 
tales about me” and orders him to leave. Desperate to avoid the shame of being evicted 
from the party, bar Kamza offers to pay first for what he eats and drinks, then for half the 
party, then for the entire party. Each time the host refuses and finally “takes him by the 
hand and throws him out.”  
                                                
8 John 8: 44-48, from Donald Ebor, ed., The New English Bible (New York: Oxford University Press 1971). 
 
9 Adele Reinhartz, “The Gospel of John: How ‘the Jews’ Became Part of the Plot,” in Jesus, Judaism and 
Christian Anti-Judaism: Reading the New Testament after the Holocaust, eds. Paula Fredriksen and Adele 
Reinhartz (Louisville and London: Westminister John Knox Press, 2002), 108. 
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 Assuming that those who witnessed this affront without intervening are on the 
side of his enemy, the humiliated bar Kamza decides to “inform on them.” He tells 
Roman authorities that the Jews of Jerusalem are plotting a rebellion and suggests that the 
government test their loyalty by sending them a calf to be sacrificed in honor of the 
emperor. They select a healthy calf, but bar Kamza secretly blemishes it, making it 
unsuitable for sacrifice. At the Temple, some Jewish leaders want to sacrifice the calf 
anyway to preserve good relations with Rome, but R. Zechariah ben Avkolus objects 
because doing so would amount to an official sanction of improper sacrifices. Using 
similar reasoning, he also vetoes a proposal to kill bar Kamza. The blemished calf is 
refused, and the Great Revolt ensues. Thus, concludes R. Yochanan (PA2), to whom the 
story is attributed, “The anvetanuto of R. Zechariah ben Avkolus destroyed our temple, 
burned our sanctuary and exiled us from our land.”10 
 Anvetanuto is problematic in this context. The story seems to criticize R. 
Zechariah for exhibiting a legal punctiliousness that is blind to the crisis at hand. But as 
Richard Kalmin points out, such a reading contradicts the usual meaning of anvetanuto in 
early rabbinic literature, where it typically is translated as humility, modesty, patience or 
forbearance.11  
 A parallel in Lamentations Rabbah 3:4 includes several important differences that 
help clear up the problem.12 First, the parallel takes notice that “R. Zechariah was there (at 
                                                
10 Though no doubt apocryphal, the story of Kamza and bar Kamza might be loosely based on actual 
events. According to Josephus, the revolt against Rome began when the temple priests refused a sacrifice to 
the emperor. 
  
11 Richard Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia between Persia and Roman Palestine (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 43-50. 
   
12 I am using Paul Mandel’s translation of a version found in the Cairo Genizah. It is free of additions and 
corruptions based on the Bavli that appear in most printed editions of Lamentations Rabbah. In this version, 
 52 
the party). He could have protested [bar Kamzora’s treatment] but didn’t.” Second, bar 
Kamzora’s first act when he comes before the Roman ruler is to accuse the temple priests 
of eating the sacrifices he sends them instead of offering them on the altar. The ruler 
rebukes him, saying, “You say mila bisha (Aramaic: an evil thing) about them because 
you want to create a shem bish (Aramaic: bad name) for them.”13 Finally, in the scene at 
the temple, no one suggests killing bar Kamzora. The only dispute is whether to sacrifice 
the blemished calf, and it is an unnamed priest, not R. Zechariah, who forbids it. The 
story concludes: “Therefore, people say the temple was destroyed on account of [bar] 
Kamza and [bar] Kamzora. Said R. Yose bar R. Abun (PA5), ‘The anvetanuto of R. 
Zechariah bar Avkolus burned the temple.’”  
 This version explicitly portrays bar Kamzora as trying to slander other Jews. 
What’s more, the government official’s assumption that bar Kamzora has come before 
him to denigrate his Jewish enemies implies that such behavior is routine. In this context, 
where the only mention of R. Zechariah before the final line is the pointed criticism of his 
silence at the party, the reference to his anvetanuto makes more sense: He was too timid 
or fearful of offending the host to protest bar Kamzora’s public humiliation. Thus some 
translations have suggested that anvetanuto be read as “lack of self-confidence or “desire 
to please others.”14  
                                                                                                                                            
the man’s friend is bar Kamza and his enemy is bar Kamzora. See Paul Mandel, “The Loss of Center: 
Changing Attitudes Towards the Temple in Aggadic Literature,” Harvard Theological Review 99, no. 1 
(January, 2006): 26.  
  
13 Mandel, “The Loss of Center,” p. 29. Mila bisha appears to signify an untrue statement intended to 
embarrass or insult. Thus the ruler rebukes bar Kamzora for trying to slander his fellow Jews, using the 
Aramaic equivalent of motzi shem ra.  
 
14 Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia between Persia and Roman Palestine, 45. See also Mandel, “The Loss of 
Center,” 27, where it is translated as “timidity.” As Kalmin notes, however, even these translations are not 
 53 
 Mandel argues that the references to R. Zechariah are later additions to an original 
Palestinian version, now lost, in which he is absent.15 Even if he is correct, the story still 
reads as a criticism of sectarianism and sectarian rhetoric at the time of the Great Revolt: 
Upper class Jewish society was so divided that a host could love one man while loathing 
his namesake. (Interestingly, this sectarianism makes no sense to the servant, the one 
common Jew in this story. He is unable to distinguish friend from foe.) The destructive 
discourse among the Jewish elite — which included public humiliation, slander and 
informing on one another — brought down the wrath of Rome upon Jerusalem and the 
Jewish people. In some versions of this story, there appears to be pointed criticism of 
religious leaders who timidly acquiesced to this discourse instead of condemning it. 
 There is further textual evidence that some early rabbis understood the kind of 
rhetoric referenced in the story of Kamza and bar Kamza to be lashon ha-ra. A teaching 
in b. Yoma 9b contends that the Second Temple was destroyed on account of sinat 
chinam (baseless hatred). The passage concludes that because the First Temple was 
destroyed on account of the three cardinal sins (idolatry, sexual sin and murder), sinat 
chinam is equal to all of them combined. We have already identified teachings in both the 
Yerushalmi and the Bavli that make the same claim about lashon ha-ra. This indicates 
                                                                                                                                            
without their difficulties. In virtually all its other uses in rabbinic literature, aventanuto carries a positive 
connotation, not a negative one as it seems to here. 
  
15 Mandel, “The Loss of Center,” p. 28. He notes that the reference to R. Zechariah being at the party is the 
only Hebrew line in an otherwise Aramaic text, and that the final line attributed to R. Yose about 
Zechariah’s anvetanuto is taken verbatim from an unrelated halakhic midrash in the Tosefta (t. Shabbat 17: 
6). He concludes that a later Palestinian redactor added this line at the end of the aggadic midrash about the 
Temple’s destruction and, so that this addition would make sense, incorporated R. Zechariah into the story 
by having him attend the party at which bar Kamzora is humiliated. In the Bavli’s version, R. Zechariah 
remains part of the story but only as the official who forbids the sacrifice and the murder of bar Kamza. 
Kalmin contends this is evidence of how the Bavli rabbinizes its sources more than Palestinian texts, even 
to the extent of portraying rabbis as flawed if not villainous. Regardless, this does not diminish my 
argument that one of the story’s themes is a condemnation of sectarianism and the rhetoric associated with 
it.    
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the existence of a tradition that associated lashon ha-ra with sinat chinam and connected 
them to the destruction of the Second Temple.16 In the context of this tradition, one can 
read the tale of Kamza and bar Kamza as a dramatization of how sinat chinam and lashon 
ha-ra — sectarian hatred and the divisive rhetoric associated with it — led to the 
destruction of the Jerusalem.  
 The repudiation of the sectarian rhetoric of slander no doubt served ideological 
ends in that it was a rejection of the hellenistic mode of social discourse in favor one that 
was uniquely Jewish. It also can be understood as a pragmatic political response to the 
role such rhetoric had played in the tumultuous first century events that culminated in the 
loss of Jewish independence and exile. The bar Kochba rebellion (132-135 CE), which 
resulted in even greater destruction and persecution, would have reinforced the negative 
perception of sectarianism and its rhetoric.17  
   The association of sectarian rhetoric with disunity, social instability and political 
oppression accounts for specific Talmudic depictions of those who speak lashon ha-ra as 
disrupting peaceful relations, betraying or informing on others, or speaking about 
someone in a way that comprises his position with an authority figure. It also helps 
explain notions of lashon ha-ra that I have characterized as expansive — the traditions 
                                                
16 A number of latter rabbinic commentaries make the same connection, including Sefer Chafetz Chaim. A 
passage in b. Yoma 9b is even more explicit in associating destructive rhetoric with sinat chinam. Referring 
to the presence of sinat chinam during the First-Temple period, a teaching attributed to R. Eleazer (T2) 
says, “This refers to those who eat and drink together and then stab each other with the daggers of their 
tongues.” 
     
17 The revolt led by the messianic figure bar Kochba did more than sharpen the theological divide between 
Jews who considered Jesus the messiah and those who didn’t. It was a time of heightened sectarian 
divisions among Jews in general. The letters of bar Kochba discovered in the 1960s indicate that he was an 
autocratic leader whose war of redemption was rejected by many Jews and who sometimes had to threaten 
putative allies into carrying out his orders. Talmudic passages that criticize the otherwise venerated R. 
Akiva for proclaiming bar Kochba the messiah indicate that the rabbis were bitterly divided in their 
assessment of this messianic figure. 
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that emphasize its gravity and the culpability of the listener/believer, or that portray it not 
just as slander but as any speech, even seemingly innocuous truthful speech, that 
demeans or harms another Jew.   
 Such notions of lashon ha-ra conform to what Shaye Cohen describes as some 
early rabbis’ vision of a plural Jewish society “which tolerates disputes without 
producing sects,” one in which “the dominant ethic is not exclusivity but elasticity.”18 In 
contrast to the hellenistic rhetoric of slander, the strict prohibition of lashon ha-ra 
reflected a preference for a mode of social discourse in which disagreement and 
difference did not signify categorical separation. Or as Kimelman might put it, emphasis 
on the prohibition against lashon ha-ra reflects a willingness to accept difference and 
autonomy as the necessary cost of preserving the unity and stability of klal yisrael.19       
 Regardless of how strong this pluralistic impulse may have been, however, we 
shouldn’t assume that it went unchallenged or even that it always predominated among 
the early rabbis. Jewish identity was especially uncertain during late antiquity,20 more so 
after the destruction of the Temple, the center of Jewish practice and authority. Even the 
boundaries of the rabbinic movement itself were amorphous. We know from epigraphic 
evidence that, in addition to the sages whose texts we read today, there were other 
religious teachers who were called “rabbis” by their Jewish students and adherents but 
                                                
18 Shaye Cohen, “The Significance of Yavneh: Pharisees, Rabbis and the End of Jewish Sectarianism,” 
Accessed Aug. 31, 2011 at the Center for Online Judaic Studies.  
http://cojs.org/cojswiki/The_Significance_of_Yavneh:_Pharisees,_Rabbis,_and_the_End_of_Jewish_Sectar
ianism,_Shaye_J.D._Cohen,_Hebrew_Union_College_Annual_55. Originally published in the Hebrew 
Union College Annual 55 (Cincinnati: HUC Press, 1984). 
  
19 Kimelman, “Judaism and Pluralism,” 131. 
 
20 Shaye Cohen, The Beginnings of Judaism: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties, Berkeley (Los Angeles 
and London: University of California Press, 1999), 1-10. He says that Jewish identity was elusive for two 
reasons: There was no single definition of “Jew” in late antiquity, and there were few empirical or objective 
criteria by which to determine who was a Jew.  
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who likely were more accepting of Greco-Roman culture.21 A major enterprise of the 
early literary rabbis was to reduce variations of belief and practice — to sharpen the 
boundary between Us and Them 22 — in order to bring more certainty to Jewish 
collective identity and their own movement. To some extent this meant rejecting certain 
beliefs and practices along with those who advocated them.  
 Consider, for example, the rabbinic attitude toward Jesus and his followers. Peter 
Schäfer contends that rabbinic texts dating well into the third century treat Jesus 
followers as a deviant Jewish sect and reveal a “well-designed attack against what the 
rabbis experienced as the reality of the Jewish-Christian message.”23 Daniel Boyarin 
argues that rabbinic Judaism “constituted itself and its authority vis-à-vis other forms of 
late antique Judaism in part by defining itself over and against early Christianity. This 
suggests the rabbis were reading Christianity as a Jewish heresy, and thus a part of 
Judaism, until well into late antiquity.”24 This does not mean that all or even most 
Christians saw themselves as a Jewish sect, only that some rabbis did.  
 We can get an idea of how some rabbis spoke about this sect from brief excerpts 
from two contemporaneous texts, one rabbinic and the other Christian. The first is a 
                                                
21 Hezser, Social Structure, 121-122. She argues that the figures in early rabbinic literature were not an 
exclusive group but rather a “sub-set of rabbis whose statements and stories were chosen by editors of the 
respective documents.” While we know little about the other rabbis who lost out to the literary rabbis, it is 
likely they were more open toward certain aspects of Greco-Roman culture. See also Hezser, Social 
Structure, 488-489 where she contends that there were no clear boundaries between the rabbis on the one 
hand and Jewish scribes, priests and judges on the other. The literary rabbis emphasized the importance of 
Torah scholarship in order to distinguish themselves as superior to these rivals, who may have been those 
often referred to as unlearned. 
 
22 Cohen, The Beginnings of Judaism, 341-344. 
 
23 Peter Schäfer, Jesus in the Talmud, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 48. 
 
24 Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism (Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 25. Two pages earlier, he argues that some rabbis viewed Jesus followers 
as a “deviant Judaism” and that the slow separation of rabbinic Judaism and Christianity was not complete 
until the sixth century.  
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baraita in b. Sanhedrin 43a that dates to the late second or early third century. This 
Palestinian text refers to the death of “Yeshu,” who “practiced sorcery, seduced Israel 
and led them away from God.” About Yeshu, the baraita says, “nothing favorable could 
be found.”25 The other text is by Tertullian, who wrote it in the late second century. In it 
he anticipates Jesus’s return and imagines himself mocking those who slandered the 
messiah and now face eternal damnation: “This is your carpenter’s son, your harlot’s son, 
your Sabbath-breaker, your Samaritan, your demon-possessed,” he gloats.26   
 The rabbinic text portrays Yeshu much like the bad kings in the Tanakh (Hebrew 
Bible) — an insider who causes the people to stray. To at least some rabbis, then, this 
was an internal dispute over a common scripture and tradition. More important, these 
texts indicate that the rabbis were not shy about using rhetoric that branded their Jewish 
religious rivals as deviants. Tertullian appears to list epithets typically used to de-
legitimize Jesus and his followers.   
 To use Kimelman’s terms, such texts indicate that there was a strong counter 
tendency among the rabbis to reject difference and enforce uniformity within klal 
yisrael.27 This tendency resulted in a greater willingness to employ the kind of speech 
                                                
25 Schäfer, Jesus in the Talmud, 1-14. Some scholars contend that Yeshu and similar characters in the 
rabbinic texts do not refer to Jesus of Nazareth because the details of their lives do not conform to those of 
the figure in the New Testament. One Talmudic account, for instance, describes Yeshu as a Jew with 
connections to Roman officials who was arrested for inciting others to renounce Judaism and then stoned to 
death on Passover eve along with five disciples. Even if this character and others do represent Jesus, the 
discrepancies with New Testament accounts indicate that the rabbis didn’t know much about Jesus and his 
followers and weren’t concerned about them. Schäfer argues persuasively, however, that such discrepancies 
are part of a deliberate rabbinic counter-narrative indicating just the opposite — a thorough knowledge of 
and ferocious polemical response to the foundational Christian story and theology. Furthermore, the rabbis’ 
polemic was not just against Jesus but his followers as well. This response is muted in the Yerushalmi 
because at the time of its redaction, Christians had gained political power in Palestine.. 
     
26 Tertullian, De Spectaculis, 100.30. 
 
27 Kimelman, “Judaism and Pluralism,” 131-135. He notes that the Mishnah and the Tosefta give very 
different portrayals of the competition between the houses of Hillel and Shammai. The latter describes the 
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that excised or marginalized Jews who did not conform to the literary rabbis’ ideas about 
Jewish belief and practice. It helps account for notions of lashon ha-ra that we might 
characterize as less restrictive — the traditions that undercut its gravity, that insist that it 
involves lying or patently malicious speech (or at least question the extent to which it 
pertains to truthful or innocuous speech), or that mitigate the culpability of the 
listener/believer.  
  
Social dynamics 
In addition to conflicting political and ideological concerns, I want to consider 
how social dynamics help explain the contested notions of lashon ha-ra among the early 
rabbis. Hezser describes the early rabbinic movement in Palestine as a small, loosely 
connected network of personal alliances characterized by “regulated conflicts” among 
individual rabbis or small groups of rabbis. Because this social network had no 
independent institutions or formal hierarchies that conferred authority, rabbis generally 
gained status and wielded influence through kinship relations as well as their personal 
charisma, knowledge and intelligence, including their ability to persuade through social 
discourse. Their authority also tended to be highly localized.28  
 This social structure inhibited the centralization of power and instead fostered the 
independence and free-lance authority of individuals and small groups. Thus, we find 
rabbinic teachings like y. Shab. 19.1.16, which advises the person who doesn’t like one 
                                                                                                                                            
rivalry as vigorous but respectful while the Mishnah portrays it as having erupted into violent conflict. 
These two sources indicate that tolerance of difference was variable among the early Palestinian rabbis.  
   
28 Hezser, Social Structure, 155-156, 252-253 and 455 ff. See also Richard Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors 
and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia, Brown Judaic Studies No. 300 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994), 15. He 
describes the Babylonian rabbinic movement as similarly “diverse” and “decentralized” and lacking 
institutional structure.   
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rabbi’s ruling to consult another.29 A concept like lashon ha-ra would have helped 
preserve solidarity within a social network in which authority was so widely dispersed.  
  But we should also consider what countervailing social forces were at work. First, 
while authority may have been dispersed within the rabbinic movement, it would not 
have been evenly dispersed. Even in social networks without hierarchies and institutions, 
individuals and groups at the center have more links to others in the group than those at 
the periphery, which generally translates into greater influence and power.30 Second, 
some rabbis achieved status and influence not through kinship relations and personal 
charisma but on the basis of their class, wealth and connections to non-rabbinic 
institutions. These factors would have tended to concentrate power rather than disperse it, 
or at least to create power differentials that could be exploited.31 Finally, the stakes 
involved in rabbinic power and power differentials would likely have been magnified as 
the movement’s influence in Jewish society grew during the Mishnaic-Talmudic period.32   
                                                
29 Hezser, Social Structure, 359.  
 
30 Ibid., 239. See also John-Paul Hatala, “Social Network Analysis in Human Resource Development: A 
New Methodology,” Human Resource Development Review 5, no. 1 (2006): 52.  
 
31 Hezser, Social Structure, 406-417. She argues, for instance, that there was no patriarchy in the sense of 
an official position recognized by all or most Palestinian rabbis. Judah ha-Nasi, often cited as the first 
patriarch, was in all likelihood merely a wealthy, knowledgeable and charismatic rabbi of high social 
status. Respect for him probably was wide but not universal or official. And while there may have been 
other rabbis who were similarly influential, efforts to reconstruct an unbroken line of succession are 
speculative at best, indicating that the rabbinic tradition of an official patriarchal office and dynasty is an 
idealization. 
 
32 This point does not require that we accept an idealized view of rabbinic hegemony, only that we believe 
that the movement, which began on the margins of Jewish society, became increasingly visible and 
influential during the Talmudic period. The texts provide some evidence for this. See Hezser, Social 
Structure, 394-395. She notes that both Talmuds contain more stories about groups approaching rabbis than 
the Mishnah. Such stories “give the impression of growing rabbinic authority in amoraic time.” In addition, 
while tannaitic texts idealize rabbinic authority as having been widely accepted, amoraic texts include 
many stories in which rabbis are insulted or their opinions are portrayed as unpopular. That amoraim were 
confident enough to give a more realistic picture of rabbinic interaction with non-rabbis is “likely to reflect 
something of a real change” in their activity and influence within the larger Jewish society.  
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 Here I would like to consider Naomi Janowitz’s study of the min in early rabbinic 
literature. The term is commonly translated as “heretic,” but Janowitz notes that the 
rabbis apply it to such a wide variety of characters and for such a wide variety of 
behavior and beliefs that the min has no discernible identity. It is “little more than a foil 
against whom the rabbi can then pose himself as something else.” This indicates that for 
the early rabbis, the epithet had as much to do with establishing and aggregating status 
and power as with creating and defending specific ideas and practices. In the min “we see 
not the presenting of a fixed doctrine, but the indexing of the rabbi as the one in 
charge.”33      
 For my purposes, Janowitz makes two important points. First, min is used in 
rabbinic literature to describe other rabbis as well as non-rabbis. Thus, to the extent that 
the epithet was a tool for aggregating power, rabbis employed it among themselves as 
well as against non-rabbinic Jews. Second, the language used to denounce minim in the 
rabbinic texts “is some of the strongest available, calling their books magic and 
questioning the parentage of their children.”34  
 The fact that some rabbis were willing to use demeaning rhetoric to marginalize 
opponents and aggregate power to themselves allows us to read some notable Mishnaic-
Talmudic confrontations in a new light. In b. Rosh Hashannah 24b-25a, Rabban Gamliel 
II humiliates R. Yehoshua ben Chananiah in a dispute about a calendar ruling. Only after 
Yehoshua acquiesces to Gamliel’s authority does the latter restore solidarity and accept 
                                                
33 Naomi Janowitz, “Rabbis and their Opponents: The Construction of the ‘Min’ in Rabbinic Anecdotes,” 
Journal of Early Christian Studies 6, no. 3 (1998): 452 and 460.  
 
34 Ibid., 452. 
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him as “my teacher and my disciple.” 35 B. Shabbat 108a tells the story of the initial 
meeting between the influential Babylonian amora Mar Samuel and Rav, a noted sage 
who was returning to Babylonia after years of training in Palestine to become the head of 
another academy. After sending an emissary to check out his potential rival, the wary 
Samuel invites Rav to a sumptuous dinner but then refuses to tell him where the privy is. 
Suffering great stomach distress, Rav curses Samuel’s male children and successfully 
prays for their deaths. In Baba Metzia 84a, Yochanan swaps bitter insults with his 
brother-in-law and protege-turned-rival, Reish Lakish, after the latter disputes the 
former’s ruling on a minor legal point. The feud eventually results in the untimely deaths 
of both sages.36 
  Regardless of whether these stories recount actual events and historical figures, 
they indicate not only that the struggle for status and authority was an important subtext 
of legal disputes and rivalries among rabbinic contemporaries but also that these power 
struggles involved the kind of invective that can be described as lashon ha-ra. This 
conclusion is supported by Kalmin’s finding that both tannaitic and amoraic texts 
routinely portray rabbis expressing personal hostility toward contemporaries but not 
toward more distant predecessors.  
 
                                                
35 The fact that the literature says Yehoshua’s allies temporarily deposed Gamliel from his position as head 
of the Sanhedrin for this and other insults further indicates that the confrontation was less a legal dispute 
than a power struggle. Indeed Gamliel appears to have been quite interested in aggregating authority. 
Rabbinic texts say he also ordered that the prayer condemning minim be inserted into the amidah, 
excommunicated his brother-in-law, R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, for allegedly consorting with Jesus 
followers, and issued bans against R. Meir and R. Nathan. 
 
36 A number of scholars have described the unflattering story about Reish Lakish and Yochanan, both noted 
Palestinian amoraim, as a Babylonian critique of Palestinian rabbis. Even so, it supports the evidence noted 
below that Palestinian rabbis had more contact with non-rabbis and that public invective was more common 
among Palestinian rabbis. This kind of speech may have been one of the intended criticisms. 
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Contemporaries and near-contemporaries express not only anger or 
surprise in response to specific statements or actions but also the 
conviction that a particular sage is fundamentally flawed or inadequate. 
The accusation will be made, for example, that a rabbi’s traditions are 
untrustworthy, that he violates halakhah, that his premature death was 
punishment for his failure to show proper respect toward great scholars . . 
. Such commentaries, which strike at the core of a rabbi’s character, 
appear primarily aimed at contemporaries and near contemporaries.”37   
  
The fact that rabbis directed derogatory language primarily at contemporaries indicates 
that its purpose had as much to do with power relations as with clarifying legal or 
ideological issues. It also reflects a certain predilection for acquiring and exercising 
authority through rhetoric that demeaned or marginalized other rabbis. The tendency to 
use such rhetoric would have resulted in narrower notions of lashon ha-ra that were more 
tolerant of harsh polemical speech.  
 We should not think of the rabbis as divided into two camps, one eschewing 
divisive, sectarian rhetoric and the other embracing it, one rejecting the use of 
authoritarian language and the other eager for it. It is more productive to think in terms of 
a dialectic tension between opposing rabbinic impulses — to tolerate difference or to 
insist on uniform belief and practice, to respect the autonomy of individuals and small 
groups or to aggregate and exert authority. 
 In this context we also should consider how rabbinic literature treats am ha-aretz 
(people of the land), a term that refers to “the majority of Jews who are uneducated or 
                                                
37 Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors, 145-146. Likewise, rabbis are portrayed expressing 
reverence for contemporaries or near contemporaries much more often than for distant predecessors. 
Because this phenomenon occurs consistently across early rabbinic genres, Kalmin concludes that the 
rivalries and alliances it portrays were not invented by later editors and that specific expressions of 
condemnation or praise are roughly contemporaneous with their attributions. 
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resistant to rabbinic custom,” i.e. non-rabbis.38 While am ha-aretz are routinely criticized 
for their lack of Torah knowledge and improper behavior, and while they are portrayed as 
distinct from and inferior to rabbis and their followers, Sacha Stern argues that the 
treatment of these non-rabbis in rabbinic texts is quite variable and sometimes 
contradictory.39  
 Some passages emphasize the affinity of am ha-aretz to non-Jews and express 
extreme scorn and hatred for them. This indicates that, at least for some rabbis, the 
distinction between themselves and the am ha-aretz “extended as far as excluding the 
latter, in some way, from the distinctive category of Israel.”40 Other passages, however, 
treat the am ha-aretz more sympathetically, depicting them as flawed but still 
indispensable members of the people of Israel.41  
 While some scholars have explained such contradictions in terms of a lessening of 
rabbinic hostility toward non-rabbis over time, Stern says they are better understood as 
representing a conflicted attitude among the rabbis toward non-rabbinic Jews: 
 
It is the same R. Yohanan who urges that an am haAretz be “torn like a 
fish” (in b. Pesachim 49b) but who is upset at the suggestion (in b. Ketuvim 
111b ) that the amei haAretz have no share in the world to come. Clearly 
                                                
38 Charlotte E. Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee, eds., The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and 
Rabbinic Literature (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xvii. 
  
39 Sacha Stern, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writing (New York: Brill, 1994), 119.   
 
40 Ibid.,114. One of the best known is the discussion in b. Pesachim 49b in which R. Elazar (T2) asserts that 
one may stab an am ha-aretz when the Day of Atonement falls on the Sabbath. In the same discussion, an 
un-attributed baraita warns that a man should not marry his daughter to an am ha-aretz because the union 
will produce children who are “ugly and unacceptable.” Another warns against marrying the daughters of 
am ha-aretz because “they are reptiles and their wives are vermin, and regarding their daughters, scripture 
says, ‘Cursed is one who sleeps with a beast.’” 
 
41 Ibid., 119. He notes that b. Hulin 92a likens am ha-aretz to the leaves of a grapevine that protect the fruit 
(rabbis): “Let the clusters pray for the leaves, for without the leaves, the clusters would not last.” Similar 
comparisons can be found in Lev. Rab. 36.2, Num. Rab. 3.1 and Song of Solomon Rab. 6.11.  
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the Talmud considers that it was possible for the rabbis to entertain both 
notions simultaneously.”42  
 
 I would argue that the same tension that gave rise to conflicted rabbinic attitudes 
toward am ha-aretz is reflected in the contested notions of lashon ha-ra. We have already 
looked at the teaching in Arakhin 15a attributed to R. Elazar ben Parta (T2) about the 
“terrible power of lashon ha-ra.” If the spies were punished so severely for defaming the 
Holy Land, it concludes, one can expect an even greater punishment for defaming a 
chaver. Although commonly translated as “friend” or “companion,” chaver has a 
narrower meaning in early rabbinic literature. The term signifies an associate or a 
colleague in a circle of masters and disciples, and it is often used to distinguish rabbis 
from am ha’aretz.43 Thus while this teaching emphasizes the gravity of lashon ha-ra, we 
must consider the likelihood that it does so only in regard to rabbinic Jews, possibly even 
one’s own rabbinic circle, in contradistinction to am ha-aretz.   
 By way of contrast, we have examined several teachings in the Bavli that cite 
Psalm 101:5 as a proof text: “Whoever speaks evil about his rei’a in secret I will cut 
down.” Translated variously as neighbor, friend or associate, rei’a carries a broader 
connotation than chaver and probably includes non-rabbis.44 In addition, a teaching in b. 
Arakhin 15b attributed to R. Chama (PA2) explicitly discusses the prohibition against 
lashon ha-ra in regard to rabbis and am ha-aretz. It contends that for rabbinic sages the 
remedy for lashon ha-ra is Torah study while the remedy for am ha-aretz is to “become 
                                                
42 Ibid., 120.  
 
43 Fonrobert and Jaffee, Cambridge Companion, xviii, and Stern, Jewish Identity, 114. 
  
44 Marcus, Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Bavli, Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature 
(Peabody MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2005), 1475. 
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humble.” In other words, rabbis must continue to speak while non-rabbis must be silent 
and listen.45 While this teaching privileges rabbis vis-à-vis am ha-aretz, it nevertheless 
includes both within the group protected from lashon ha-ra. 
 
Accounting for differences between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi 
 My analysis shows that broad notions of lashon ha-ra — the traditions that 
emphasize its gravity and the culpability of the listener/believer and that depict it as 
including truthful, even innocuous speech  — predominate in the Yerushalmi. Although it 
would be misleading to suggest that the Bavli does not also condemn lashon ha-ra, it 
gives fuller expression to the counter traditions that express narrower notions of the 
offense and that are less restrictive of negative speech.     
 To understand this difference we should keep in mind that the early rabbinic 
concept of lashon ha-ra was prescriptive, not descriptive. It was a response to the threat 
posed by divisive polemical rhetoric in the context of certain historical and social 
circumstances — political oppression, social instability and/or a relatively weak position 
within Jewish society. Where such circumstances were more prevalent and of greater 
concern, we can expect there to have been a greater emphasis on the danger of lashon ha-
ra. Where such circumstances were less prevalent we can expect there to have been less 
emphasis on the danger of lashon ha-ra. The circumstances of rabbis in Palestine and 
Babylonia differed in just this way.    
                                                
45 This is followed by a teaching attributed to R. Acha bar Rav Chanina (PA3) that portrays lashon ha-ra as 
a more serious offense. Once it is committed, the sin cannot be remedied. Thus one must avoid committing 
it. Still, his preventatives are identical to R. Chama’s remedies. Rabbis should engage in Torah study while 
am ha-eratz must humble themselves. The prohibition applies to both groups.  
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 If we consider the position of Jews in late antiquity, life was certainly more 
precarious and uncertain for those in Palestinian. Although Persian Jews were not 
immune from political oppression and persecution, especially after the Sassanians came 
to power in the third century, imperial might was a greater concern for Jews in Palestine, 
where the two great Roman wars occurred. Given these historical circumstances, it’s not 
surprising that Palestinian rabbis were more wary of internal polemical rhetoric that 
might destabilize Jewish society, exacerbate Jewish political vulnerability or put Jews in 
danger with authorities.  
 We should also recall that the Yerushalmi was redacted in the mid-fourth century 
not long after Constantine became the first Roman emperor to embrace Christianity. This 
was an important political development that empowered one of the literary rabbis’ chief 
religious rivals while increasing their own political vulnerability. Not only does this 
development account for why the rabbinic polemic against Christianity is muted in the 
Yerushalmi,46 it also helps explain why lenient Palestinian teachings regarding lashon ha-
ra found in the Bavli are largely absent from the Yerushalmi.  
 Likewise, if we consider the rabbis status vis-à-vis other Jews, we find that those 
in Palestinian “occupied a relatively weak position in Jewish society and depended on 
non-rabbis for support and social advancement.”47 In terms of power relations among 
Jews, Palestinian rabbis were more vulnerable than their Persian counterparts, who 
occupied a higher position in Babylonian Jewish society. For this reason, Palestinian 
rabbis were quite concerned about their image and position among non-rabbinic Jews 
                                                
46 Schäfer, Jesus in the Talmud, 8-10. 
   
47 Kalmin, The Sage in Jewish Society, 10. 
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whereas Babylonian rabbis, because of their higher social status, were less concerned 
about “keeping up appearances and depicting themselves positively and felt freer to give 
their bickering homiletical expression.”48   
  The structure of Jewish societies in Babylonia and Palestine also were different, 
much like the larger Persian and Roman societies in which they existed. Social relations 
among Palestinian Jews were less rigid than those among Jews in Babylonia, where a 
caste-like social hierarchy resulted in less contact and movement among classes. Thus, 
while Babylonian rabbis were largely removed from the daily lives of non-rabbis and 
content to make their pronouncements on important social and political issues “in the 
privacy of their own study houses,” Palestinian rabbis interacted more with non-rabbinic 
Jews and often delivered their opinions in public with the hope of gaining their influence 
and support.49 In short, Palestinian rabbis, because they were more dependent on and had 
more interactions with non-rabbis, were more concerned about the potential impact of 
divisive rhetoric. Babylonian rabbis, because they were relatively more secure within 
Jewish society and did not expect their discourse to be widely disseminated beyond their 
study houses, were less concerned about the impact of such rhetoric on their relationship 
with other Jews.   
  A similar dynamic was at work within the rabbinic movements themselves. 
Kalmin argues that the paucity of “dispute dialogues” in the Bavli among noted 
Babylonian rabbis such as Rava and Abaye is just one of several textual indications that 
Babylonian rabbis of equal status had fewer face-to-face confrontations with each other, 
                                                
48 Ibid., 108. 
 
49 Richard Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia Between Persia and Palestine (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 8. 
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preferring to remain in their study houses with their students. (Dispute dialogues do not 
merely juxtapose contradictory opinions; they also include dialogue in which the 
disputants are portrayed as discussing their differences.) The fact that dispute dialogues 
between noted Palestinian amoraim such as Yochanan and Reish Lakish are more 
common indicates that Palestinian rabbis of equal status had more frequent 
confrontations.50  
 A key point here is that Babylonian rabbinic discourse was “inner directed”51 — 
perhaps not private in the sense of an interpersonal conversation but certainly intended 
for a limited audience. It appears that efforts by Babylonian rabbis to exert authority were 
“private” in the same sense — that is, contained within small, already well-defined 
hierarchies consisting of students and protégés. From this it is reasonable to conclude that 
Babylonian rabbis were, in general, less concerned about rabbis outside their circles 
infringing on their authority.      
 The inner-directed nature of Babylonian discourse also helps us understand why 
the Bavli is concerned about the public/private distinction regarding lashon ha-ra while 
the Yerushalmi is not. In the Babylonian context, the ba-seiter teachings and others that 
depict lashon ha-ra as private speech represent a tradition that applies the prohibition to 
the rabbis’ own inner-directed discourse. The shem ra teachings and others that depict 
lashon ha-ra as public speech represent a tradition that applies lashon ha-ra to non-
rabbinic discourse. (This does not preclude the possibility that the shem ra tradition also 
was intended to criticize the public nature of Palestinian rabbinic discourse.)     
                                                
50 Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors, 96 ff. His point is not that the dialogues themselves are 
historically accurate but that they reflect a historical reality about direct contact or lack of it between 
rabbinic disputants in general. 
  
51 Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia, 15. 
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 It is worth noting that all of the Babylonian rabbis cited in regard to the 
public/private issue are third- or fourth-generation amoraim, who lived roughly from the 
early to the late fourth century. Indeed, more than three quarters of the Babylonian rabbis 
cited in all the Bavli’s discussions of lashon ha-ra are from these two generations. 
Kalmin argues that the mid-fourth century is the point at which Babylonian rabbis 
became “receptive to Palestinian literature and modes of behavior.”52 If this included a 
greater willingness to take rabbinic discourse outside the privacy of the study house and 
into the public sphere, where interactions with other rabbis and non-rabbinic Jews were 
more likely, then it makes sense not only that lashon ha-ra would become a more 
significant issue for Babylonian rabbis at this point but also that discussions of it would 
reflect tension about the distinction between the old private discourse and the new public 
discourse.  
  With this in mind, let’s look more closely at the aforementioned passage in b. 
Arakhin 15b-16a that follows the editorial query about what constitutes lishna bisha.  It 
begins with a purported disagreement between Rabbah (BA3) and Abaye (BA4):  
 
Rabbah: Anything said [about a person] in his presence is not lishna bisha.  
Abaye: [But in that case] it is all the more impudence and lishna bisha.  
Rabbah, citing R. Jose (T3): I have never said a word [about someone] and 
looked behind me [to see if he was there.]  
  
If we read this discussion in the context of Babylonian rabbis negotiating the 
transition from the private, “inner directed” discourse of their individual study houses to 
more frequent contact with other rabbinic circles and non-rabbinic Jews, Abaye’s 
statement asserts that one must be even more careful to guard against lashon ha-ra in 
                                                
52 Ibid., 4.  
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these direct exchanges. To the modern ear, Rabbah’s rejoinder seems to assert a 
commendable ethical principle: A person should not be two-faced and say something 
negative about another behind his back — that is, in the privacy of the study house — 
that he would not say to his face. But given Rabbah’s initial comment, I would argue that 
his teaching is aimed not at urging his fellow Babylonian rabbis to be circumspect in 
private but rather at giving them permission to speak forthrightly in public: Don’t be 
afraid to say to a person’s face — that is, in public — what you say in private. According 
to this view, the fact that Babylonian rabbis were having more contact with one another 
(and non-rabbinic Jews) was not grounds for restricting their discourse.  
 The passage that follows is attributed to Rabbah bar Rav Huna (BA3, a 
contemporary of the Rabbah cited above). It says, “Anything said in the presence of three 
is not lishna bisha [because] your rabbinic colleague (chaver) has a colleague and your 
colleague’s colleague has a colleague.” This passage uses the word chaver and appears to 
privilege rabbinic discourse, which typically occurred in groups of three or more. 
According to this view, the study house is a special zone where one is allowed to speak 
without having to worry about the prohibition against lashon hara.  
Significantly, however, the argument continues by recognizing that rabbinic 
discourse is no longer “inner directed.” Contact among rabbinic Jews has reached the 
point where something said in the privacy of one study house will inevitably reach others 
— that is become widely known or public. In effect, it argues that rabbinic Jews comprise 
one big, public study house in which discourse is exempt from the prohibition against 
lashon hara. Thus, one can speak freely in his own study house without having to worry 
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about being accused of denigrating a fellow rabbinic Jew in another study house behind 
his back.  
 The next passage contains the two previously cited baraitot attributed to Rav 
Dimi, a fourth-generation Palestinian amora who traveled extensively in Babylonia. The 
first asserts that even blessing a friend (re’a) loudly — that is, in public — is lashon ha-
ra. As an example, it cites the visitor who extols the hospitality of his host in a 
marketplace. Inevitably someone who hears the praise will take advantage of the host. 
While this teaching can be read as a warning against obsequiousness or insincere flattery, 
it nonetheless emphasizes the potential harm of public speech and advocates restricting it, 
even if it is not malicious or overtly harmful. Significantly, the example refers to a non-
rabbinic public setting — a marketplace — and to speech about a re’a, which could 
include non-rabbis. The second baraita warns against talking about the good qualities of 
one’s chaver lest it spark a discussion of his faults. This teaching, then, concerns speech 
about a fellow rabbinic Jew, possibly in the context of Torah study. Read as a single unit, 
these teachings represent a more expansive view of lashon hara than did the two previous 
passages. The prohibition against lashon ha-ra applies to remarks about both rabbis and 
non-rabbis and to discourse in both the study house and non-rabbinic settings.   
 
Conclusion to Part I 
 In the preceding chapters I identified two broad Talmudic traditions regarding 
lashon ha-ra. One portrays it as an especially grave sin and applies the prohibition 
against it more strictly. I argued that this tradition arose as a response to sectarian rhetoric 
associated with the Roman wars, the destruction of the temple and the loss of nationhood. 
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Representing an approach to the problem of Jewish unity that tolerates difference and 
autonomy, it seeks to inhibit verbal attacks against those who are different or who act 
independently. The textual evidence indicates that it was more prevalent among rabbis 
who were felt socially or politically vulnerable. 
 The other tradition sought to mitigate the gravity of lashon ha-ra and to apply the 
prohibition against it more leniently. This tradition is an expression of the tendency to 
preserve Jewish unity by enforcing conformity and consolidating power through verbal 
attacks on those perceived to be deviant or independent. It was more prevalent among 
rabbis whose social and political situations were relatively more secure.   
 Having shown how the problem of Jewish unity helps account for the contested 
notions of lashon ha-ra in early rabbinic literature, I now turn now to nineteenth century 
Lithuania and Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan’s Sefer Chafetz Chaim. 
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Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I explained the contested notions of lashon ha-ra in 
early rabbinic literature as a reflection of the inherent tension in the idea of a united 
Jewish people. My goal in Part II is to show how the same tension is at work in Sefer 
Chafetz Chaim, the first published work of Lithuanian Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan. 
 In this chapter I will present textual evidence that Kagan wrote Sefer Chafetz 
Chaim in response to rancorous public discourse among traditional Jews, especially the 
way they were speaking about religious and civil authorities. In Chapter IV, I will argue 
that this discourse reflected the erosion of social cohesion and diffusion of communal 
authority among Lithuanian Jews under Russian rule during the nineteenth century. Like 
the early rabbis who sought to suppress sectarian rhetoric, Kagan was responding to a 
social reality that he viewed as a profound threat to Jewish unity.  
  But also like the early rabbis, his concern about rancorous rhetoric among his 
fellow Jews was mitigated by competing considerations. While his primary aim in Sefer 
Chafetz Chaim is to suppress discourse that alienated Jews from one another, he 
nevertheless permits and even encourages it for certain purposes. Chief among these is to 
establish and maintain the boundaries of Jewish society. To that end, Chapter V will 
identify which Jews Kagan argues are not protected by the prohibition against lashon ha-
ra because they are no longer members in good standing of klal yisrael, the idealized 
community of Israel. This will give us an idea of where he stood in the contemporary 
debate about the Jewish collective identity.  
Chapter VI, on the other hand, will examine the exceptions in which, according to 
Kagan, it is permissible to speak negatively about those within klal yisrael. Here we will 
 75 
see that his concern about divisive, authoritarian discourse is in tension with certain 
ideological, ethical and pragmatic considerations — defending rabbis and their authority, 
protecting individuals from harm or injustice, and permitting the exchange of information 
necessary for conducting routine affairs, especially those involving commerce and 
personal finance. Many of the leniencies Kagan cites hinge on the distinctions we saw in 
the early rabbinic notions of lashon ha-ra, particularly the speaker’s intent and whether 
the remarks are public or private. 
My analysis of Sefer Chafetz Chaim follows a trend that challenges the 
paradigmatic explanation of modern Jewish history primarily as a conflict between 
traditionalism on the one hand and enlightenment ideology and the politics of 
emancipation and assimilation on the other. Johnathan Frankel has described the 
paradigm as reductionist.1 It tends to portray West European Jews as embracing 
emancipation and assimilation, willing to modify (or compromise, depending on one’s 
viewpoint) their religious/national distinctiveness in return for a place in the larger 
society. On the other hand, the paradigm explains the history of East European Jews in 
terms of their rejection of enlightenment ideology and their resistance to assimilation. It 
tends to portray them as clinging faithfully (or stubbornly, depending on one’s viewpoint) 
to traditional religious ideas, practices and authority.  
The historiography of Frankel and others problematizes the paradigmatic 
explanation of Judaism’s encounter with modernity. While not ignoring or discounting 
the effect of the haskalah (the Jewish enlightenment) among East European Jews, it 
focuses on a number of economic and social factors not directly related to enlightenment 
                                                
1 Johnathan Frankel, “Assimilation and the Jews of Nineteenth-Century Europe: Towards a New 
Historiography?” in Assimilation and Community: The Jews in Nineteenth-Century Europe, eds. Johnathan 
Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 16 ff.   
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ideology or emancipation politics that altered traditional Jewish life in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In doing so, it challenges perceptions about solidarity among East 
European Jews and the cohesiveness of their society.  
 
Background on Kagan’s life and literary output 
Kagan was born in 1838 in the small Belarussian town of Zhetl, but his family 
moved to Vilna when he was ten. There he studied at a yeshiva under Rabbi Jacob Barit, 
a prominent traditional scholar who nevertheless had a “fair knowledge” of science and 
modern languages — including Russian and German — and was an influential 
representative of Jewish interests before the Russian government.2 Thus, while Kagan 
had a traditional Lithuanian religious education, he was mentored during his formative 
years in a relatively sophisticated milieu that encouraged engagement in public affairs 
and with non-Jewish society.  
When he was seventeen, Kagan moved to Radin, a village located in present-day 
Belarus about fifty miles south of the Vilna. Except for travel and a brief period during 
World War I when he fled to Russia, Kagan spent the rest of his life in Radin. After 
marrying, he served briefly as a communal rabbi, operated a grocery store with his wife 
and then started a yeshiva in Radin. Eventually he turned the operation of the yeshiva 
over to others and supported himself through his writing. He published more than twenty 
books and became “one of the major rabbinical authorities of the late nineteenth and 
                                                
2 Louis Ginzberg and Herman Rosenthal, “Jacob Barit,” Jewishencyclopedia.com, accessed Sept. 11, 2011, 
www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?artid=293&letter=B&search=Barit. Barit advised Sir Moses 
Montefiore during his tour of Russia in 1846, was a member of the Jewish delegation that met with Tsar 
Nicholas I in 1852 on the issue of Jewish military conscription and, most important, was a key figure on the 
Vilna Commission, the body appointed by the Russian government in the late 1860s to investigate Jewish 
communal authorities in Lithuania.  
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twentieth centuries.” Though he avoided political controversy, Kagan was engaged in 
Jewish public affairs throughout his life. In 1912 he played a prominent if largely 
symbolic role in the founding of the East European orthodox political party Agudat 
Yisrael. Twelve years later he helped establish Va’ad ha-Yeshivot, a council to support 
traditional religious education throughout Eastern Europe. Beyond that, “he continued to 
respond to current events and wrote open letters to the Jewish press” until shortly before 
his death in 1933.3  
The six-volume Mishnah Berura (1884-1907) — a commentary on the section of 
Joseph Caro’s Shulchan Arukh dealing with the laws on prayer, the synagogue and 
holidays — is often cited as Kagan’s most important work. It remains a popular halakhic 
authority among Orthodox Jews. However, Sefer Chafetz Chaim (1873), his first 
published work, was the one of three books dealing with interpersonal relations that 
established his reputation among East European Jews as a “paragon of piety” who was 
widely admired for his modesty and virtue.4 According to the custom in which prominent 
rabbis are known by the title of their first commentary, Kagan commonly is referred to as 
the Chafetz Chaim. His notoriety among Jews today stems in large part from the fact that 
a foundation by that name has made his works — principally those dealing with lashon 
ha-ra and other issues of speech — the centerpiece of a movement to promote good 
character and proper relations among Jews.5  
                                                
3 Benjamin Brown, “Yisrael Me’ir ha-Kohen,” The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, 
accessed Sept. 6, 2011, www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Yisrael_Meir_ha-Kohen. 
  
4 Ibid. The others are Shmirat ha-Lashon (1876), a short compilation of moral and aggadic writings that 
elucidate the laws of lashon ha-ra explained in Sefer Chafetz Chaim, and Ahavat Chesed (1888), a 
commentary on the laws governing personal relations pertaining to money and property.  
   
5 The Chafetz Chaim Heritage Foundation based in Monsey, N.Y., is the organizational force behind the 
contemporary shmirat ha-lashon movement. The movement is primarily an ultra-Orthodox Jewish 
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However, it should be stressed that Sefer Chafetz Chaim is not a work of musar, 
the traditional Jewish ethical literature that deals with personal virtue and character 
development. Rather it is a legal code that “attempts to bring the prohibitions concerning 
slander, libel, and gossip, which had normally been addressed in the context of moral and 
ethical literature, into the realm of Jewish law, governed by clearly defined rules.”6 
Kagan himself asserts in the preface: “Know my brother reader that even the small points 
found herein [are supported by a legal argument]. So it will be apparent to everyone that I 
did not base this book on attributes of piety (midot chasidut) but only on the law (rak al 
tzad ha-din).”7 
 
Structure and content of Sefer Chafetz Chaim 
 My intent is to explore the social and historical factors that influenced Kagan’s 
approach to the concepts of lashon ha-ra and r’khilut rather than to offer a complete 
explanation of the law as Kagan presents it. Before proceeding, however, it will be useful 
                                                                                                                                            
phenomenon that began in the late 1980s, although it also has raised awareness of Kagan and the concept of 
lashon ha-ra among all streams of Judaism. 
  
6 Brown, “Yisrael Me’ir ha-Kohen,” www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Yisrael_Meir_ha-Kohen. 
  
7Israel Meir Kagan, Sefer Chafetz Chaim (Vilna: 1873), Preface: 9; Yedidyah Levy, trans., Sefer Chafetz 
Chaim (Nanuet NY: Feldheim Publishers, 2008), 1: 25. Kagan makes the same point in the next paragraph 
when he assures readers that “each and every word in this book is written exactly according to the law.” 
Other comments in the Preface also indicate that Kagan envisioned Sefer Chafetz Chaim as a legal code. 
For instance, while he refers to lashon ha-ra as a destructive midah (attribute or character trait), he 
describes it as “very much unlike” other character flaws such as anger, cruelty and cynicism in that the 
Torah carries an explicit prohibition against it. (Leviticus 19:16  — “Do not go about as a tale bearer 
among your people.”) His point is that refraining from lashon ha-ra is a matter of law, not merely of good 
character. See also Kagan, Preface (h): 10; Levy, 1: 27 where he defends his frequent references to 
Sha’arei Teshuva, a commentary by the thirteenth-century Spanish Rabbi Yonah Gerondi (Rabbeinu 
Yonah). Although Sha’arei Teshuva is a work of musar, Kagan assures readers that “everything he 
[Gerondi] wrote was carefully taken from the perspective of the law, especially his rules on lashon ha-ra.” 
At any rate, Kagan explains, his own opinions seldom rely solely on Sha’arei Teshuvah and are all 
supported by appropriate halakhic sources.  
 79 
to provide some definitions and explanations as well as a synopsis of the structure and 
content of the book.  
My analysis is based on the first edition of Sefer Chafetz Chaim (Vilna, 1873), 
although I occasionally cite the second edition (Warsaw, 1877). All references will be to 
the first edition except where noted. In addition to the Preface, Introduction and 
Appendix, Sefer Chafetz Chaim has nineteen chapters and an addendum. The first ten 
chapters deal with lashon ha-ra, the last nine and the addendum with r’khilut. As is 
customary in rabbinic literature, the clauses in each chapter are numbered for reference. 
In addition, Sefer Chafetz Chaim is divided into two parts. The first is called mekor ha-
chaim (the source of life). Kagan describes it as a brief summary of the law (ha-halakha 
b’kitzur). The much longer second part is called be’er mayim chaim (spring of the waters 
of life). In it Kagan presents more complex legal arguments based on traditional rabbinic 
sources. The two parts appear together on the same page in the format of a text with 
footnotes. There also are dozens of hagahot (elaborations) throughout both mekor ha-
chaim and the be’er mayim chaim.  
Because the part in which a passage appears occasionally is important for my 
argument, my citations will refer to it as well as the chapter, clause and page. “Kagan, 
1.1: 37,” for example, refers to the first clause of the first chapter of the mekor ha-chaim, 
which is on page 37. “Kagan, 1.1.1: 37-38” refers to the first note in the be’er mayim 
chaim accompanying the same clause, which is on pages 37-38. An “(h)” indicates the 
citation is from a hagahah.8 In addition, each citation will refer to the corresponding 
                                                
8 Kagan numbers the chapters dealing with r’khilut separately from those on lashon ha-ra. I will use his 
system, although I will add an “R” to the chapters on r’khilut in order to avoid confusion. For example, 
“Kagan, 1.1” will refer to the first clause of the first chapter in the section on lashon ha-ra and “Kagan, 
 80 
volume and page of Yedidya Levy’s four-volume English translation of the 1877 edition, 
which includes the original Hebrew on facing pages. Although I have used Levy as a 
guide, the translations are my own except where noted.       
The first thing we can say about Kagan’s approach to lashon ha-ra is that he 
portrays it an egregious sin. The Preface and Introduction — which together comprise 
almost twenty percent of the book  — emphasize its grave metaphysical effects and 
existential consequences for the Jewish people. For example, Kagan cites the Zohar, the 
foundational book of Jewish mysticism, in arguing that the sin of lashon ha-ra prevents 
words of Torah and prayers from reaching heaven, thereby strengthening the “great 
complainer (m’katreig) against klal yisrael.” This not only results in “the slaughter of 
many [Jews] in many nations” but also causes destruction in “all of the [heavenly] 
worlds.”9 He also cites the passage in b. Arakhin 15b that attributes the destruction of the 
Second Temple to lashon ha-ra.  
While these arguments and others have a clear foundation in rabbinic literature, 
there are some innovative elements in the Preface and Introduction that ratchet up the dire 
implications of this sin. For example, not only does Kagan agree that lashon ha-ra caused 
the exile, but he also contends that the Jewish people must rectify the sin before God 
fulfills his promise to redeem them.  
 
If we search and investigate our ways for the sins that are the essential 
cause of our long exile, we will find many. But the sin of the tongue is the 
worst for many reasons. First, it is known that it was the cause of our exile 
as is explained in [the Bavli and the Yerushalmi]. If that is the case, then 
how can the redemption come if there is no attempt to rectify this sin?  
                                                                                                                                            
R1.1” to the first clause of the first chapter of the section on r’khilut. “Kagan, A.1” will refer to the first 
clause of the addendum. 
  
9 Kagan, Preface: 8; Levy, 1: 11, 13 and 15. Levy translates m’katreig as the “heavenly prosecutor.”    
 81 
Because this sin is such a terrible defect that it caused us to be exiled from 
our land, surely it prevents us from returning to our land.10 
   
In the next paragraph he says, “It is incumbent on us to rectify this sin before the 
redemption.” And the last sentence of the Preface expresses the hope that Sefer Chafetz 
Chaim will help Jewish society turn away from lashon ha-ra. “And by the merit of this, 
the redeemer will come to Zion soon in our time.”11 
The gravity of lashon ha-ra is also the focus of the twenty-five-page Introduction, 
most of which is devoted to explaining how those who speak and believe lashon ha-ra 
violate as many as 31 laveen and aseen and invoke upon themselves three Torah curses.12 
Rabbinic literature does identify a legal basis for the prohibition against lashon ha-ra in 
the Torah, specifically the commandment in Leviticus 19: 16: “Do not go about as a tale 
bearer among your people.” Previous commentators have linked the prohibition to other 
Torah commandments as well.13 However, Kagan’s discussion of lashon ha-ra in the 
context of so many commandments and curses goes far beyond anything in rabbinic 
literature.  
In many cases, his legal arguments refer to sources that do not mention lashon ha-
ra in connection with the commandments being discussed. For example, he argues that 
someone who speaks lashon ha-ra and thereby causes a fellow Jew to lose his livelihood 
                                                
 
10 Kagan, Preface: 7; Levy, 1: 7 and 9. 
 
11 Kagan, Preface: 10; Levy, 1: 33. 
 
12 Aseen and laveen (singular asah and lav, literally, “do” and “don’t”) refer respectively to positive Torah 
commandments (observe the Sabbath, for example) and negative Torah commandments (the prohibition 
against eating pork, for example). According to rabbinic tradition, the Torah contains 365 laveen and 248 
aseen for a total of 613 mitzvot (holy obligations). 
 
13 Kagan cites sources, for example, that discuss lashon ha-ra specifically in the context of Exodus 23:1 
(“Do not carry a false report”) and Leviticus 22:32 (“Do not profane my holy name”). 
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violates the asah in Leviticus 25: 35-36 that requires a Jew to support his impoverished 
kinsman. “How much more so are we commanded not to cause someone to lose his 
livelihood (by speaking lashon ha-ra),” Kagan argues. The sources he cites — 
Maimonides and the Shulkhan Aruch — discuss this asah in the context of giving charity 
and making loans to those in need, not the prohibition against lashon ha-ra.14 Elsewhere 
Kagan says that speaking lashon ha-ra violates the lav in Levitcus 19:14: “Do not place a 
stumbling block before the blind.”  The rationale is that the person who speaks lashon ha-
ra causes those who listen to violate the prohibition against believing it. Yet the sources 
he cites — the Bavli and Maimonides — discuss this commandment only in the context 
of asking a fellow Jew for a loan with interest, thereby causing him to violate the 
commandment against usury.15  
  I am not suggesting that these arguments are strained or unreasonable from the 
standpoint of rabbinic hemeneutics. Kagan follows accepted rabbinic exegetical rules that 
permit making such connections between Torah commandments. Rather my point is that 
associating the prohibition against lashon ha-ra with so many other Torah 
commandments is unprecedented in rabbinic literature and represents an effort to 
emphasize its gravity. Indeed, in Kagan’s view even these 31 commandments do not tell 
the whole story about the terrible implications of lashon ha-ra and r’khilut. A careful 
analysis reveals that violating this prohibition results in transgressions of “all of the 
                                                
14 Kagan, Introduction (asah 4): 28; Levy, 1: 221, 223 and 225. 
 
15 Kagan, Introduction (lav 4): 15-16; Levy, 1:137-143. 
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laveen and aseen having to do with relationships among individuals and most of those 
dealing with an individual’s relationship with God.”16  
 However, as was the case with the early rabbinic texts, Sefer Chafetz Chaim 
occasionally mitigates the gravity and consequences of lashon ha-ra. Although the 
Preface and Introduction clearly are intended to emphasize the seriousness of the sin, 
Kagan also distinguishes between “masters of lashon ha-ra” (ba’alei lashon ha-ra) and 
those who “stumble in this regard occasionally” (nichshal bazeh lifrakim). It is only the 
former to whom b. Arakhin 15b refers when it says that their offense is equivalent to the 
three cardinal sins of murder, sexual sin and idol worship and caused the destruction of 
the temple. “They (ba’alei lashon ha-ra) are punished accordingly and do not experience 
God’s presence.” On the other hand, the punishment for speaking lashon ha-ra 
occasionally is no more severe than for the occasional violation of any other Torah 
commandment.17 Indeed Kagan says he hopes one benefit of codifying the laws on 
lashon ha-ra will be to prevent those who merely speak it occasionally from becoming 
ba’alei lashon ha-ra.  
Elsewhere he explains that the prohibition against lashon ha-ra applies 
“even to someone who related something disgraceful about a fellow Jew incidentally 
(b’mikreh)” — i.e. without intending to denigrate or harm him.  
 
But if, God forbid, he becomes accustomed to this sin [so that he commits 
it] all the time (bitmidut), like those people who routinely sit together and 
                                                
16 Kagan, Introduction: 11; Levy, 1: 39.  
 
17 Kagan, Preface (h): 10; Levy, 1: 31. Although b. Arakhin 15b does not make this distinction, subsequent 
commentators have. In this clause, Kagan cites Rabbeinu Yonah in Sha’are Teshuvah and Maimonides in 
Hilchot De’ot. See also Kagan, 1.4: 39; Levy, 1: 299, where Kagan says rishonim (medieval authorities) 
determined that b. Arakhin 15b refers to those who have “become accustomed to committing this sin all the 
time and do not guard themselves from it because it has become second nature to them.” 
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say, “Someone did this and someone’s ancestors did that,” or “I heard this 
about so-and-so,” and the remarks are disparaging, the rabbis of the 
Talmud call people like this ba’alei lashon ha-ra. They are punished much 
more severely [than those who speak lashon ha-ra b’mikreh] because they 
maliciously violate God’s Torah.18 
 
Clearly Kagan’s purpose in these passages is to emphasize the sinfulness of inveterate 
speakers of lashon ha-ra who relish denigrating their fellow Jews. In doing so, however, 
he also mitigates the sinfulness of those who speak lashon ha-ra only occasionally 
(lifrakim) and/or without malicious intent (b’mikreh). He is not excusing occasional or 
accidental speakers. They are sinful. But they are not nearly as sinful as ba’alei lashon 
ha-ra.  
More important, they are not nearly as destructive to Jewish society. “Everyone 
who speaks lashon ha-ra magnifies [the effect of] sin in heaven . . . From this we can see 
the enormity of the destruction that ba-alei ha-lashon wreak on klal yisrael.”19 His 
primary point here is not that every instance of lashon ha-ra has negative repercussions 
for the Jewish people. Rather it is to explain why those who speak lashon ha-ra 
habitually have a much greater negative impact on Jewish society than those who do so 
only occasionally. 
The second thing we can say about Sefer Chafetz Chaim is that it does not ban 
denigrating or harmful speech in all instances but rather seeks to establish the limits of 
such speech. The prohibition against lashon ha-ra applies to speech about Jews, but it 
does not apply to speech about all Jews. We will look at where Kagan draws this line in 
Chapter V, but for now it is enough to say that in some cases it is even a mitzvah — a 
                                                
18 Kagan, 1.3: 38; Levy, 1: 297. 
  
19 Kagan, Preface: 8; Levy, 1: 13.  
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holy obligation — to denigrate a Jew who is no longer amitekha (your colleague). What’s 
more, negative or harmful speech is not entirely forbidden even about those who are 
amitekha. It is permitted in certain circumstances in order to achieve a toelet (legitimate 
benefit)  — for example, to prevent or recover damages resulting from an interpersonal 
offense. We will examine these exceptions in Chapter VI.  
Finally, we should consider some definitions. Although the rubric of lashon ha-ra 
includes what we call gossip and slander, the notion is broader than these two terms and 
defies easy translation. For Kagan lashon ha-ra refers to any remark that improperly 
demeans or harms another Jew who is amitekha. R’khilut is a specific kind of lashon ha-
ra that involves telling one Jew what another Jew said or did to harm him, thereby 
creating or exacerbating animosity between them.20 The prohibition against lashon ha-ra 
and r’khilut applies to both the speaker and ha-m’kabel (the person who accepts the 
remarks as true) and pertains regardless of whether the remarks are made publicly or 
privately, directly to the subject or out of his presence. Finally, the prohibition applies 
regardless of whether the remarks are true or false. If the remarks are false, they 
constitute motzi shem ra, or slander, which Kagan views as the most egregious form of 
lashon ha-ra.21  
                                                
20 See Kagan, RK1.2: 127. “Who is a r’khil? Someone who carries words from this person to that person 
and says, ‘So-and-so said this about you,” or ‘So-and-so did this to you,’ or ‘I heard he did this to you or 
wants to do this to you.’” See also Kagan, Preface: 8; Levy, 1: 41 and Kagan, Preface (h): 9; Levy, 1: 23. 
Kagan explains that most of the laws regarding r’khilut can be deduced from his discussion of lashon ha-
ra. However, because the sin of improper speech is so common and such a “great stumbling block,” he 
feels he must explain the law as it pertains to r’khilut in detail, even at the risk of being redundant. 
 
21 Kagan, Preface: 8; Levy, 1: 41. Thus Kagan refers to eight afanim (characteristics or parameters) that 
must be considered when discussing the laws pertaining to prohibited speech: whether the remark is lashon 
ha-ra or r’khilut, whether it is true or false (the latter is motzi shem ra), whether it is made in the presence 
of the subject or not, and whether the issue is the culpability of the speaker or the listener/believer.  
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However, while lashon ha-ra does includes slander, Kagan discusses lies and 
exaggerations only a few times, and when he does it is often in an incidental manner 
indicating that the sinfulness of lying about someone is so obvious that it can be assumed 
and does not need extensive explanation. It’s clear, in other words, that Kagan’s main 
concern throughout the book is truthful or factually neutrual remarks that demean, harm 
or cause conflict among Jews. Indeed he says one of the primary reasons lashon ha-ra is 
so prevalent in contemporary society is that many Jews do not realize that the prohibition 
pertains to truthful remarks.
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE DEPICTION OF CONTEMPORARY JEWISH DISCOURSE IN  
SEFER CHAFETZ CHAIM 
 
Introduction 
Kagan says in the Preface that his goal is to create a single source for “all the laws 
pertaining to lashon ha-ra and r’khilut scattered throughout shas v’rishonim” — the 
ancient and medieval rabbinic sources.1 Much of Sefer Chafetz Chaim, therefore, is taken 
up with an analysis of the Talmuds and other rabbinic texts from these earlier eras. 
However, Kagan regularly emerges from his analysis of halakhic precedents to comment 
on aspects of contemporary discourse among Jews that he contends violate the 
prohibition against lashon ha-ra. Many of these observations are accompanied by the 
formulaic phrase ba-avonoteinu ha-rabim matzui ha-rabah m’od (because of our many 
sins it is extremely common), an explicit indication that he views a particular kind of 
speech act as not only sinful but also widespread. In this chapter I will examine these 
observations to determine what they reveal about the nature of the discourse that alarmed 
Kagan. 
For the most part I am limiting my analysis to passages in which he comments 
unambiguously on contemporary Jewish society. However, I will also consider examples 
of lashon ha-ra that he implies were common without explicitly saying they were. 
Several of these are in the last chapter on r’khilut and the addendum in which he 
illustrates how the laws on r’khilut should be applied in specific circumstances.   
                                                
1 Kagan, Preface: 9; Levy, 1: 21. Compiling all the laws on lashon ha-ra into a single source will make 
them more accessible, thereby helping to reduce its prevalence in contemporary Jewish society, he says.  
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My analysis of these observations and examples will show that Kagan depicts 
Jewish society as divided and highly contentious. It will also show that he is especially 
concerned about public disputes and confrontations. For the most part, Kagan places this 
public contentiousness in traditional settings such as the beit midrash and the synagogue 
or in the context of financial relationships and contracts such as business partnerships, 
employment and marriage agreements. He also describes public criticism of rabbis and 
Torah scholars as widespread and acknowledges the diminished status and authority of 
the beit din (religious court) and kahal (Jewish communal government). Taken as whole, 
Kagan’s observations about lashon ha-ra in contemporary society reflect a broad erosion 
of solidarity among Lithuanian Jews and a general decline in allegiance to traditional 
institutions of civil and religious authority.  
Kagan’s observations indicate that the discourse that alarmed him had little to do 
with the ideological dispute between traditionalists and maskilim, the adherents of the 
Jewish Enlightenment. Sefer Chafetz Chaim clearly is not intended to suppress criticism 
of the latter. As I will discuss in Chapter V, maskilim do not fit Kagan’s definition of 
Jews who are amitekha. As a result, publicly condemning and humiliating them is a holy 
obligation, not a sin. And given the fact that Kagan’s intended readers were traditionally 
observant Jews, it is highly unlikely that his purpose was to condemn maskilic criticism 
of traditionalism. On the contrary, we will see that Sefer Chafetz Chaim aims to persuade 
his observant readers, including the religious elite, to stop demeaning one another.  
If Kagan was concerned about the way traditionally observant Lithuanian Jews 
were speaking to and about each other, then to fully understand the discourse to which he 
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was responding we must open the contextual lens and consider factors other than the 
haskalah. I will discuss these factors in Chapter IV.  
  
A divided and contentious society 
The explicit premise of Sefer Chafetz Chaim is that the sin of lashon ha-ra 
pervaded contemporary Jewish society. “Many, many people commit it thousands of 
times during their lifetimes and don’t take it upon themselves to guard against it.”2 
Elsewhere Kagan elaborates about what he perceives as the dire state of contemporary 
Jewish discourse:  
. . . the matter (of guarding against lashon ha-ra) has collapsed so 
completely that people are accustomed to saying whatever happens to 
come out of their mouths without considering whether their words are 
r’khilut and lashon ha-ra. Because of our many sins, we have become so 
accustomed to this sin that many people do not consider it wrong even if 
they speak unmitigated lashon ha-ra and r’khilut — for example saying 
something evil about one’s chaver and purposely condemning and 
dishonoring him.3  
 
Even allowing for hyperbole, these descriptions indicate that Kagan was not responding 
to speech acts that he considered unusual or that he associated with some aberrant 
minority. Indeed his use of the word chaver indicates that he viewed them as widespread 
among traditionally observant Jews.  
He reiterates this view in his explanation of how the trivialization of the sin of 
lashon ha-ra inevitably results in the desecration of God’s name, another grave Torah 
                                                
2 Kagan, Preface: 8; Levy, 1:15. See also Kagan, Forward: 2. In the first approbation, Rabbi Mordechai 
Klostsky of Lida supports Kagan’s view of contemporary discourse with a colorful metaphor: Jewish 
society was filled with “grasshoppers” ceaselessly chirping lashon ha-ra and r’khilut.  
 
3 Kagan, Preface: 9; Levy, 1: 19 and 21. 
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violation. “And especially in regard to the prohibition against lashon ha-ra and r’khilut 
we see that, because of our many sins, everyone is accustomed to [seeing it] as a hefker 
(triviality). In their eyes it isn’t considered a Torah violation at all.”4  
In addition to noting the pervasiveness of lashon ha-ra, this clause goes on to 
describe its pernicious effect: Those who consider lashon ha-ra a trivial matter resist 
rebuke and persist in speaking it until they “no longer consider [the subjects of their 
remarks] to be part of the community of Israel.”5 In Kagan’s view, widespread violation 
of the laws against lashon ha-ra was creating divisions that undermined Jewish solidarity 
and social cohesion.  
The same view comes through in Kagan’s discussion of how lashon ha-ra 
frequently leads to violations of the Torah prohibition against chanupah, or obsequious 
flattery. In this case Kagan is referring to a person who “purposely speaks lashon ha-ra 
and r’khilut about p’loni (so-and-so) in order to ingratiate himself to [another person] 
who has a grudge against p’loni.” He describes this form of chanupah as common. 
 
And know that because of our many sins, we find this sin very often [in 
today’s society]. One person denigrates his chaver, and then the listener, 
even though he knows the speaker’s words violate halakha, nevertheless 
nods his head and adds his own comments that make the matter worse 
because he [the first speaker] sometimes is a ba’al ha-beit chashuv 
v’khadumah [an important leaseholder or the like] and [the second 
speaker] wants a favor from him or fears he will seem unwise.6 
     
                                                
4 Kagan, Introduction (lav 6): 17; Levy, 1: 151. The translation is Levy’s. In rabbinic law a hefker is an 
object or property whose owner has legally abandoned it. Kagan is using the term as a figure of speech for 
something unwanted or abandoned — hence trivial. 
  
5 Ibid.  
 
6 Kagan, Introduction (lav 16): 23-24; Levy, 1: 193 and 195.  
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The point is not that Kagan condemns chanupah, which is to be expected, but 
rather that he portrays Jewish society as divided and fractious: It was not uncommon for 
influential members of the community to denigrate someone with whom they were 
having a dispute. Others often joined in, either to curry favor with the speaker or to 
protect their reputations and positions. And once again Kagan uses the word chaver, 
indicating that he is referring to traditionally observant Jews speaking about one another.   
Elsewhere Kagan discusses what a person should do when he finds himself 
“sitting with a group of people assembled for a specific matter,” and some of them begin 
speaking lashon ha-ra. The context is not entirely clear, although he seems to be referring 
to official or conventional gatherings that a person might be required or expected to 
attend — a civic meeting, religious service or wedding, for example. In previous clauses 
Kagan explained that a person must rebuke someone speaking lashon ha-ra and defend 
the subject of the remarks unless doing so would incite further denigration, in which case 
it is a mitzvah for the person to leave or place his fingers in his ears. (Either action 
prevents him from hearing the objectionable remarks and signals his disapproval.) But in 
this situation it is likely that the listener will be publicly ridiculed if he leaves or places 
his fingers in his ears. Under such circumstances, he is required only to “steel himself to 
protect his soul and fight God’s war against his yetzer ha-ra (evil inclination). . . and not 
accept lashon ha-ra.”7  
In the be’er Kagan acknowledges that his lenient position is problematic, given 
the numerous rabbinic precedents that forbid inaction in the face of sin, particularly 
violations of Torah commandments. “Truthfully, one who wishes to comply with heaven 
                                                
7 Kagan, 6.5: 80-81; Levy, 2: 307 and 309. This means the listener is prohibited not only from believing the 
denigrating information but also from deriving any benefit or pleasure from listening to it. 
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must carefully consider how to behave [in this kind of situation] . . . Perhaps the law 
requires that [the listener] put his fingers in his ears as our sages said that it is better to be 
thought a fool all your life than to be an evil person for even a moment.”8 On the other 
hand, he observes, “There is a reason for a leniency [in this situation] since in our time, 
because of our many sins, he would be regarded as a fool and a simpleton.”9 Kagan’s 
lenient position, then, appears to be a pragmatic concession to what he describes as the 
dire state of discourse in contemporary Jewish society: Not only was it common for a 
person to find himself at a gathering in which Jews were speaking disparagingly of other 
Jews, but also such discourse was so widely accepted that taking even a tacit stand 
against it was likely to result in public ridicule.  
In another clause Kagan warns his readers to stay away from anshei reisha (evil 
people) and ba’alei lashon ha-ra who gather in groups to publicly denounce a fellow Jew 
or listen to such denunciations.10 The purpose of this clause is to argue that such 
gatherings violate the asah in Deuteronomy 10:20 “to cling to him (God).” But in making 
this legal argument, Kagan also indicates that they were common and associates them 
with discussions of  “worldly matters.”  
 
And because of our many sins, we commonly see on the holy Sabbath 
after the third meal that some groups of men study Torah and converse 
about the God of Life, and the rest of the people it seems converse about 
worldly matters. And most certainly speaking about these matters 
devolves into lashon ha-ra and wickedness and cynicism. Therefore 
leaving Torah masters to join these evil groups and listen to their nonsense 
violates this positive commandment (to cling to God).11 
                                                
8 He is citing m. Eduyot 5.6. 
 
9 Kagan, 6.5.11: 78-79; Levy, 2: 313. 
 
10 Kagan, Introduction (asah 6): 29, Levy, 1: 229. 
 
11 Ibid.  
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Kagan is not merely expressing the traditional aversion to the study and 
discussion of worldly matters instead of religious texts. He also appears to be describing 
an actual social phenomenon in which observant Jews were shirking religious studies on 
the Sabbath in order to take part in discussions of controversial, non-religious matters that 
typically involved overt criticism of other Jews. In the be’er Kagan indicates that one had 
to be careful even at weddings or other traditional social gatherings, where it was easy to 
become involved in such conversations.12 
We get another indication of widespread acrimony within contemporary Jewish 
society in Kagan’s discussion of the prohibition against believing lashon ha-ra (as 
opposed to merely listening to it as in the example above).  If a person hears a negative 
report about another Jew, he may suspect that it is true and even investigate further, but 
only if he has a legitimate interest in protecting himself or another Jew from harm or 
loss.13 However, he may neither “secretly hate him [the subject of the remarks] in his 
heart” nor, in taking steps to protect himself or others, do anything that harms or shames 
the subject in any way.14 In the be’er, Kagan elaborates on this restriction. One may not 
relate the information to others who have a legitimate interest in protecting themselves if 
                                                                                                                                            
 
12 Kagan, Introduction (asah 6): 29; Levy, 1: 231. 
 
13 As noted in Part I, the Talmudic source for this leniency is the passage in b. Niddah 61a which faults 
Gedaliah ben Achikam, the ruler of Judah under Nebuchadnezzar, for failing to take precautions after being 
warned of a plot to assassination him. It concludes that although it is forbidden to accept lashon ha-ra as 
true, one may suspect that it might be and take appropriate measures to protect oneself and others.  
 
14 Kagan, 6.11: 88-90; Levy, 2: 377 and 379. In this case, he is talking about the information coming from a 
single reliable witness. Just as the beit din may not punish anyone based on the testimony of a single 
witness, neither may an individual take action that would harm someone or cause him a loss based on the 
word of just one person. 
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they are likely to bypass the beit din and act on their own to harm or shame the subject in 
a way the law does not permit.  
 
Because of our many sins, it is very common that the listener will do 
something worse to [the subject] than the law would allow even if the 
information is true. Therefore it is necessary to be extremely careful in this 
situation to see the consequences [of relating negative information in order 
to warn others]. It is often preferable to sit and do nothing.15  
 
 Not only does Kagan limit the leniency that allows a person to repeat a negative 
report about another Jew in order to prevent or rectify harm, but also his rationale is that 
Jewish society was so contentious that such revelations often provoked improper or 
illegal retribution that ratcheted up animosity. I would also point out that his observation 
indicates that it was common for individuals to circumvent the beit din in seeking redress 
for offenses against them, which tells us something about the diminished status and 
authority of religious courts. 
 
Public disputes and confrontations 
Kagan is unambiguous in his view that denigrating another Jew or saying 
something that harms him is lashon ha-ra, regardless of whether it is done privately or in 
public. However, as several of the passages above indicate, his primary concern in Sefer 
Chafetz Chaim is the latter. He makes this clear in the Preface, where he argues that one 
of the two reasons lashon ha-ra pervades contemporary society is that many ba’alei 
torah (those learned in Torah) wrongly cite leniencies for derogatory or harmful remarks 
made bifnei t’lata (in the presence of three, meaning publicly), b’panai (directly to the 
subject or in his presence) and in response to a ba’al machloket (someone who routinely 
                                                
15 Kagan, 6.11.30: 89-90; Levy, 2: 385.  
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provokes public controversy).16 The implication of this passage is that rabbis and others 
among the scholarly elite were sanctioning rhetoric associated with public disputes and 
confrontations. Kagan states clearly that one of his primary aims is to rebut the legal basis 
for these leniencies.   
He begins the second chapter, for example, by asserting that it is forbidden to 
speak lashon ha-ra about a fellow Jew to just one person, “and all the more so [is it 
forbidden] in front of many” — that is publicly. Indeed “the greater the number of people 
who hear this lashon ha-ra, the greater the speaker’s sin because his chaver suffers more 
denigration.”17 Speaking lashon ha-ra in public, then, is worse than speaking it in private, 
and speaking it to a large audience is worse than speaking it to a small one. 
Kagan devotes the rest of the chapter to debunking the perceived leniency 
regarding speech bifnei t’lata, which derives from the following teaching in b. Arakhin 
16a attributed to R. Rabbah bar Rav Huna (BA3): “Anything said in the presence of three 
is not lishna bisha because your chaver (rabbinic colleague) has a chaver and the chaver 
of your chaver has a chaver.” Kagan’s legal arguments on this issue are among the 
longest and most complex in Sefer Chafetz Chaim. While it is beyond the scope of this 
project to present them in full, I will summarize two of them here.  
The first concerns a commentary in the tosafot on Rabbah bar Rav Huna’s 
teaching.18 The tosafot reasons that because such remarks inevitably become widely 
                                                
16 Kagan, Preface: 8; Levy, 1: 17. As noted above, the other is that hamon — the general Jewish public — 
does not understand that lashon ha-ra applies to truthful remarks as well as those that are false. 
 
17 Kagan, 2.1: 41-42; Levy, 1: 321.  
 
18The tosafot consists of glosses from various medieval rabbis that appear in most printed editions of the 
Bavli. This commentary actually accompanies b. Bava Batra 39a, which repeats the teaching attributed to 
R. Rabbah bar Rav Huna in b. Arachin 16a. 
  
 96 
known — that is, public — one must assume they will get back to the subject. Thus, it is 
as if the speaker has made them b’panai. And according to the passage in b. Arakhin 15b 
immediately preceding Rabbah bar Huna’s ruling, anything said about someone in his 
presence is not lashon ha-ra.19  
 Kagan finds this position kasha m’od (very difficult or problematic) because it is 
too permissive.20 Taken at face value, he argues, it seems to permit even false derogatory 
remarks as long as they are spoken in public, and certainly that can’t be the intent of the 
tosafot. He argues that the actual meaning of this commentary can be understood only in 
light of the one on remarks b’panai. In that gloss the tosafot permits only ambiguous 
remarks b’panai, or as Kagan puts it, remarks that “are not entirely demeaning or 
damaging.”21 In the be’er he says the leniency applies only to remarks that are ambiguous 
and “could be understood as not containing lashon ha-ra.”22  
Kagan reads the tosafot as arguing that, in regard to ambiguous remarks, one must 
assume that a typical Jew will be especially careful not to say anything demeaning or 
harmful about another Jew to his face. Thus, as long as a remark b’panai has a plausible 
meaning that is not demeaning or damaging, the speaker deserves the benefit of the 
                                                
19 As Kagan notes, several other prominent authorities make the same connection between these two 
leniencies. R. Shmuel ben Meir (Rashbam), for example, argues that because comments bifnei t’lata will 
inevitably become public, the subject is sure to hear about them, i.e. it is as if they were made b’panai. 
Thus it is permissible to tell the subject about them without violating the prohibition against r’khilut. Kagan 
explicitly rejects this leniency, finding “no basis to support Rashbam.” See Kagan, 2.3.6: 46-47; Levy 1: 
385. He repeats this rejection in Kagan, R2.3: 131-132; Levy, 4: 139. 
 
20 Kagan, 2.1.1: 41, Levy, 1: 325.  
 
21 Kagan, 2.2: 42; Levy, 1: 337. 
  
22 Kagan, 2.2.2: 43; Levy, 1: 341. 
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doubt. One must assume that he intended the benign meaning, which means the remark is 
not lashon ha-ra.23  
However, while the tosafot permits certain ambiguous remarks b’panai, Kagan 
insists this leniency does not extend to lashon ha-ra gamurah — remarks that are 
patently demeaning or otherwise harmful. And because the position of the tosafot on 
remarks b’panai is the basis for its position on remarks bifnei t’lata, it therefore does not 
permit patently derogatory remarks spoken bifnei t’lata for the very reason that they are 
likely to get back to the subject. Instead the tosafot allows only remarks that have a 
plausible positive or neutral meaning and are delivered in a way that does not contradict 
or undermine that meaning. (In Kagan’s view, this also absolves those who listen to such 
ambiguous remarks b’panei or bifnei t’lata as long as they do not infer a negative 
meaning.)24  
Likewise, Kagan seeks to narrow if not eliminate a leniency cited by Maimonides 
regarding remarks bifnei t’lata: “If the speaker made his remarks in front of three people, 
then those remarks are considered to have become generally known in society. And if one 
of the three people repeats them, he will not be in violation of the prohibition against 
lashon ha-ra as long as he does not intend to spread the information further.”25 
Maimonides does not absolve the original speaker of lashon ha-ra, only those 
who repeat the remarks. His argument is that because remarks bifnei t’lata eventually 
                                                
23 Kagan, 2.2.2: 43; Levy, 1: 343. According to Kagan, whether the ambiguous statement can plausibly be 
understood in a non-negative sense depends on the speaker’s demeanor as well as the words themselves. 
“With a little change of expression, the speaker can alter the entire meaning to be either degrading or not 
degrading.” The former is avak lashon ha-ra and is not permitted. 
  
24 Kagan, 2.2.2: 43-44, Levy 1: 345 and 347.  
 
25 Maimonides, Hilchot De’ot, 7:5, as cited by Kagan. 
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become widely known, those who hear the comments can repeat them as long as they do 
not knowingly convey the information to someone who has not heard it yet. According to 
Kagan, the key factor for Maimonides is the intent of the person who repeats the original 
remark. Only if he intends to spread the negative information and thereby further demean 
or harm the subject it is lashon ha-ra.26 
In a long series of legal arguments, Kagan whittles away at Maimonides’ position. 
It applies only to someone who hears the derogatory remarks first hand27 and only if he 
l’sapeir b’derekh akrai (relates the information randomly or by chance).28 The sense here 
is that the speaker is not culpable only if he repeats the original remark inadvertently as 
opposed to deliberately. While Kagan and Maimonides agree that repeating remarks 
heard bifnei t’lata with the intent of spreading the information violates the prohibition 
against lashon ha-ra, Kagan’s position is stricter. Maimonides allows the speaker to 
deliberately repeat the remarks as long as he is not trying to disseminate the information. 
Kagan, however, argues that deliberately repeating the information under any 
                                                
26 Kagan, 2.2.3: 44-45; Levy, 1: 361. In his commentary on b. Arakhin 16a, R. Shlomo Yitzhaki (Rashi) 
also holds that someone who “reveals what is said bifnei t’lata” is not guilty of lashon ha-ra because the 
original speaker either intends for the information to become public or does not care if it does. Unlike 
Maimonides, however, Rashi does not cite the intent of those who repeat the remark as a factor in this 
leniency. Kagan describes Rashi as ambiguous. He might merely be agreeing with Rashbam that it is 
permissible to repeat the information, though only to the subject of the remarks, a position Kagan has 
already rejected out of hand. However, Kagan thinks it more likely that Rashi is identifying a leniency that 
applies only in the very narrow circumstance in which someone reveals sensitive information about himself. 
By telling three people, he indicates that he doesn’t care if they repeat it. 
 
27 Kagan, 2.4: 48; Levy, 1: 397. Unless “the report is already publicized (nitparseim) and known (noda) to 
everyone.” I will explore this exception in Chapter VI. 
 
28 Kagan, 2.3: 46; Levy, 1: 373.  
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circumstance, even without malice to someone who already knows it, is problematic. His 
rationale is that doing so inevitably hastens its dissemination.29  
Furthermore, if any of the three listeners is a God-fearing person who usually is 
careful not to speak lashon ha-ra, even this limited leniency does not apply because it 
cannot be assumed the remarks will eventually become widely known.30 Kagan also 
argues that the leniency of bifnei t’lata applies only in the city where the remarks are 
made31 and is void if the speaker cautions the listeners not to repeat them.32 After 
explaining all these restrictions, he concludes with an admonition. 
 
Understand, my brother, how important it is to avoid this leniency 
[regarding remarks made bifnei t’lata]. There is almost no place and no 
circumstance where we can meet all the conditions. And even if we do, we 
must study the law on this matter as it is the opinion of many authorities 
that there is no source for this leniency in the Talmud. Therefore, he who 
guards his soul will stay far away from this [leniency].33 
 
Kagan takes a similarly hard line in the next chapter against the leniency 
regarding remarks made directly to the subject or in his presence. “From one perspective, 
the sin is greater b’panai than not b’panai. Besides violating the prohibition against 
                                                
29 Kagan, 2.3.7: 47-48; Levy, 1: 393. We should recall here Kagan’s distinction between ba’alei lashon ha-
ra and those who l’sapeir g’nut chavero b’mikreh. While both deliberately say something about a fellow 
Jew, their motives are different. The former intend to demean or harm the subject. The latter do not. To put 
it another way, their remarks about the subject are intentional but the harmful effect of those remarks is not. 
Although they are not nearly as sinful as ba’alei lashon ha-ra, those who speak deliberately but demean 
unintentionally are still guilty of lashon ha-ra. Thus, in regard to repeating remarks made bifnei t’lata, it is 
not enough to speak without the malicious intent of spreading the information as Maimonides holds. In 
Kagan’s view, one must actually speak b’derekh akrai — inadvertently or, as Levy describes it, “without 
premeditation during a chance conversation.”   
 
30 Kagan, 2.5: 49-50; Levy, 1: 403. Or if one of the three is a friend or relative of the subject. 
  
31 Kagan, 2.6: 50-51; Levy, 1: 419. Even if there is frequent travel between the two cities.  
 
32 Kagan, 2.7: 51; Levy, 1: 423. 
  
33 Kagan, 2.10: 52; Levy, 1: 439 and 441. 
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lashon ha-ra, [the speaker] shows himself to be mean and impudent, and he arouses more 
contention.”34 In Kagan’s view, speaking b’panai is not a leniency. It is more sinful to 
speak badly about someone in his presence than when he is absent. 
The source of the leniency regarding remarks b’panai is the following exchange 
in b. Arakhin 15b between Rabbah and Abaye:  
 
Rabbah: Anything said [about a person] in his presence is not lishna bisha  
Abaye: [But in that case] it is all the more impudence and lishna bisha.  
Rabbah: I agree with R. Yose (T3) who said, “I have never said a word 
[about someone] and looked behind me [to see if he was there.]”  
 
The issue at stake in this debate seems to be whether one may speak bluntly about a 
person when addressing him directly as Rabbah’s initial statement indicates, or whether, 
as Abaye argues, one must be more circumspect when speaking b’panai so as not to 
offend or embarrass.  
It is important to take note of the connection in rabbinic literature between 
remarks b’panai and those bifnei t’lata. As mentioned above, the tosafot and Rashi cite 
the Talmudic passage regarding the former as the underlying legal rationale permitting 
the latter. Kagan himself describes them as “one and the same law”35 and was well aware 
that the status of remarks b’panai had important implications for public discourse and 
controversy. His purpose was to debunk the perception that one was free to speak 
negatively about someone bifnei t’lata — that is, in a context that ensured the remarks 
would get back to the subject  — because doing so demonstrated a willingness to say the 
same thing b’panai.   
                                                
34 Kagan, 3.1: 56; Levy, 2: 81. 
 
35 Kagan, 2.2.2: 44; Levy, 1: 347. 
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As we have already observed, Kagan endorses the opposite view. Essentially he 
agrees with Abaye’s position that a Jew must be especially careful not to say anything 
that could be construed as negative or demeaning about another Jew to his face — or, in 
the case of remarks bifnei t’lata, that is likely to get back to him.  He contends that 
authorities who apparently allow negative remarks bifnei t’lata based on the leniency 
regarding remarks b’panai must be referring not to comments that would otherwise be 
lashon ha-ra but rather to permissible negative remarks  — those spoken to or about a 
Jew who is no longer amitekha, for instance, or that are spoken to protect the innocent 
from harm.36 Kagan ends the long be’er on this issue with a caution similar to the one 
regarding remarks bifnei t’lata: 
 
We know all this (that remarks that would otherwise be lashon ha-ra are 
forbidden even if they are or would be made in the presence of the subject) 
from Rambam (Maimonides), the SeMag (Rabbi Moses ben Jacob of 
Coucy), the tosafot and Rabbeinu Yonah. And who would be so bold as to 
cite a leniency in opposition to all these authorities?37  
 
I am not suggesting that Kagan treats more lenient positions regarding comments 
bifnei t’lata and b’panai unfairly from the standpoint of rabbinic hermeneutics, or that his 
own strict positions are without precedent. Rather my point is that his effort to render 
                                                
36Kagan, 3.1.1: 56-57; Levy, 2: 83-103. Note particularly his analysis of Rashi, R. Eliezar ben Samuel of 
Metz in Sefer Yere’im and Rabbeinu Yonah in Shaare Teshuvah. See also Kagan, 7.1 and 7.2 and 10.7: 91 
and 118-119; Levy, 3: 85, 87, 237 and 239. In the first two clauses he prohibits believing lashon ha-ra 
“even if the speaker makes his remarks publicly in front of many people” or “claims that he would have 
made those same remarks b’panai.” In the second, he says that in situations when it is permissible to 
denounce another Jew, it is better to do so bifnei t’lata rather than discreetly. In this way the speaker 
demonstrates not only that he is not lying and has a legitimate reason for making the remarks but also that 
is he not afraid that the subject will find out about them. Kagan’s position, then, is that while it is preferable 
to make justifiable negative or demeaning remarks bifnei t’lata or b’pannai, speaking bifnei t’lata or 
b’panai does not justify negative or demeaning remarks. 
 
37 Kagan, 3.1.1: 57; Levy, 2: 103.  
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these perceived leniencies irrelevant indicates that his primary concern — as stated 
explicitly in the preface — was demeaning and/or confrontational public discourse.  
This conclusion is supported by a number of his observations about lashon ha-ra 
in contemporary Jewish society that associate it with public controversy, referred to in 
rabbinic literature as machloket. For example, Kagan argues that publicly denouncing a 
Jew for committing a halakhic offense that harms another Jew is permissible only if one’s 
intent is to achieve a beneficial outcome — either to help the wronged person limit or 
recover damages or to prevent others from being wronged.38 This is true even if the 
potential harm is not imminent. Thus, one can denounce the subject to others in order to 
warn them to stay away from him.  
However, having already placed nine limiting conditions on this leniency in a 
previous clause,39 Kagan adds another: One may not disclose this kind of offense to 
ba’alei rasha (masters of evil) — those who routinely commit the same interpersonal 
offense and do not consider it sinful. Denouncing the offender to these people not only 
serves no purpose but also results in kilkul gadol (great harm) because they are almost 
certain to tell the offender about the speaker’s remarks, thereby creating animosity 
between them.40 Denouncing someone to such people “usually causes machlokot g’dolot 
(great controversies) and in particular can lead to malshinut (informing on a fellow Jew to 
non-Jewish authorities).” When faced with this kind of situation, Kagan concludes, one 
                                                
38 The disclosure is not permissible, however, if the speaker has any personal or financial motivation. Thus 
the speaker could not tell others about the incident if he dislikes the subject and would derive satisfaction 
from denouncing him. 
 
39 They are listed in Kagan, 10.2: 112-114; Levy, 3: 271 and 273. I will address these conditions in Chapter 
VI.  
 
40 Thus the speaker would be inciting these listeners to commit the sin of r’khilut. 
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must refrain from denouncing the person who has committed an interpersonal sin, even if 
all the other conditions for doing so are met.41 In the be’er Kagan states even more 
explicitly that the contentiousness of contemporary Jewish society demands exercising 
great restraint when it comes to publicizing one Jew’s offense against another.  
 
Based on what is seen [in society today], because of our many sins, the 
comments will get back to the accused and result is machlokot ravot 
v’atzimot (many great controversies) without any benefit. (It is understood 
that the basic reason for prohibiting r’khilut is to prevent controversy 
among the Jewish people.) It is more likely that [the person who discloses 
the offense] will provoke controversy and will not cause people to refrain 
from [the subject’s] evil ways . . . Even though there is a slight reason to 
permit these disclosures because [the subject] might be influenced by 
public opinion and change his lifestyle from bad to good and compensate 
[the person he wronged], nevertheless it seems obvious to decide the law 
stringently. . . This slight possibility [is outweighed] by the greater 
likelihood of conflict if the remarks were permitted.42  
 
This passage reveals several salient points. First, it indicates that condemning or 
otherwise publicizing interpersonal offenses often was not an effective social sanction 
and instead merely exacerbated dissention and machlokot. More important, while Kagan 
no doubt sympathizes with those eager to denounce interpersonal sins and warn the 
public about the “evil person” committing them, it is exactly this kind of denunciation — 
presumably by traditionally observant Jews — that he describes as dangerously divisive 
and seeks to limit. And because it is in the be’er, we can infer that this warning is 
directed at ba’alei torah.  
                                                
41 Kagan, 10.4: 116; Levy, 3: 301. 
 
42 Kagan, 10.4.18: 116; Levy, 3: 311. Kagan does, however, add a caveat: If the victim would inevitably 
discover that he has been wronged and if he is able to protect himself or recover his loss, then one may 
disclose the offense to him.  
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We should also consider Kagan’s position when the interpersonal offense is 
lashon ha-ra. If someone hears one Jew disparaging another, he is permitted to “publicize 
[the speaker’s] terrible offense to b’nei adam (society in general),” but only if the subject 
of the lashon ha-ra already knows about it. Otherwise he may not disclose the remarks to 
anyone lest word get back to the subject. If that were to happen, the observer would be 
guilty of r’khilut. So concerned was Kagan about preventing animosity among Jews that 
this stringency applies “even if [the speaker] is min ha-pachutim (an inferior person or 
boor) who is mocking a prestigious figure in the community, including [the observer’s] 
own father or rabbi.”43  
Kagan qualifies this position in the be’er, where he cites a ruling in the Shulkhan 
Aruch that permits a person to denounce a fellow Jew in order to “zealously defend the 
honor of a Torah sage.”44 In the next clause, he says this leniency also pertains to 
denigrating remarks about other Jews, not just Torah sages, but only in a limited way: 
Only if the speaker is likely to repeat the remarks to others may one denounce him 
publicly. Kagan’s rationale is that exposing the speaker as a boor and his remarks as 
sinful will limit further damage to the victim’s reputation. This benefit trumps concern 
about animosity that might develop from the victim learning about the remarks. Kagan 
then explains why it is important to pre-empt the speaker in this way. 
  
. . . as a result of our many sins, we all fail when it comes to lashon ha-ra, 
especially accepting lashon ha-ra. [Given this situation] it is probable that 
[the speaker’s] lashon ha-ra will be accepted as true, and it will be hard to 
remove his words from their hearts after the fact . . . Therefore it is 
                                                
43 Kagan, 10.5: 117; Levy, 3: 313 and 315. 
 
44 Kagan, 10.5.20: 117; Levy, 3: 317. 
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certainly correct to pre-empt [the speaker] and lay out before the people 
the great injustice of his remarks and somehow defend [the subject].45  
 
There is tension evident in these two clauses as Kagan tries to balance conflicting 
concerns — limiting public denunciations of those who speak lashon ha-ra in order to 
avoid exacerbating animosity among Jews on the one hand, and allowing such 
denunciations in order to defend individuals whose reputations were being harmed on the 
other. Central to both positions, however, is Kagan’s description of a divided and 
contentious Jewish society in which people frequently — even eagerly — engaged in 
derogatory discourse about one another.     
Kagan gives us another glimpse of public discord in contemporary Jewish society 
in his discussion of how those who routinely speak lashon ha-ra violate the 
commandment to fear God as well as the prohibition against using God’s name in vain:  
 
Since we are discussing this mitzvah (to fear God), I thought I should issue 
a warning about something that occurs commonly in our society, namely 
invoking [God’s] name in vain . . . Someone will see something done that 
is against the Torah and become upset. Because of the many sins of 
society, ba’alei lashon (masters of the tongue) make jokes about him and 
mock him, saying, “What is the difference between [the protestor] and [the 
person he criticizes]? He puts on a cloak of fear and zealously defends h’ 
tzeva’ot (the Lord of the heavenly hosts) but he is a bigger transgressor.”46 
 
Kagan’s point is that by using the term tzeva’ot, one of the seven holy names that 
should never be spoken, the ba’alei lashon who publicly mock the protester demonstrate 
that they have no fear of God. However, this does not appear to be a dispute about the 
importance of halakhic observance per se. It is not even clear that those mocking this 
                                                
45 Kagan, 10.6: 117-118; Levy, 3: 319 and 321. 
 
46 Kagan, Introduction (asah 11): 32; Levy 1: 251.  
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person disagree with his assessment that a halakhic violation has occurred. They are 
criticizing him not for being a zealous defender of the law but rather for being a hypocrite 
who routinely violates the same or a similar law. Kagan seems to be describing a public 
dispute among traditionally observant Jews about a specific allegation and the moral 
credibility of the accuser. Not only does he portray such disputes as common but he also 
indicates that they were typically characterized by vicious, demeaning rhetoric. 
 
The traditional context and content of public disputes 
 The preceding analysis shows that Kagan viewed lashon ha-ra as widespread in 
Jewish society and associated it with frequent public disputes and controversies. In the 
last part of this chapter I will look more closely at the content of these disputes and the 
contexts in which they were occurring.   
A number of Kagan’s observations depict lashon ha-ra as common in the beit 
midrash or directed at talmidei chakhamim (Talmudic sages). In one clause, for example, 
he says it is forbidden to live in the same neighborhood with people who routinely speak 
lashon ha-ra or to associate with them or listen to their conversations.47 However, this is 
not some small group of deviants who isolate themsleves from the rest of the community 
or who otherwise can be easily identified and avoided. In the same clause he explains 
what a Torah scholar must do “if he discovers that one of his students is a ba’al lashon 
ha-ra.” Even Torah students, it seems, were among those who routinely denigrated their 
fellow Jews.48  
                                                
47 Kagan, 9.4:110; Levy, 3: 251. 
  
48 He must “distance himself” from the student if a reprimand would be useless. In the same clause Kagan 
discusses the obligations of a person who finds himself among ba-alei lashon ha-ra “due to circumstances 
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The widespread presence of ba-alei lashon ha-ra in Jewish society becomes even 
more apparent in an accompanying hagahah, where Kagan writes, “From this [the 
prohibition against living near or associating with ba’alei lashon ha-ra] we can learn that 
most certainly one must be very careful not to choose for himself a seat in the synagogue 
or in the beit midrash that is near ba’alei lashon ha-ra.”49 Those who routinely spoke the 
kind of rhetoric that Kagan viewed as sinful were present in the most traditional settings 
of religious study and prayer.  
Elsewhere Kagan observes that “many people make the mistake of telling their 
wives about the wrongs done to them by others in the beit midrash or the marketplace.” 
This is lashon ha-ra, he warns, and inevitably results in controversy because the wives 
will bear a grudge against their husbands’ antagonists and argue with them and their 
family members.50 The chauvinism aside, this observation associates lashon ha-ra with 
disputes arising in the beit midrash.51  
 In another clause, Kagan not only tells us that lashon ha-ra was common in the 
beit midrash but also provides insight into its content:  
 
                                                                                                                                            
beyond his control.” He must rebuke them if it would not worsen the situation. If they are denigrating a 
righteous person, “this is the one circumstance where he is obligated to get up and leave” so as not to 
appear to be participating in the sinful discussion.  
 
49 Kagan, 9.4 (h): 110; Levy, 3: 253. The danger is not just that these people will tempt a person to speak 
lashon ha-ra. Sitting near them in synagogue might cause a person to miss saying an “amen” or distract 
him during the Torah reading. And in the beit midrash, ba-alei lashon ha-ra distract others from studying 
the text. 
  
50 Kagan, 8.10: 106; Levy, 3: 217.  
 
51 See also Kagan, R7.1: 144-145; Levy 4: 249. Kagan forbids speaking or believing r’khilut regardless of 
whether it is about a man, a woman or a close relative. “People often make this mistake,” he says. He then 
gives an example: Someone sees two boys hitting each other and tells the father of one of them about the 
fight, causing “great conflict” between the fathers of the two boys. “Very often, this [occurs] in the beit 
midrash.”  
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I find it necessary to write this explicitly because I have seen that many 
people are accustomed [to speaking lashon ha-ra] about someone when he 
gives a lecture in the beit midrash. . . The law forbids mocking him and 
saying that his drashot (scriptural interpretations) are without substance 
and not worth listening to. And because of our many sins, we see that 
many people erupt in this manner . . . According to the law, this is 
unmitigated lashon ha-ra because speech like this often causes monetary 
damage and sometimes distress and shame as well . . . [The critic] should 
approach [the lecturer] one-on-one after his talk to suggest that he change 
his method because his remarks are not being heeded . . . But under no 
circumstance can this critic make a public mockery of the lecturer.52 
 
This passage describes the routine “eruption” of mockery and derision directed at 
lecturers in the beit midrash, the traditional setting of religious study. A long hagahah 
sheds even more light on the substance of the criticism: In addition to being ridiculed “for 
not knowing what he is talking about,” a lecturer in the beit midrash was likely to be 
criticized for speaking “to satisfy his personal needs” — that is, to collect a fee.  
 
Even if he wanted to collect a fee but also wanted to increase Torah 
knowledge and observance, he is still a righteous person . . . From the 
perspective of truth, we are required to give the lecturer the benefit of the 
doubt (regarding his motives) . . . Maybe at the time he preaches, his basic 
intention is that everyone hear words of musar and yirat ha-shamayin 
(fear of heaven) . . . Usually this criticism [of the lecturer] comes from 
people who themselves have no yirat ha-shamayim, so criticism for lax 
Torah observance grates on them. The shortcomings they assign to the 
lecturer are really their own. Because of our many sins, the critic’s ridicule 
stems from a hatred of the lecturer. In some instances he may be an 
authority who ruled against [the critic] in some civil matter. Or perhaps it 
is in the nature of critics to hate decent men because they disapprove of 
their lowly behavior . . . When one carefully considers the actions of the 
critics and their listeners, one will find that they violated every one of the 
laveen and aseeen described in the Introduction.53  
 
                                                
52 Kagan, 2.12: 53-55; Levy, 1: 449. A one-sentence hagahah adds a caveat — “unless the lecture includes 
heresy.” We will explore this exception in Chapter V.  
 
53 Kagan, 2.12 (h): 54; Levy, 1: 451-457. 
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In these passages Kagan describes unabashed animosity toward lecturers in the 
beit midrash. They were routinely ridiculed not only as boring and ignorant but venal as 
well. Apparently it was also common for critics to resent a lecturer’s moral critiques of 
Jewish society and to hold grudges against rabbinic decisors for past rulings. More 
important, this anger and derision was not coming from outsiders but from within the beit 
midrash itself. The setting and criticism are entirely traditional. Not only do they portray 
a lack of deference toward the scholarly elite, but they also indicate the presence of hard-
edged rivalry if not outright animosity among them.  
In another clause Kagan explains that believing lashon ha-ra about chakhamim 
(sages) is an especially grave sin. If adam beinoni (an average Jew) deserves the benefit 
of the doubt, “all the more so if the [subject] is a God-fearing person for whom it is even 
more imperative to fulfill the positive commandment to judge your countryman 
favorably.”54 Although the mekor does not further identify a “God-fearing person,” a long 
hagahah focuses exclusively on criticism of the beit din or individual rabbinic decisors. 
 
We often find that when someone leaves the beit din after having lost a 
case, [a litigant] will go over to a friend and lay out in front of him all 
of his arguments demonstrating his innocence. This person continues 
to speak against the beit din, cursing them and defaming them, saying 
things I could not print . . . He finds errors and inconsistencies in the 
verdict based on his understanding of the law . . . [and] both he and his 
friend are convinced that the rabbi or the beit din of that city are not 
reasonable or capable of making a just verdict . . . 55  
 
In the same hagahah, Kagan goes on to say that that the friend must not believe or 
encourage such criticism and should try to convince the disgruntled litigant that the 
                                                
54 Kagan, 6.8: 84; Levy, Vol. 2: 347-349. 
 
55 Kagan, 6.8 (h): 84-85; Levy, 2: 349-355.  
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court’s decision was correct. What’s more, “Regarding [an acknowledged Talmudic 
sage], the commandment to judge favorably applies even if circumstances point to the 
side of culpability.” Thus, Kagan argues, even if the litigant argues convincingly that the 
beit din erred, his friend must suspect that he did not present his case so convincingly to 
the court. Even if, after examining the facts thoroughly, the friend can find no 
justification for the court’s decision, he still may not believe the court was wrong or 
criticize its verdict publicly. Instead he should approach the rabbi or a member of the 
court privately to get a more thorough explanation.  
That Kagan would defend the authority of the beit din and rabbinic decisors is less 
significant than the contemporary social reality his defense reveals: frequent public 
criticism of rulings by the beit din, the institution through which rabbis exerted their 
authority. And as in the previous passage, the critics were traditionalists. They were not 
challenging the authority of the beit din per se but rather criticizing the halakhic 
soundness of a particular ruling or the legal acumen of a particular court or decisor.  
Likewise, in another clause ostensibly dealing with the prohibition against 
believing lashon ha-ra about unlearned Jews, Kagan instead emphasizes how much 
greater a sin it is to believe lashon ha-ra about a Torah sage, especially a rabbinic 
decisor. 
 
A person’s evil inclination persuades him to believe the prohibition 
against belittling a talmid chakham applied only to [the Mishnaic-
Talmudic period], when the sages were very great, and not in our time. 
But this is pure error. Each talmid chakham is appropriate for his 
generation. Even in our time, one who teaches and toils in Torah is called 
a talmid chakham [and deserves the same respect]. The person who scorns 
him is a sinful criminal and must be excommunicated. And even more so 
if this talmid chakham is a morah hora-ah ba-ir (the legal decisor of a 
community), the sin [of believing lashon ha-ra about him] is certainly 
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much more serious. Besides being obligated to respect and honor him (the 
decisor) because he (the critic) relies on his decisions, the person who 
denigrates the chakham prevents society from serving God. It will cause 
people to ask, “Why should we approach him with questions about our 
legal affairs if he cannot mediate [correctly] among us.” As a result each 
[person] will build an altar for himself (i.e. rely on his own legal 
interpretations).56 
  
Rabbis often use this “all the more so” formulation to emphasize their own status 
and authority within Jewish society. However, I would argue that this passage — 
particularly the left-handed support of contemporary chakhamim and the hyperbolic 
condemnation of their critics — indicates that hostility toward Torah sages, particularly 
rabbinic decisors, was widespread. It’s also clear that Kagan viewed this attitude as a 
threat to the status of religious courts and the fabric of Jewish society. I would also point 
out that, as was the case in previous passages, the criticism he describes reflects 
dissatisfaction with contemporary rabbis and their decisions, not with the idea of rabbinic 
authority itself. In that sense it appears to be coming from traditionalists.  
We should also consider Kagan’s argument that the prohibition against r’khilut 
(telling one person the bad thing another has said about him or done to him) applies even 
to reminding a person of something he already knows about — a case he lost before the 
beit din, for example.  This merely causes him to remember his loss and “to hate [his 
court opponent.]”57 In the be’er, however, Kagan indicates that he is worried about 
comments that undermine the court’s authority or cast doubt on it ability to decide the 
                                                
56 Kagan, 8.4: 104; Levy, 3: 195 and 197. See also Kagan, R7.2: 145; Levy, 4: 253 and 255. Although the 
clause begins with an admonition not to speak r’khilut about am ha-aretz, it is devoted almost entirely to 
the gravity of spreading r’khilut about a chakham. Because a sage would not do or say anything that 
wrongly harms another Jew, such gossip is all but certain to be a lie, Kagan argues. More important, since 
Torah sages are so important in Jewish society, the animosity created by gossiping about them is greater 
and results in more controversy and danger.   
 
57 Kagan, R4.1: 135; Levy, 4: 169.  
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law correctly. And that fact that it appears in the be’er indicates that it was intended to 
suppress second-guessing of the beit din among the scholarly elite. 
 
Even if he knows all the arguments on both sides, it is forbidden to speak 
in the presence of the person found liable because what good would come 
of it since the verdict is final and irrevocable. If there was a mistake that 
would reverse the ruling, he should not tell this to [the litigant] but rather 
discreetly approach the beit din to discuss the matter. Perhaps they will 
reverse the ruling.58  
 
In addition to Torah sages and the beit din, Kagan’s observations about 
contemporary society also describe animosity toward and among tovei ha-ir (city 
administrators) — that is, members of the kahal. For example, he says tovei ha-ir must be 
careful not to reveal their own positions or the positions of their colleagues in split 
decisions involving issues in which “someone loses and another gains.”59 They must not 
“blame [fellow administrators] and exempt themselves, even if it is true.”60  
In the be’er Kagan warns that revealing information about split decisions causes 
“arguments and a sense of hatred [among those adversely affected]” toward the 
administrators who voted against them. But it appears that he is also addressing disputes 
among communal leaders themselves. Arguing that “the informed opinion of the majority 
is much more likely to be closer to the truth than the view of the minority,” he 
                                                
58 Kagan, R4.1.2: 135; Levy, 4: 171. 
 
59 The phrase is hanhagat anshei ha-ir b’iny’nai ha-arakhot v’khayotzei ba-zeh b’davar she-hu chov lazeh 
v’zakhut lazeh. Levy translates this as “the amount of tax each resident should pay or something like this in 
which one party gains and another party loses.” Although civil authorities did apportion the tax burden, we 
shouldn’t assume that Kagan was referring only to financial winners and losers. As I will explain, decisions 
by the kahal about how to fulfill the conscription quotas for the Russian army created many non-financial 
winners and losers. 
 
60 Kagan, 2.11: 52-53; Levy, 1: 441 and 443. Even if the administrators do not agree to keep private their 
individual positions on an issue, an administrator who votes in the minority cannot relate his own opinion 
even casually to a disinterested third party lest it get back to one of those involved.  
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admonishes the latter to accede to the former once it becomes clear what the decision will 
be. In effect, he urges communal leaders to put up a united front on controversial 
decisions, even if they privately disagree.61 Kagan’s position certainly has halakhic 
precedent.62 My point, however, is that it not only reflects concern that controversial 
decisions were eroding support for communal authorities but also indicates that some 
communal leaders were inciting public dissension by openly resisting or criticizing 
decisions of the majority.  
The same view is implicit in Kagan’s warning not to praise a person in public on 
the theory that in any group there will be those who, because they dislike or envy the 
person, will respond by denigrating him.63 The be’er elaborates by putting this 
prohibition specifically in the context of speaking about g’dolei ha-dor (great or 
important people of the time) in a public setting.  
 
One can learn a lesson from this, namely how important it is to stay away 
from gatherings where people speak the praises of even g’dolei ha-dor 
because it is virtually certain that as a result of their praise the 
conversation will lapse into lashon ha-ra, and we know that the 
consequences of speaking lashon ha-ra against such people are far more 
serious than speaking lashon ha-ra against an ordinary Jew.64 
 
The significance of this passage is not just that Kagan condemns the denigration 
of important people as an especially grave offense but that he also describes it as so 
                                                
61 Kagan, 2.11.23: 53; Levy, 1: 443-447. See also Kagan, R3.1.2: 133; Levy, 4: 151 where he explains that 
the same prohibition applies to telling litigants how individual members of the beit din voted. 
  
62 He cites b. Sanhedrin 29a, which prohibits a judge from telling the litigants that he favored one side but 
was overruled by the majority, and b. Sanhedrin 86b, which condemns the “rebellious sage” who disagrees 
with the majority of the Jerusalem court and follows the minority opinion. 
   
63 The person who denigrates the subject is guilty of lashon ha-ra while the person who intentionally 
incites the derogatory comments by praising the subject is guilty of avak lashon ha-ra.  
 
64 Kagan, 9.2.7: 109; Levy, 3: 247. 
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routine that one should expect it even at gatherings where they are being honored. This 
indicates that public dissatisfaction with and criticism of civic leaders was widespread. It 
also suggests that there were rivalries among them and their followers that resulted in the 
kind of rhetoric that Kagan viewed as lashon ha-ra. 
 
Disputes about money and business 
Many of Kagan’s observations also associate lashon ha-ra with disputes about 
money, particularly those involving contracts and commercial activity. In discussing the 
prohibition against believing r’chilut, for example, Kagan offers the example of a 
businessman who has lost a government contract.  
 
For example, he loses a government lease and doesn’t know whether 
someone spoke against him or whether the government official made the 
decision on his own. It is forbidden for him to suspect a fellow Jew . . . 
Even if he hears that this person caused his loss, he is not permitted to 
believe this to be true, only to suspect.65  
 
In a related hagahah, it becomes clear that this is not a chance example. “Because 
of our many sins, many problems arise from this bad character trait of believing r’khilut,” 
Kagan says. He then offers two more examples in the hope that “through God’s mercy it 
will have some impact by revealing the deceit of the yetzer hara (evil inclination).” 
 The first example involves a Jewish businessman who inquires about the loss of a 
government lease. A government official blames another Jew in order to deflect blame 
from himself. “Immediately [the victim’s] response is to believe in his heart that this is 
true.” The second example involves a gentile businessman who has agreed to purchase 
                                                
65 Kagan, R6.3: 140-141; Levy, 4: 213. This is true even if  “society in general” believes him to be the 
cause of the victim’s loss.  
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“mashka (liquor) or the like” from a Jewish distributor. (Typically, such a distributor 
would have held a leasehold agreement with a private magnate or other gentile authority.) 
The context here is that the gentile customer and the Jewish distributor have struck but 
not consummated a deal. From a halakhic standpoint, it would be improper for another 
Jew to offer the buyer a better price or do anything that interferes with the existing 
agreement. In this case, however, the customer approaches a second Jewish dealer who, 
unaware of the pending arrangement, sells him the same merchandize at a lower price. 
When the first dealer asks the gentile buyer why he has reneged on their agreement, the 
buyer tells him the second dealer came to him with a better offer. “And he [the first 
dealer] immediately believes this is absolutely true and thinks the other Jew is a rasha 
(evil person) who has improperly interfered with his business.”66 
Kagan portrays gentile officials and businessmen as unethical and the cause of 
frequent misunderstandings and animosity among Jews who trade with them.67 
Regardless of whether this passage inaccurately stereotypes non-Jewish businessmen or 
rationalizes the questionable practices of their Jewish counterparts, it indicates that 
commerce with gentiles — specfically commerce related to government leaseholds —
 was a frequent context for the kind of discourse among Jews that Kagan considered 
lashon ha-ra.  
This is supported by another passage in which he explains that r’khilut is an even 
more serious sin when the remarks are made to a non-Jew. “Yet there are people who 
                                                
66 Kagan, R6.3 (h): 140-141; Levy, 4: 215-221.  
 
67 In the same clause he explains, “There are [gentile] buyers who, even after making a purchase agreement 
with one [seller], will go to other [Jewish] dealers of the same kind, perhaps to get a little lower price than 
the first deal.”  
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very often make just this mistake. They tell a nakhri (a foreigner, or non-Jew) about a 
defect in merchandise sold to him by a Jew or in the work done for him [by a Jew] or 
something like this. And this results in the loss of his livelihood.”68   
Elsewhere, Kagan indicates that sinful discourse was common even in business 
transactions that did not involve gentiles. 
  
Now I will explain a mistake made by many people. It is common for 
someone to bring merchandise to a city to sell and see many buyers. And 
frequently someone without the money to complete a transaction 
immediately selects merchandise and asks the dealer not to sell it to 
someone else until he can return with his money. During this time, other 
buyers come to [the merchant] and pressure him to sell them the same 
merchandise, and he agrees. And when the first buyer returns [with his 
money] and asks for his merchandise, the seller says, “So-and-so came, 
and I did not want to sell him [your merchandise] but he threw down 
money and took [the merchandise]. I reluctantly acceded because I didn’t 
want to start a quarrel.” By doing this, the merchant absolutely violates the 
Torah prohibition against peddling gossip among your people, even 
though [the second buyer] also committed a serious sin by pressuring the 
merchant to sell merchandise he had promised to someone else. . . It is 
necessary to be very careful in such circumstances not to reveal the name 
of the second buyer even if the merchant takes the blame himself for 
making the deal. It is likely the admission will still cause the first buyer to 
hate the second in his heart, thinking that he diminished his livelihood. 
[The merchant] should only say, “I sold it to someone else by mistake.”69 
 
In this passage we learn not only that Kagan was troubled by the prevailing business 
practices of Jewish merchants and buyers but also that such transactions often were the 
context for the kind of discourse that he sought to suppress.  
                                                
68 Kagan, R 7.4: 145; Levy, 4: 257. In a related hagaha, Kagan says this clause pertains to false remarks. If 
the remarks are truthful and the speaker would be permitted to repeat them to a Jew in order to achieve a 
beneficial result, then he can also tell a non-Jew. Levy cites subsequent editions of Sefer Chafetz Chaim in 
which editors speculate that this hagahah was inserted to mollify censors. Regardless, my point remains: 
The clause portrays r’khilut as common in the context of business dealings with non-Jews.  
 
69 Kagan, R9.15: 157; Levy, 4: 357-361. He goes on to say that if the second buyer didn’t actually pressure 
the merchant too badly or the merchant didn’t tell him about the first agreement but simply sold the goods 
because it was a better deal, then by blaming the second buyer he commits the graver sin of motzi shem ra. 
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The view comes through even more clearly in another clause in which Kagan 
explains that one may not repeat stories about another Jew’s past halakhic violations (or 
the past violations of his family members) if the subject now conducts himself according 
to the law. His position is based on the rabbinic precedent that forbids publicly shaming a 
ba’al teshuvah (repentant sinner) by mentioning his previous sins.70 In the be’er, Kagan 
explains that the former sinner’s atonement is not complete until he rectifies the harm he 
wrought. A repentant thief, for example, must reimburse his victim. But Kagan allows a 
leniency when restitution is impossible or impractical. 
 
Either this person does not have the means to fulfill the mitzvah of 
restitution or it is not relevant — for example, [the person] was not an 
outright thief but his way of doing business was not strictly halakhic. It 
involved altercations and quarrels in which he snatched business from his 
fellow Jew as is typical [in contemporary society] because of our many 
sins. [This person’s] yetzer hara convinces him that his [unethical 
business practices] were not prohibited because he had to make a living. 
And now that this man has changed his evil ways and conducts his 
business properly, he is a ba’al teshuvah. There is absolutely no basis for 
denouncing this person, even if his earlier practices were common 
knowledge and he was unable [to make restitution] to everyone he had 
previously dealt with.71 
 
For my purposes, the relevant point is not Kagan’s position regarding the ba’al teshuvah 
but rather what he is telling us about commerce in contemporary Jewish society: 
Merchants and other business owners typically ignored or fudged halakhic standards, and 
                                                
70 Kagan, 4.1: 61-62; Levy, 4: 135. This applies even if the remarks are not made in the presence of the 
subject, and even if the comments were not intended to be demeaning and would not cause the listener to 
change his good opinion of the subject.  
 
71 Kagan, 4.1.3: 62; Levy, 2: 143. Kagan cites Rabbeinu Yonah’s ruling in Sha’are Teshuvah that public 
condemnations can be made “only for the sake of being zealous for the truth or to assist the victim of a 
sinner.” Neither of these purposes, Kagan reasons, pertains in the two situations he cites — the repentant 
thief who lacks the means to repay his victim and the formerly unethical businessman for whom there is no 
practical way to identify and repay all his victims. However, Sha’are Teshuva itself does not cite these 
specific exceptions. 
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their unethical or illegal business practices were the source of controversy and angry 
public discourse. 
Another clause deals with the kind of information that may be sought (or 
conveyed) by someone who is hiring an employee, entering into a business partnership or 
arranging a marriage.72 One may make discreet inquiries before entering into these kinds 
of contractual agreements, Kagan says, even if there is no reason to suspect that the 
prospective employee, partner or in-law has done something improper. Such inquiries 
have a legitimate purpose: To protect the inquirer from hiring a bad employee or entering 
into a bad partnership or marriage arrangement. Even if negative information is 
exchanged, neither the inquirer nor the respondent is guilty of speaking or believing 
lashon ha-ra as long as he does not intend to denigrate the subject of the inquiry, only 
discover (or reveal) pertinent information.73  
 However, there is an important caveat to this leniency: The inquirer should 
explain his purpose at the outset, emphasizing that he is seeking only information 
relevant to the business deal, not merely digging up dirt or hoping to incite the respondent 
into denigrating the subject. In an accompanying hagahah, Kagan indicates that improper 
inquiries were the norm in contemporary society.  
 
Yet most of society stumbles in this matter. Because of our many sins, in 
matters of matchmaking and the like, when they ask and inquire about the 
                                                
72 An arranged marriage involved a legal contract in which the fathers of the couple agreed to certain 
financial obligations — the amount of the bride’s dowry, for example, and in some cases a minimum level 
of support for the newlyweds from the groom’s family. Typically one father would want to make sure the 
other had the financial wherewithal to fulfill his obligations under the marriage contract. This is not to 
suggest that non-financial considerations weren’t also important in marriage arrangements. However, non-
financial factors such as the status of the families or the groom’s level of Torah scholarship had financial 
implications as well.   
 
73 Kagan, 4.11: 70-71; Levy, 2: 221 and 223. 
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nature of the participant (prospective groom, business associate or 
employee), they pretend as if they don’t have a bit of interest [in this 
person]. And in doing so, they violate this prohibition by causing their 
fellow Jews to speak lashon ha-ra.74 
 
There are dozens of other passages in which Kagan discusses lashon ha-ra in 
similar contexts or describes disputes related to financial losses, employment and 
commerce as common. Although it is not possible to examine them all, I will mention 
some: 
• One may not engage in lashon ha-ra even if it means the loss of one’s livelihood 
— for example, if a person’s employer is someone with “no sense of Torah” who will fire 
him for not speaking lashon ha-ra as he does. More important than Kagan’s position, for 
which there is much rabbinic precedent, is that he describes sinful discourse as common 
in the workplace, where owners and managers pressured employees to participate: “It is 
well known that, because of our many sins, these men are completely uninhibited by this 
profound sin.”75 
• The prohibition against spreading a calumny (hotzia dibah) about a fellow Jew 
also pertains to his merchandize or services. “It is very common, because of our many 
sins, that one shopkeeper spreads a calumny about another shopkeeper’s goods, all 
because of envy.”76 This is one of the few instances in which Kagan explicitly portrays 
lashon ha-ra as a lie. However, my point is that he places this common violation in the 
context of intense commercial competition.  
                                                
74 Kagan, 4.11: 72; Levy, 2: 227.  
 
75 Kagan, 1.6: 39; Levy, 1: 307.  
 
76 Kagan, 5.7: 77; Levy, 2: 273.  
 
 120 
 • One cannot demean a fellow Jew merely for “refusing a favor concerning a loan, 
charity, hospitality and the like.” Here Kagan appears to be referring to the provision of 
money or material comfort to fellow Jews that, while not required in a strict legal sense, 
nevertheless is expected of those who are righteous and ethical. It is “absolute lashon ha-
ra” to reveal that someone did not live up to this expectation. “And because of our many 
sins, many people fail in this regard. If he is not received in one city as pleasantly as he 
would like, when he travels to another city he publicizes this denigration to the important 
people there.” 77 
• If a businessman explores the possibility of ending one partnership and entering 
another but eventually decides not to, it is forbidden to tell the original partner. This is 
r’khilut because it would cause one partner to distrust the other. The same applies to a 
pending marriage arrangement in which the prospective groom or his family considers 
another potential bride.78  
• The last chapter of Sefer Chafetz Chaim discusses “cases in which r’khilut is not 
prohibited as long as we fulfill the necessary conditions.”79 I will explore this leniency in 
another chapter, but for now the important point is Kagan puts it in the context of 
someone “who sees that his chaver wants to participate in something with [another Jew] 
                                                
77 Kagan, 10.12: 121-122; Levy, 3: 367. See also Kagan, R8.3:. 146; Levy, 4: 265. In the latter Kagan 
forbids r’khilut in the context of loans and other financial favors. If one Jew turns down another’s request 
for a financial favor, it is forbidden for the rejected party to say, “So-and-so told me himself [that you 
granted him the same favor].” The point is that the subject will be angry at so-and-so for telling others 
about the favor and thereby putting him in the position of having to deal with their requests for a similar 
favor. 
  
78 Kagan, R2.4: 132; Levy, 4: 141 and 143. 
  
79 Kagan, R9 (introduction): 147; Levy, 4: 271. The be’er for this introduction is a long, unnumbered 
argument that the prohibition against lashon ha-ra is unlike any other Torah lav in that a person is 
responsible for indirect damages and becomes culpable even before they occur. His purpose is to caution 
readers not to be too quick to use the leniencies he is about to cite. My point, however, is that this warning 
reinforces the fact that he is addressing speech in the context of financial activity. 
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and he surmises that this affair certainly will turn out bad for him.”80 The sense is that he 
is talking about business venture or other financial transaction in which the observer’s 
chaver is likely to be taken advantage of or lose money.  
Kagan explores specific circumstances and examples throughout the chapter that 
bear this out: The chaver is about to hire an employee the observer knows to be a thief;81 
the chaver has legally finalized a business or financial deal with someone the observer 
knows will take advantage of him;82 the observer sees his chaver about to patronize a 
dishonest merchant (for example, one who marks up the price of his goods more than the 
halakhic limit of twenty percent),83 or the observer sees one customer convince a 
merchant to sell him goods that the merchant had already agreed to sell to another 
customer.84 
Finally, we should consider Kagan’s argument prohibiting the public 
condemnation of a fellow Jew who has committed a Torah violation “even if it is 
something that much of Jewish population is not careful to observe, for example, saying 
that someone does not want to study Torah . . .”85 One may not criticize a fellow Jew for 
a sin even if doing so is not likely to harm his reputation because most people commit the 
very same offense themselves. What’s interesting is that Kagan includes disregard for 
Torah study in this category.  
                                                
80 Kagan, R9.1: 147; Levy, 4:  275. 
  
81 Kagan, R.9.1.1: 147, Levy, 4: 277. 
 
82 Kagan, R9.5: 150-153; Levy, 4: 307 and 309. 
 
83 Kagan, R9.10: 153-154; Levy, 4:  329 and 331. 
 
84 Kagan, R9.15: 157; Levy, 4: 358.  
 
85 Kagan, 4.2: 62; Levy, 2: 145. 
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He elaborates in the be’er, where he cites a ruling by Rabbeinu Yonah in Sha’are 
Teshuvah that prohibits denouncing another Jew for a Torah violation except where the 
behavior is widely regarded as sinful and the transgression so flagrant that it 
demonstrates a profound disrespect for God. According to Kagan, “[The sin of not 
wanting to learn Torah] is not in this serious category. Because of our many sins, today’s 
society is lax in regard to Torah study, believing that it interferes with earning a living.”86 
 There are two key points about this passage. First, in Kagan’s view, economic 
stress had as much to do with contemporary attitudes toward Torah study as ideology. 
Second, it’s fair to assume that denigrating rhetoric directed at those who were lax in 
Torah study was coming from traditionally observant Jews if not from Torah scholars 
themselves. Yet Kagan, while no doubt among those who lamented this trend, 
nevertheless prohibits the public condemnation of Jews who were not fulfilling their 
obligations to study Torah.87 Instead, he says, “it is necessary to approach this person 
privately and reprove him gently and make him understand that laxity in Torah study is a 
rationalization of his yetzer hara [and that] even a destitute person must set aside a 
regular time for Torah . . . But [the speaker may not] go and dishonor him in front of the 
rest of the people.”88  
                                                
86 Kagan, 4.2.6: 62; Levy, 2: 147. 
 
87 See also 4.11 (h): 72; Levy, 2: 229. Kagan observes that “it is typical in [today’s] society that when [a 
person] moves to a new city and meets someone from his former town, he inquires about all his old 
acquaintances in general and in detail, how well they are behaving, both in their relationship with God and 
with other people, either good or bad. In particular these inquiries are made to find out whether the youth 
are still studying Torah. . . There is no grounds for permitting these types of inquiry because the questioner 
has no intention of moving back to the first town to rebuke them (privately) and convince them to return to 
Torah study. This kind of inquiry and response is utter lashon ha-ra.” This passage is further indication that 
laxity in Torah study was an issue of public discussion and that Kagan was trying to suppress public 
criticism by traditionally observant Jews of those they perceived to be lax in fulfilling this obligation. 
  
88 Kagan, 4.2.6: 62, Levy, 2: 149. 
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Discourse about rabbis and Torah sages 
As noted above, Kagan identifies two reasons that lashon ha-ra was so prevalent 
in contemporary Jewish society: The Jewish masses (hamon) did not know the law while 
masters of Torah (ba’alei torah) rationalized or misinterpreted it in order to establish un-
warranted leniencies.89 The dual structure of Sefer Chafetz Chaim is intended to address 
these two audiences. The mekor instructs the unlearned masses on the basic requirements 
of the law regarding lashon ha-ra and r’khilut. Meanwhile, the be’er corrects the 
mistaken legal reasoning of the scholarly elite. Kagan acknowledges that he is appealing 
to these two distinct groups when he explains that the mekor is for readers for whom 
wading through the intricate legal arguments in the be’er would be difficult or tedious.90  
That Kagan felt compelled to write for both Torah scholars and the Jewish masses 
is significant. As noted in my introduction, although Sefer Chafetz Chaim deals with only 
a small corner of halakha having to do with improper speech, within the spectrum of 
rabbinic literature it falls into the category of legal codes. Traditionally, legal codes were 
not written for the general Jewish population. Although some non-rabbis may have read 
or been familiar with them, in the eyes of their rabbinic authors such codes were part of 
an ongoing discourse among the scholarly elite and were intended to guide the rabbinate 
in making halakhic rulings. This is true even of Rabbi Joseph Caro’s revered Shulkhan 
Aruch, the abridged version of his Beit Yosef that omits the halakhic sources found in the 
                                                
89 Kagan, Preface: 8; Levy, 1: 17. 
 
90 Kagan, Preface: 9; Levy, 1: 25.  
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longer work.91 The authors of legal codes assumed that their intended readership — 
primarily the rabbinate and their students — had the status and authority to determine the 
practice of Jews in general. Even if it had been possible to write for a general audience, 
there was no reason to.  
For Kagan, on the other hand, writing only for the scholarly elite was not 
sufficient. In order to ensure the proper behavior of Jewish society in regard to lashon ha-
ra, he felt it necessary to appeal directly to the general Jewish population. Thus the two-
part structure of Sefer Chafetz Chaim implicitly acknowledges the diminished status of 
rabbis as the arbiters of socio-religious practice among Lithuanian Jews. In recognizing 
that correct halakhic observance was a matter of individual choice and could not be 
assured by the authority of communal institutions, Sefer Chafetz Chaim is an expression 
of modern Jewish orthodoxy.92  
 The diminished status of rabbis is supported by a number of observations in Sefer 
Chafetz Chaim about contemporary society. Let’s begin with Kagan’s discussion of a 
situation in which someone witnesses an adam beinoni (an average Jew) knowingly 
                                                
91 Although the Shulkhan Aruch would become the legal handbook of observant East European Jews, Caro 
wrote it late in life almost as an afterthought and says in the introduction that it was intended not for a 
general audience but rather for “young [Torah] students” who didn’t yet have the intellectual maturity and 
knowledge to understand the more complex legal arguments in Beit Yosef. He did not anticipate that it 
would be widely read by ordinary Jews. 
 
92 In “Rupture and Reconstruction,” Haym Soloveitchik attributes the rise of a stringent, text-based 
authority within modern Orthodox Judaism to the decline of “mimetic practice” — the variable religious 
customs determined by family and affirmed by communal authorities, particularly rabbis. He argues that 
this change, which began in the nineteenth century and was exacerbated by the Holocaust, has resulted in a 
flood of legal texts aimed at instructing a general Jewish audience on correct religious practice. 
Soloveitchik cites Kagan’s Mishnah Berurah as an example of the tendency of Orthodox Jews to place the 
authority of texts ahead of custom. The structure of Sefer Chafetz Chaim indicates that Kagan was 
responding to this phenomenon a decade before beginning Mishnah Berurah. See also Benjamin Brown, 
“”Soft Stringency’ in the Mishnah B[e]rurah: Jurisprudential, Social, and Ideological Aspects of a Halachic 
Formulation,” Contemporary Jewry 27 (2007), 15. Kagan was very much aware that “many Jews could not 
or would not turn to available rabbis . . . and believed with all his heart that one of the major solutions to 
the crisis was the composition of popularized halacha books for Jewish laymen.”   
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commit a widely recognized sin against God — adultery, for example, or the 
consumption of a forbidden food. For Kagan, an adam beinoni signified a traditional 
Lithuanian Jew, someone who intended to observe religious law and was remorseful 
when he did not. An observer may not tell anyone about the one-time sin against God of 
an adam beinoni because it’s possible the offender has already repented. Instead the 
observer must admonish the offender gently in private.93  
But Kagan qualifies this prohibition in a hagahah: In addition to admonishing the 
offender, one is obligated to disclose the information privately or discreetly to certain 
individuals so long as there is no intent to denigrate the subject and doing so will achieve 
a legitimate benefit. For instance, a person who knows first hand that a woman has 
committed adultery must, in addition to admonishing her, tell her husband so that he will 
“separate himself from her” — that is, not have sexual relations with her while she is in a 
state of sexual sin.94  
In the be’er Kagan discusses this qualification in regard to informing the beit din 
about a halakhic violation. Normally a single witness is barred from reporting the offense 
of a fellow Jew to the beit din because the court must hear testimony from at least two 
witnesses in order to act. Absent this legitimate benefit, an official report to the beit din 
by a lone witness can serve no purpose other than to denigrate the offender. Therefore, it 
is lashon ha-ra. However, Kagan argues that the discreet, unofficial disclosure of a 
                                                
93 Kagan, 4.4: 63-65; Levy, 2: 155-157. See also Kagan, 4.5.23 (h): 66; Levy, 2: 181 and 183. Kagan 
acknowledges but rejects a more lenient position that seems to permit publicly denouncing adam beinoni 
for a one-time violation of religious law. While it may be permissibleto secretly hate an average Jew who 
sins one time, Kagan says, “regarding the issue of publicly denouncing his behavior or insulting him to his 
face, we take the strict view that he repented [and disclosure in prohibited]. One should analyze this very 
carefully.”  
 
94 Kagan, 4.4 (h): 65; Levy, 2: 159. 
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halakhic offense to members of the beit din does achieve a beneficial effect. Even though 
the court cannot convict or punish the offender, it can at least prevent him from swearing 
an oath or testifying in other cases.95 Therefore, he says, “it appears that if this disclosure 
is made [by a single witness] to a beit din, it is not altogether forbidden, although it 
would be better if it were not initially disclosed.” What’s more, while the court may not 
take official action against the offender, “substantial thought must be given to whether 
this person must be reprimanded [privately] by the city’s judges.”96 
It is not surprising that Kagan privileges the beit din by allowing its members to 
hear certain derogatory reports that others may not and suggesting that they may respond 
to such reports in an unofficial capacity. What’s significant for my argument, however, is 
that Kagan exempts the lone witness from the obligation to warn the offender before 
disclosing the offense to the beit din. In doing so, he makes this observation about 
contemporary society: “At any rate, what is the relevance in a time like this of giving or 
receiving a forewarning . . .”97  
This cryptic aside refers to forewarnings in general, either by a single witness or 
by multiple witnesses. Apparently Kagan believed it was a toothless threat to warn a 
typical Jew that his sinful behavior would be reported to religious authorities if it 
continued. Even the offender’s acknowledgement of his sin was no guarantee about his 
future behavior. Kagan’s description of such forewarnings as ineffective or irrelevant 
                                                
95This benefit holds even if there is no specific case in which the sinner might be a witness. It is still 
permissible to disclose the sin to the beit din, “because perhaps it might be relevant at some time in the 
future when this person might be called as a witness or asked to swear an oath.”  
 
96 Kagan, 4.4.16: 64; Levy, 2: 165-169. 
   
97 Kagan, 4.4.16: 64; Levy, 2: 169.  
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reflects an awareness of the diminished status of the beit din and its authority to 
determine social norms even among adam beinoni.  
  We find a similar implication in the following two clauses, both of which deal 
with a situation in which someone witnesses a halakhic violation by one of “those foolish 
clowns who hate to be admonished.” Here Kagan is still referring to a traditionally 
observant Jew who has committed a one-time offense and, therefore, should be privately 
and gently admonished, not publicly humiliated. But in contrast to the adam beinoni, who 
normally is contrite and repentant when admonished by a peer about having committed a 
known sin, this person is likely to become angry and defensive, to insist that his actions 
were not sinful and repeat them out of sheer stubbornness.  
In order to avoid this, the witness should not rebuke the offender himself but 
rather disclose the offense to the city’s beit din or the offender’s rabbi so that they can 
admonish him privately.98 The rationale here is that this stubborn, foolish person is more 
likely to accept a rebuke from “those who are important and influential in society.”99 
However, because it would be a sin — lashon ha-ra — to do anything that results in the 
public humiliation of the offender, the witness must be careful to make the disclosure 
only to a discreet authority figure, one who will not tell anyone else.  
In the next clause, Kagan qualifies this position with a leniency. If the witness 
feels the person is likely to commit the sin again, he can report the offense to the person’s 
rabbi, even if the rabbi is not particularly discreet and the information is likely to become 
                                                
98 Kagan, 4.5: 65-66; Levy, 2: 173 and 175. 
 
99 Alternatively, Kagan says, a witness may report this person to his relatives if he is sure they will believe 
him and the offender is likely to heed their reprimand.  
 
 128 
public. This leniency holds, however, only if one is sure this indiscreet rabbi is 
sufficiently influential that his rebuke will be effective.100  
In this case, where there is a conflict between enforcing proper religious behavior 
and risking the public humiliation of a fellow Jew, Kagan comes down on the side of the 
former. However, in doing so he also reveals something important about the status of the 
rabbinate in contemporary Lithuanian Jewish society: The very fact that one would have 
to consider whether a particular rabbi was sufficiently influential within his community 
before telling him about a halakhic violation indicates that some rabbis were not.101  
There also is an underlying assumption in Sefer Chafetz Chaim that many Jews 
were no longer turning to rabbis and the beit din to settle matters that had long been 
within their purview, particularly business disputes and other financial disagreements. 
For example, Kagan explains that the rationale behind the prohibition against r’khilut — 
telling one Jew about the bad thing another Jew has said about him or done to him — is 
that it causes hatred and conflict between them. The exception is if telling the person 
allows him to protect himself against harm or loss. In that case, revealing the information 
to him is a mitzvah, not a sin. 
 However, if the victim is the type of person who, instead of bringing the matter to 
the beit din, is likely to bypass the court and “take the law into his own hands,” then the 
information may be related only by two first-hand witnesses and only if they are certain 
                                                
100 Kagan, 4.6: 66-67; Levy, 2: 189 and 191. As always, the speaker’s sole motivation must be constructive 
— in this case to make sure the subject has seen the error of his ways — not to shame or otherwise harm 
someone.  
 
101 This passage should not be interpreted simply as a jab at the so-called “state rabbis” — those who 
graduated from state-sanctioned seminaries and whose appointments had to be approved by the Russian 
government. As I will argue later, while state rabbis contributed to the decline of the rabbinate’s status and 
authority, there were other factors as well. At any rate, it is not likely that Kagan would have considered 
them legitimate rabbis.  
 129 
the victim’s response will not harm the offender or cause him a financial loss that 
exceeds the punishment the beit din would have meted out for the offense. Kagan’s 
insistence that one must take into account whether revealing information about an 
interpersonal offense would result in a legally acceptable outcome is an implicit 
acknowledgment that many of Jews were, in fact, taking such matters into their own 
hands rather than relying on the beit din.  
The same impression comes through in Kagan’s discussion about whether an 
individual may believe a report that another Jew has said or done something to harm him 
for which there are d’varim nikarim (recognizable things, i.e. circumstantial evidence). If 
the report comes from a single witness, the victim may not harm the offender or cause 
him a monetary loss.102 In the be’er Kagan gives an example “of what is common [in 
contemporary society].”  
 
Money is stolen from Shimon’s house on the night that Reuven happens to 
stay there. Shimon checks his safe and finds it broken and everything 
indicates that his chaver (Reuven) caused his loss. Even so, he may not 
seize [Reuven’s money claiming that it is his] . . . only bring him to court 
where the beit din will make him swear an oath about whether he was 
involved.103  
 
Here Kagan not only discusses r’khilut in the context of a financial loss from theft but 
also implies that it was not unusual for individuals to try to recover such losses on their 
                                                
102 Kagan, R6.9: 143; Levy, 4: 237-239. If the evidence is strong — meaning it leaves no grounds for 
judging the alleged offender favorably — the victim may believe the report, but only if doing so serves a 
constructive purpose, i.e. it allows him to protect himself or recover a loss. 
  
103 Kagan, R6.9.20: 143-144; Levy, 4: 243. Just as the victim cannot do anything to harm the suspect, the 
beit din cannot punish him because there are not two eyewitnesses to the crime.   
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own instead of going through the beit din.104 In the next clause, he indicates that this 
frequently involved turning to gentile authorities.  
 
We can see for ourselves how people make this mistake, because of our 
many sins, that if someone’s business is harmed by malshinut (i.e., 
someone informed on him) or the like and he has circumstantial evidence 
that a Jew did this do him, he turns around and informs on him too. The 
people’s common perception is that if someone informed on his chaver, it 
is permissible for him to [retaliate and] inform on him too.105 
 
 
We should also consider Kagan’s discussion about speaking ill of a fellow Jew to 
gentiles, which is worse than making such comments to another Jew. Worse still is the 
“terrible and hateful sin” of the malshin — the informant — who speaks badly about 
another Jew to gentile authorities.  
 
He is considered in the category of informants who are equal to those who 
deny God or repudiate Torah or do not believe God will bring the dead 
back to life, and their punishment will continue long after gehinnom 
ceases to exist. Therefore every Jew must guard himself carefully not to 
commit this terrible act. One who does inform on Israel to them [gentile 
authorities] is considered to have abused and cursed and raised his hand 
against the Torah of Moses our teacher.106  
 
                                                
104 According to Kagan, this was true even of Jewish communal administrators. See Kagan, 7.14: 102; 
Levy, 3: 183. “See how often people make a mistake in this regard when something is stolen from them, 
and they suspect someone, they tell tovei ha-ir that they have circumstantial evidence and, contrary to the 
law, they (tovei ha-ir) beat and punish him so that he will confess. . . . In reality this is not legal. They 
(tovei ha-ir) may not depend [solely] on [the word] of the complainant and punish a Jew without 
justification.” Although Kagan’s use of pronouns makes identifying the antecedents difficult, he indicates 
that civil authorities frequently acted outside the bounds of halakha in response to accusations of theft or 
financial wrongdoing. In this case, they are not permitted to act without either having first-hand knowledge 
of conclusive circumstantial evidence or hearing testimony about it from at least two independent 
eyewitnesses. 
  
105 Kagan, R6.10: 143; Levy, Vol. IV: 245. 
 
106 Kagan, 8.12: 106-107; Levy, 3: 221. 
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 Similar hyperbolic condemnations of informants can be found elsewhere in 
rabbinic literature, and it would be unusual if Kagan did not take this position. More 
interesting is an accompanying hagahah, which sheds some light on the contemporary 
social situation he may have been addressing: “It is known that there are people who pay 
witnesses and deal treacherously with their fellow Jews before the government’s judges 
to acquire [their fellow Jew’s] money unjustly.”107  
According to Levy, at least one previous editor of Sefer Chafetz Chaim believed 
this hagahah was inserted at the insistence of government censors. However, it seems 
unlikely that the censors would require this cryptic hagahah while permitting other 
explicitly unflattering remarks about gentiles in this clause and elsewhere in Sefer 
Chafetz Chaim. It is more likely that the injustice to which Kagan refers has something to 
do with the lower standards of evidence in gentile courts, including the fact that, unlike 
the beit din, they could accept testimony from non-Jews and lone witnesses. Thus Kagan 
is not merely reiterating the historic rabbinic condemnation of the malshin. He appears to 
be referring to a tendency among contemporary Jews to settle their legal disputes in 
gentile forums in order to circumvent halakhic standards of evidence.108
                                                
107 Kagan, 8.13 (h): 107; Levy, 3: 223.  
 
108 See also Kagan, R9.5.17: 151-152; Levy, 4: 311-319. He forbids a single witness from telling one Jew 
what another has done to or said about him if the first one will “take matters into his own hands ” and 
renege on a business deal. In the long be’er, Kagan reminds readers that this requirement prohibits single-
witness testimony in a gentile court, regardless of the veracity of the testimony. It is single-witness 
testimony that the Talmud condemns, he says, not testimony in gentile courts per se. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF NINETEENTH CENTURY 
LITHUANIAN JEWISH DISCOURSE 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will examine developments in the nineteenth century that 
ruptured solidarity among Lithuanian Jews and undermined traditional institutions of 
authority. I will argue that the resulting social instability not only explains why Kagan 
perceived lashon ha-ra to be so prevalent and threatening but also helps account for his 
specific descriptions of it.  
We should be careful not to overstate the solidarity among Jews in the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth or the authority of their communal institutions at the onset of 
Russian rule at the end of the eighteenth century.1 Social criticism already had become 
“an integral part of the inner life of the Jews of Eastern Europe,” and the number of edicts 
condemning “gossip mongers” and those who ridiculed town notables indicates that civil 
authorities were concerned about such criticism.2 Likewise, the prevalence of “heresy 
hunting” in East European Jewish society during the last half of the eighteenth century 
                                                
1 The partition took place in three stages between 1772 and 1795. Most of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
including Vilna, came under Russian rule in the final partition.  
  
2 Shmuel Ettinger, “The Modern Period,” in A History of the Jewish People, ed. H. H. Ben-Sasson, trans. 
George Weidenfeld (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 766-767. Jewish artisan and craft 
societies, for instance, protested corruption and patronage among communal leaders and the enactment of 
taxes on certain goods and services. Some even organized their own synagogues and hired their own rabbis. 
Communal authorities tried to obstruct the societies by limiting their access to public funds, restricting their 
membership and, in some cases, banning them outright. Ettinger also observes that ethical literature popular 
among East European Jews during the eighteenth century included “a strong element of social criticism.”  
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indicates a certain inability of religious leaders to control behavior that challenged their 
authority to determine religious norms.3 
Still, while life in eighteenth century Poland-Lithuania was hardly tranquil much 
less idyllic, Jews existed in what Michael Stanislawski calls a “legalized insularity” that 
allowed for a relatively stable, autonomous society with secure communal institutions of 
authority as well as a quasi-national political structure adept at defending Jewish 
interests. Even in the first few decades after the partition of Poland-Lithuania, “Jews 
continued to live in their own autonomous communities, governed by Jewish civil and 
criminal, as well as ritual, law.”4  
Gershon Hundert makes a similar argument. Despite internal religious turmoil 
associated with the Frankist and Hasidic movements and external pressure in the form of 
periodic violence and restrictions on Jewish movement and economic activity, “there was 
also an irreducible continuity among the majority of Jews” in Poland-Lithuania 
throughout the eighteenth century. This was due mainly to the crucial role of Jews in the 
feudal economy and their “ramified, complex and extensive communal organizations.”5  
                                                
3 Gershon D. Hundert, Jews in Poland-Lithuania in the Eighteenth Century: A Genealogy of Modernity 
(University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2004), 183. These would include the Vilna 
Gaon’s bans of excommunication against Hasidim issued in 1777 and 1781.  
 
4 Michael Stanislawski, Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia, 
1825-1855 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983), xi. 
 
5 Hundert, Jews in Poland-Lithuania, 234-239. Up to 75 percent of the Jews in Poland-Lithuania lived in 
private towns and on private estates whose magnate/noble owners retained considerable power in the 
politically de-centralized Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Because Jews were so important to the 
economy of these private estates, the owners deflected efforts by the Catholic Church, the royal 
government and landless gentry to restrict Jewish autonomy and economic activity. This does not mean that 
the Jews of Poland-Lithuania were, as a group, wealthy or free in the sense that we think of it today. 
Hundert describes them as a “colonized economic group.” (37) The primary beneficiaries of their economic 
activity were the landed nobility for whom they worked. Jewish security and communal autonomy were 
always a function of the self-interest of these magnate/nobles and, therefore, somewhat tenuous. 
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Likewise, authority in East European Jewish society remained concentrated in 
long-established institutions. While its relationship with the state and other centers of 
power became increasingly complex, the kahal “continued to function in the 
overwhelming majority of East European cities and towns,” where it was viewed as “the 
institutional expression of Jewish autonomy.”6 Meanwhile, the beit din — typically 
headed by the local rabbi — remained the sole religious and legal authority for the vast 
majority of Jews. Far from a time of communal crisis, the eighteenth century was a 
period of enhanced Jewish autonomy and solidarity in Poland-Lithuania that gave rise to 
“an incipient Jewish national identity.”7  
Furthermore, at the end of the eighteenth century, Lithuania’s Jewish society was 
arguably the most secure and cohesive in Eastern Europe. Lithuanian Jews had been the 
first to organize a supra-communal political body that purported to represent and govern 
Jews from all the “lands” within a specific nation state.8 They also had been among the 
most active and successful in exerting political influence to promote Jewish interests in 
the larger society. Even during the early years of Russian rule, “the Jews of the 
Lithuanian lands played a very important role” in maintaining Jewish political activity.  
 
Lithuanian Jews were accustomed to organized activity of this sort, as a 
legacy of the Commonwealth. Lobbying activities and elected delegates 
were nothing new to them . . . [Lithuanian] Jewish activism was not 
random or accidental, but directly linked to traditions of the Jews of the 
                                                
6 Ibid., 100. 
 
7 Ibid., 77-78.  
 
8 H.H. Ben-Sasson, “The Middle Ages,” in A History of the Jewish People, 672. Documents from 1569 
indicate that “select men from all the lands of Lithuania” were enacting legislation in the name of “all the 
communities of the states of Lithuania whose authority has been invested in us.” This self-described pan-
Lithuanian Jewish legislature existed a full decade before the founding in 1580 of its Polish counterpart, the 
Council of Four Lands. Although Lithuanians were originally part of the Council of Four Lands, they 
withdrew in 1623 to form the independent Council of the Land of Lithuania. 
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Commonwealth. These activities demonstrated real political 
sophistication. 9 
 
Mordechai Zalkin contends that the authority of the Vilna kahal in particular was 
at its height as the dawn of the nineteenth century. In addition to setting and collecting 
taxes, it established and enforced commercial regulations, supervised the registration of 
local Jewish citizens, maintained communal records, and issued permits for travel and 
other activities.10 This is not to suggest that Lithuanian Jews were immune from internal 
dissent, discrimination, violence or outside attempts to infringe on their autonomy and 
economic activity. But in general they were more cohesive and their institutions of 
authority more secure than Jews and Jewish institutions in Poland or elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe.11 As a result of its relative social stability, Lithuania saw a net influx of Jews 
from Poland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And the fact that 
                                                
9 John D. Klier, “Traditions of the Commonwealth: Lithuanian Jewry and the Exercise of Power in Tsarist 
Russia,” in The Vanished World of Lithuanian Jews, eds. Alvydas Nikzentaitis, Stefan Shreiner and Darius 
Staliuna (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2004), 6-7.  Lithuanian Jews were instrumental in ensuring 
that Jewish communities were included in the Charter for the Towns (1785), which gave certain rights to 
corporate groups in regard to municipal governments. And when Tsar Alexander I set up a special 
committee in 1802 to consider the status of Jews in Russia, Lithuania accounted for two of the four 
provinces that sent lobbyists to St. Petersburg. The Lithuanian delegates “displayed real political 
sophistication” in blocking a number of objectionable provisions, including one that would have allowed 
the state to interfere in the Jewish religious cult.  
 
10 Mordechai Zalkin, “Who Wields the Power? The Kahal and the Chevrot in Vilna at the Beginning of the 
19th Century,” in The Gaon of Vilnius and the Annals of Jewish Culture (Vilnius: Vilnius University 
Publishing House, 1998) 354. The chevrot were charitable and civic associations comprised of socially and 
economically influential individuals. Though the chevrot were “not totally subordinate,” Zalkin argues that 
“the kahal wielded the main authority” among Jews in Vilna in the early nineteenth century and used the 
chevrot to enhance its own public support. 
 
11 Egidijus Aleksandravicius, “Jews in Lithuanian Historiography,” in The Gaon of Vilnius and the Annals 
of Jewish Culture, 13-14. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the last nation in Europe to be Christianized, 
and it retained a strong pagan tradition of tolerance for national and religious difference. Not only did 
gentile Lithuanians tend “not look down on the Jewish religion,” but also corporate distinctions were less 
rigid in Lithuania than in surrounding states. This enabled Jews to achieve the status of free subordinates of 
the grand duke, essentially giving them the rights and privileges of the noble class. Lithuanian Jews 
retained many of these rights even after the grand duchy allied itself with Poland in 1569 to form the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. See also Dov Levin, The Litvaks: A Short History of the Jews of 
Lithuania, trans. Adam Teller (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2000), 44-45 and 49-54. 
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Lithuanian religious authorities were able to resist the wave of Hasidism that swept over 
the rest of Eastern Europe is evidence of their authority and relatively secure position at 
the end of the eighteenth century. Given the tradition of social cohesion and strong civil 
and religious leadership among Lithuanian Jews, it makes sense that they would have felt 
especially vulnerable as events in the nineteenth century destabilized Jewish communities 
under Russian rule and undermined traditional centers of authority. 
 
The decline of the kahal and Jewish solidarity 
The number of Jews under Russian rule increased dramatically following the final 
partition of Poland-Lithuania, and the government adopted a number of policies in the 
first half of the nineteenth century aimed at controlling if not reforming their insular 
society. It restricted the authority of Jews to raise taxes for the rabbinate and other 
communal activities. It diverted some of that revenue to new government-sponsored 
Jewish schools that taught Russian and other secular subjects as well as the traditional 
religious curriculum. It required each community’s official rabbi to be certified by the 
state, limited the authority of all rabbis to matters of religious ritual and forbade the use 
of bans of excommunication, a primary means of social control in Jewish communities. 
Finally, in 1844 the state officially abolished the kahal as an independent communal 
government. While these policies were haphazardly enforced at best and did not have the 
intended effect of russifying the Jewish population,12 they nevertheless weakened the 
traditional structure and cohesion of Jewish society. 
                                                
12 The state schools were shunned by the vast majority of Lithuanian Jews as were the so-called “crown 
rabbis.” And because the government needed a political entity to collect taxes and oversee military 
conscription in Jewish communities, the kahal continued to function, though in an attenuated form, even 
after it was officially abolished.  
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   I want to focus on two developments in particular that had a profound impact on 
Jewish solidarity and the authority of the kahal because they provide insight into some of 
Kagan’s descriptions of lashon ha-ra in contemporary society. The first was the repeal of 
the Jewish military exemption in 1827. The second was Russian government policies that 
ravaged Jewish economic life. 
When Jews of Poland-Lithuania came under Russian rule, they were required to 
pay a tax in lieu of providing conscripts for the Russian army. The decision by Nicholas I 
to end the military exemption was the key factor in “the revolutionary dismemberment of 
the legal integrity of Jewish society.”13 To understand why we must consider the 
consequences of military service for Jewish conscripts and society as well as the process 
by which they were chosen. Although conscripts were granted nominal freedom of 
religion, Jews viewed military service as a process of religious conversion.14 Jewish 
conscripts were billeted with Christians, denied contact with other Jews and routinely 
subjected to physical and psychological coercion to convert. Most of the Jewish 
conscripts were cantonists — teenagers and, in some cases, mere boys — who were 
especially susceptible to such coercion. The result was that a third to a half of Jewish 
conscripts converted.15 And because the term of conscription was twenty-five years — 
                                                
13 Stanislawski, Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews, 17. As he observes, the exemption was never viewed as a 
privilege. It was based on the assumption that Jews were unfit to serve in the military. Likewise, its repeal 
did not represent a rejection of corporate distinctions in Russian society in favor of egalitarianism. Rather it 
was viewed as a repressive measure intended to undermine Jewish society. 
 
14 While conversion may not have been the state’s primary motive for conscripting Jews, it was certainly a 
factor. Nicholas demanded regular reports on the percentage of Jewish conscripts who converted.  
 
15 Stanislawski, Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews, 22-24. Conversion was so common among Jewish conscripts 
that Christian institutions struggled to meet the demand for baptismal fonts and godparents.  
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essentially a lifetime — even those who resisted conversion were effectively lost to 
Jewish society.16 
What made conscription so destructive to Jewish social solidarity, however, was 
the role Jewish authorities played in the process. As was the case with all groups, the 
government required every community to provide a certain number of conscripts. 
However, they were selected not by the government but rather by the community’s 
leadership — in the case of Jews, the kahal. With local authorities having great leeway to 
determine who would serve, the selection process devolved into what Stanislawski 
describes as  “legalized social discrimination.” Jewish authorities drafted conscripts from 
villages instead of cities, from among the poor or otherwise powerless rather than the 
wealthy or influential, and from among those who challenged authority or violated 
community standards.17 Worse still was that seven out of every ten Jewish conscripts 
were cantonists. 
 
Although Russian officials preferred recruits under the age of eighteen . . . 
[t]here is no evidence that the government applied any specific pressure on 
the Jewish officials to comply with its preference for child-recruits; that 
the leaders of the Jewish communities did comply [with the army’s age 
preference] was one of the most significant occurrences in Russian-Jewish 
history.18  
 
                                                
16 Ibid., 18. Jews between the ages of twelve and twenty-five were eligible for conscription. Those eighteen 
and over served for twenty-five years. Those under eighteen served in special cantonists units until they 
turned eighteen, at which time their full twenty-five year term of service began. Although there were some 
exceptions, the age eligibility range for other groups in Russia was twenty to thirty-five.  
  
17 Ibid., 16-21. While the government specifically prohibited Jewish authorities from considering violations 
of “religious superstitions” as a criterion in the draft, the Vilna kahal targeted the sons of the teachers at the 
local state-sponsored rabbinical seminary until Russian authorities ended the practice.  
 
18 Ibid., 25-26. The primary reason was demographic. Because Jews typically married at a young age, many 
Jewish males 18 or over already had their own families. Faced with choosing between these young fathers 
or unmarried teenagers and boys, Jewish communities decided to conscript the latter in order to protect 
existing families and preserve manpower. A “substantial number” of Jewish cantonists were under the legal 
draft age of twelve.    
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Desperate Jewish parents took to hiding their children or using other means such 
as bribery to prevent their conscription. To fill draft quotas, Jewish authorities hired 
special agents called khappers (from the Yiddish verb “catch”) — bounty hunters whose 
job was to capture conscripts fleeing military service. The khappers, who often grabbed 
the wrong person or extorted money from the families of conscripts, “soon became 
permanent fixtures in the Pale [of Settlement] and earned the hatred and scorn of the 
masses of Jews.”19  
The Jewish public viewed conscription as an existential crisis. They were shocked 
and angered at the apparent willingness of communal authorities to contravene the ideal 
undergirding Jewish solidarity — that suffering should be distributed equitably and that 
Jews should not take advantage of one another. The social trauma caused by the loss of 
tens of thousands of Jewish men and boys, the discrimination and corruption in the 
selection process, and the deep antipathy it created for the kahal and their hirelings 
resulted in “an entirely unprecedented breaking of the ranks” against communal authority 
and among Jews in general.  
 
Numerous riots and attacks against the khappers and their kahal 
employers erupted throughout the Pale, cases of informing to the 
government mounted in both frequency and in scope, and several groups 
of Jews even took the radical step of applying for legal separation from the 
rest of the Jewish community. These actions seriously debilitated the 
autonomous communal structure, whose powers were steadily being 
diminished by the government.20 
   
                                                
19 Ibid.,  29. The system became even more corrupt in 1853 when the state allowed the conscription of any 
Jew found traveling without proper papers. Not only did khappers begin abducting itinerant Jews at 
random, ordinary citizens sometimes grabbed travelers off the street as substitutes for family members who 
had been selected for conscription.  
 
20 Ibid., 33. See also 129. In 1853 noted rabbi Eliyahu Shik called for a revolt against Jewish civil 
authorities of Grodno, historically a part of Lithuania, and led an axe-wielding crowd in an attempt to free 
three conscripts being held by the kahal.  
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While conscription was the issue that “destroyed the moral authority of the 
kahal’s leadership” and “shattered the taboo against informing,” it is important to note 
that many of the complaints about communal leaders that began flowing to Russian 
authorities dealt not only with the draft process but also with unrelated political and 
economic issues such as corrupt communal elections, illegal tax assessments, fraudulent 
accounting and financial mismanagement. The denunciations came from both Hasidic 
and traditional Litvak communities and resulted in so many criminal cases against 
members of the kahal that the Russian Senate held a special session in 1840 to establish 
guidelines for handling them. 
 “The point is not that these [accusations] are true but that traditional authority 
was no longer respected to the point where Jews would inform on [their own] authorities 
to the non-Jewish government.”21 As the kahal “ceased to be the automatic representative 
of all the Jews and submission to its authority [became] voluntary,” power in Jewish 
society grew diffuse and uncertain. The resulting competition for authority deepened 
throughout the nineteenth century, eventually “giving rise to political parties and 
movements that battled each other as much as central authorities.”22 Lithuanian 
traditionalists would have felt especially vulnerable in the late 1860s and early 1870s 
                                                
21 John D. Klier, “The Kahal in the Russian Empire: Birth, death and afterlife of a Jewish Institution, 1772-
1882,” in the Yearbook of the Simon Dubnow Institute 5, ed. Dan Diner, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2006), 41-42. A number of scholars have attributed the demise of Jewish social solidarity and the 
diffusion of civil authority to class tension, citing the especially dire impact of economic reform and 
conscription on the poor and the fact that education reform created dual school systems — state schools for 
the poor and traditional schools for those who could afford them. However, while class tension was no 
doubt a factor, Klier observes that dissatisfaction with communal leadership and efforts to disassociate 
from the Jewish community extended to well-to-do Jews of the merchant class.  
 
22 Stanislawski, Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews, 133. 
  
 141 
after the state’s concerted effort to russify Lithuanian Jewish society, an effort that was 
blunted only with the aid of prominent maskilim in Lithuania and St. Petersburg.23  
The perception that the kahal was unfair and corrupt and the political 
vulnerability of traditional authorities help explain why Kagan describes widespread 
lashon ha-ra in connection with controversial decisions by tovei ha-ir (kahal officials) 
and the denigration of g’dolei ha-dor (important personages) as common even at 
gatherings intended to honor them. Likewise, the fact that so many Jews were willing to 
resist communal authority and take their grievances to the state helps account for Kagan’s 
diatribe against malshinim as well as his admonition to those called to testify in gentile 
courts.  
Jewish social cohesion was further undermined by severe economic dislocation. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century many Jews in Poland-Lithuania still made 
their livings as leaseholders on private estates, where they were involved in managing 
inns and overseeing the manufacture and sale of alcohol. However, a number of events 
combined to close off this source of economic activity to Jews. In the wake of the Polish 
revolts against Russian rule in 1830 and 1863, many of the nobles who had protected 
Jews fled or abandoned their estates to the government. The Russian government 
expelled Jews from many of the remaining private towns and villages and sharply 
restricted Jewish leaseholds, all but eliminating Jews from a sphere of economic activity 
that once accounted for an estimated 40 percent of all Jewish income. Economically 
                                                
23 Lithuanian political influence declined during the course of the nineteenth century as its once distinctive 
political perspective and practices spread through East European Jewish society, giving rise to competing 
hubs of Jewish political leadership in Odessa, Warsaw, Kiev and St. Petersburg.  While Vilna remained an 
important intellectual and religious center, it was no longer the vanguard of Jewish political activism that it 
had been during the period of the Polish Commonwealth and the early years of Russian rule. 
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displaced Jews poured into already crowded artisan and craft guilds or turned to petty 
shop keeping for their livelihood. The result was a sharp increase in poverty and “bitter 
internal competition” among Jewish tradesmen, merchants and shopkeepers.24 The dire 
economic situation in Lithuania was made worse by a severe famine in 1867-68.  
Kagan’s portrayal of lashon ha-ra in connection with business activities and 
financial loss and his references to malshinut related to leaseholds reflect the kind of 
harsh accusations and recriminations one would expect from increased competition 
during a time of economic crisis.   
 
The decline of the rabbinate and the diffusion of religious authority 
Immanuel Etkes has observed that the biographies of Lithuanian Torah scholars in 
the nineteenth century tend to portray them as being reluctant to enter a career in the 
rabbinate. Especially in the second half of the century, it seems to have been a social 
convention among Talmudic scholars to insist that Torah knowledge should not be used 
as “a hoe with which to dig” — a traditional metaphor signifying a tool or skill with 
which one earns a living.25  
The negative view of the rabbinate was not mere lip service to the ancient ideal of 
Torah for its own sake. Rather it was an actual phenomenon among Lithuanian scholars 
for which Etkes offers several explanations. It may have reflected their desire to model 
                                                
24Ettinger, “The Modern Period,” in A History of the Jewish People, 794-795. See also Stanislawski, Tsar 
Nicholas I and the Jews 166. The number of registered Jewish guild merchants in the Pale of Settlement 
rose from 4,863 in 1830 to 27,469 in 1851. The 500 percent increase far exceeded Jewish population 
growth during the same time period. And these figures do not include unregistered artisans, craftsmen and 
other employees of merchants. 
  
25 Immanuel Etkes, The Gaon of Vilna: The Man and his Image (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2002), 210-211.  
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themselves after the Vilna Gaon, who famously refused any official communal 
appointment and instead studied Torah as a divine calling. At the same time it may have 
been an expression of defiance toward the maskilic argument that the study of halakhic 
literature was appropriate only for those aspiring to a rabbinical career.26   
Beyond these ideological factors, however, economic and political events eroded 
the status of rabbis. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most rabbis came from 
well-to-do circumstances. Rabbinic salaries, fees and attendant economic privileges were 
so lucrative that wealthy families often negotiated with community councils for plum 
appointments and paid fees to the gentile officials who had to approve them. The 
financial position of rabbis declined dramatically in the nineteenth century, however. Not 
only did a rabbinic appointment not guarantee a comfortable living, many rabbis were so 
poor that their wives had to work in order to support their families.27  
A primary cause of financial reversal of the rabbinate was a change in its legal 
status. In 1835 the Russian government began requiring rabbis to keep official records of 
births, deaths, weddings and the like, which meant they had to be proficient in Russian. 
As a result, a number of Jewish communities hired graduates from the state-sponsored 
rabbinic seminaries in Vilna and Zhitomir as their official rabbis rather than those who 
had received a traditional religious education. Although the vast majority of Lithuanian 
Jews rejected the crown rabbis and continued to rely on their traditional counterparts in 
                                                
26 Ibid., 213-214. See also Adam Teller, “The Gaon of Vilna and the Communal Rabbinate in 18th Century 
Lithuania,” in The Gaon of Vilnius and the Annals of Jewish Culture, 147-148. He traces the roots of 
Lithuanian skepticism of working rabbis to the mid-eighteenth century when the “communal rabbinate 
reached its nadir” as a result of corruption and self-dealing. The result was an increase in the number and 
importance of non-rabbinic preachers who left their professions to deliver strident social criticism. At the 
same time there arose a movement of pious ascetics that idealized scholars who withdrew from public life 
and devoted all their time to study. “The Vilna Gaon was himself a classic example of this kind of scholar.” 
   
27 Etkes, The Gaon of Vilna: The Man and his Image, 219. See also Teller, “The Gaon of Vilna and the 
Communal Rabbinate in 18th Century Lithuania,” 144. 
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religious matters, the dual rabbinate did have serious financial repercussions for 
traditional working rabbis. Because the Russian government forbade the use of 
communal tax revenue to pay unofficial rabbis, their salaries depended primarily on 
private contributions. As the economic situation in Jewish communities worsened, this 
source of funding grew so inconsistent that it became common for working rabbis to 
strike, refusing to render halakhic decisions until they were paid. Although some 
communities found ways to circumvent the law and pay traditional rabbis with public 
funds, there was nevertheless “a decline in those salaries and, as a result, in the rabbis’ 
public status.”28 What’s more, the “intense, occasionally fierce, competition” for the 
dwindling number of rabbinic posts that did pay well further diminished the prestige of 
career rabbis and reinforced the perception that they were primarily interested in Torah as 
a “hoe.”29  
There is textual evidence that Kagan himself was quite aware of the diminished 
status of rabbis and the concomitant idealization of Torah for its own sake. Aside from 
his reference to the frequent complaint that lecturers in the beit midrash were speaking 
“only to satisfy their needs,” one of the approbations in the forward of Sefer Chafetz 
Chaim goes to great lengths to assure readers that money collected from sales of the book 
would go toward its publication and distribution, not into Kagan’s pocket.30  
Here we should recall the clause in which Kagan argues that one may not tell 
another Jew that his business partner considered ending their relationship but decided not 
                                                
28 Etkes, The Gaon of Vilna, 219-220.  
 
29 Ibid., 220-221. This competition was exacerbated by two factors: Not only were there many more rabbis 
than in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but also a far greater percentage of them came from poor 
families and were, therefore, less likely to have sources of income other than their rabbinic salaries.  
 
30 See the approbation by Rabbi Mordechai Klotsy of Lida in Kagan, Forward: 2. (The Levy translation 
does not carry the approbations).  
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to. The be’er discusses this prohibition specifically in the context of a rabbi searching for 
a new position.  
 
Similarly, [if] a rabbi travels from his city to apply [for a rabbinic 
position] in another city but does not get it, the people in the other city 
may not disclose anything about this to anyone in the rabbi’s city. Even if 
this information is already known to many people and is certain to get 
back [to the rabbi’s city], nevertheless it is forbidden because everyone in 
his city will resent him.31  
 
Although Kagan does not explain why he felt it necessary to mention rabbinic job 
seekers in respect to this prohibition, Etkes’ observation about the idealization of Torah 
study may provide some insight. The fact that Kagan likens the situation of the rabbinic 
job seeker to that of a businessman looking for a more lucrative partnership indicates that 
feelings of resentment within a community towards a rabbi who wants to leave for 
another position might be expressed as criticism of his financial motives.  
We should also consider the impact on the rabbinate of the Lithuanian yeshiva 
movement, which is usually dated to the founding of the Volozhin Yeshiva in 1803. The 
yeshiva movement not only institutionalized and formalized what had previously been an 
informal system of advanced religious study but also divorced it from the direct influence 
of the rabbinate. Most roshei yeshivot (heads of yeshivas) were not communal rabbis. 
Rather they were fulltime educators who were revered for pursuing Torah for its own 
sake. In contrast to the rabbinate, their prestige grew among Lithuania Jews throughout 
the nineteenth century.32 Thus, in valorizing and institutionalizing Torah study, the 
                                                
 
31 Kagan, R2.4.7: 132; Levy, 2: 143. 
 
32 Etkes, 225-226. Haym Soloveitchik also writes about this phenomenon in “Rupture and Reconstruction.” 
Although his focus is on the contemporary situation, he argues that the shift in power from the “quasi-
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yeshiva movement created a network of independent scholars and students who competed 
with the rabbinate — and each other — for religious status and authority. 
 Shaul Stampfer makes a similar argument. At the end of the eighteenth century, 
most advanced religious study in Eastern Europe took place informally in the beit 
midrash, the public study hall maintained by each community. There were no admissions 
requirements, tests, designated teachers or formal supervisors. However, the local rabbi 
was often an important educator, and many of the students received room, board and 
other financial support from the local community. The “rapid collapse” of the beit 
midrash system in the nineteenth century led to a decline in the number and quality of 
Talmudic students, creating a perception among traditional Jews that “rabbinic leadership 
had failed to deflect the challenge of modernity.”33 Many Jews saw the network of 
private, independent academic institutions that sprung up in Lithuania as an effective 
response to this failure. In contrast to the rabbinate, the charismatic roshei yeshiva were 
venerated for revitalizing religious education.34  
 The decline in the prestige of the rabbinate during the nineteenth century and the 
corresponding rise in status of roshei yeshivot and other independent scholars resulted in 
                                                                                                                                            
mayoral rabbi and lay leaders” to the rosh yeshiva and other textual experts began in the nineteenth 
century.  
 
33 Shaul, Stampfer, “The Yeshiva after 1800,” in The YIVO Institute Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern 
Europe, accessed Sept. 10, 2011, http://www.jidaily.com/n86zw. The beit midrash system depended on both 
students and the community embracing the importance of Torah study. The former “competed to be 
recognized for excellence and sought to imitate their most successful peers.” The latter rewarded the most 
promising students with financial support, including marriage into well-to-do families. The system broke 
down in the nineteenth century when community support for students waned and wealthy families began to 
attach greater value to formal university study. This caused many students, particularly the brightest, to 
abandon Talmud study.  
 
34 Ibid. The new breed of roshei yeshiva traveled or sent emissaries throughout Eastern Europe and 
sometimes beyond to seek funding for their institutions. This private funding was used to secure facilities, 
pay faculty and make grants to students, who used the money to pay for room and board rather than relying 
on the largess of local householders as they did in the beit midrash system. Thus the yeshivot were often 
independent of both the local rabbi and the community.  
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competition for religious authority. In this context we can better understand Kagan’s 
reference to the frequent “eruption” of lashon ha-ra among traditionalists in the beit 
midrash. The communal study hall, which often doubled as a synagogue, was the primary 
public venue for religious life. At a time when religious authority was increasingly 
diffuse and uncertain, this is exactly where we would expect power struggles among 
religious leaders and their followers to have played out.  
The diminished status of the rabbis and the perceived failure of the traditional 
system of religious education also help explain some of the other descriptions of 
contemporary Jewish discourse and attitudes in Sefer Chafetz Chaim — the frequent 
criticism of legal rulings by the beit din or individual decisors, the social vulnerability of 
rabbis who were searching for new positions, and the apparently widespread perception 
that the present generation of chachamim was inferior if not downright incompetent.  
Another reference in Kagan’s discussion of lashon ha-ra in the beit midrash 
provides additional insight into tension arising from religious difference and competition. 
Referring to criticism of the lecturer who accepts a fee, Kagan admonishes his readers 
that the payment may not be his primary motivation. “Maybe at the time he is preaching 
his main intention is for everyone to hear words of musar and yirat ha-shamayin (fear of 
heaven).” Later he adds, “Usually this criticism (of lecturing for a fee) comes from 
people who themselves have no yirat ha-shamayim. Therefore it bothers them to hear 
words of musar or a rebuke for lax Torah observance.”   
The concepts of musar and yirat ha-shamayim have long traditions in rabbinic 
literature. Broadly speaking, the former refers to instruction on how to achieve a virtuous 
character and ethical behavior. The latter refers to the fear of divine punishment, which, 
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together with the awe of God’s majesty, enables a person to resist the human tendency to 
sin. At the time Kagan wrote Sefer Chafetz Chaim, however, both terms carried a special 
connotation associated with the modern musar movement that arose in Lithuania in the 
early 1840s. Though musar never grew into the popular religious revitalization 
movement its supporters envisioned, its presence in a number of yeshivot created periodic 
controversies within the Lithuanian scholarly elite throughout the last half of the 
nineteenth century. Musar opponents viewed its emphasis on non-halakhic literature as 
an infringement on the primacy of Talmud study. They also disdained the ecstatic style of 
study in musar called hitpa’alut as a challenge to traditional Lithuanian intellectualism.35 
According to Kagan, the frequent “eruption” of lashon ha-ra against lecturers in 
the beit midrash pertained not only to their use of Torah as a “hoe” but also to their topic 
— musar. By defending lecturers who simply want “everyone to hear words of musar 
and yirat ha-shamayim,” by insisting that musar adherents remain amitecha despite their 
differences in belief and practice, Kagan was taking a pragmatic stance against social 
fragmentation, one that tolerated a certain amount of divergence — even what some 
traditional Litvaks might have viewed as deviancy — within the boundaries of 
traditionalism.  
                                                
35 Lithuanian Rabbi Israel Lipkin of Salant is considered the father of the modern musar movement. He 
believed that one could not achieve yirat ha-shamayim through the intellect alone. Intellectual knowledge 
of divine punishment had to be transformed into emotional awareness. To that end, the movement 
advocated the study of musar literature b’hitpa’alut — a group activity that often involved repetitive 
chanting, groaning, crying and strange movements aimed at producing an emotional connection to the text. 
Opponents of musar likened hitpa’alut to the ecstatic prayer of Hasidic Jews. And when Lipkin created a 
small synagogue in Kovno that emphasized musar, he was accused of separating from the main community 
and de-emphasizing Talmud study. While it would be going to far to say that musar adherents considered 
the ethical texts more important than the Talmud, the movement did implicitly challenge Lithuanian 
intellectualism by suggesting that Talmudic scholarship alone was not sufficient to create good character 
and ethical behavior.  
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 Kagan’s defense of musar makes sense given that, while he himself was outside 
the ambit of the musar movement, he often is described as having been influenced by or 
at least sympathetic to it.36 He knew Israel Lipkin, founder of the modern movement, and 
wrote the introduction to a collection of essays in which Lipkin was one of the two 
primary contributors. Furthermore, Kagan’s toleration of religious difference in this case 
is consistent with his reputation as someone who “sought to unify Orthodox Jewry in 
Lithuania and endeavored to bridge internal disputes.”37 This effort would culminate 
forty years later with his important role in the founding of Agudat Yisrael 
.  
The emergence of religious orthodoxy and the popular Jewish press 
Yosef Salmon identifies the period between 1868 and 1878 as crucial in the 
development of ultra-Orthodox Judaism in Eastern Europe. Growing pressure for 
religious and social reform in the late 1860s was perceived by many Jews as “a threat to 
wash away traditional Judaism altogether .”38 During the internal debate among 
traditionalists about how to respond to this crisis, opposition to reform hardened into an 
ideological and halachic militancy characteristic of modern ultra-Orthodox Judaism.39 
                                                
36 Yehuda Mirsky, “The Musar Movement,” in The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, 
accessed Sept. 10 2011, http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Musar_Movement. 
  
37 Brown, “Yisrael Me’ir ha-Kohen,” in The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, accessed Sept. 
6, 2011, http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Yisrael_Meir_ha-Kohen. As Brown observes, this 
does not mean that Kagan didn’t have differences with other orthodox leaders on such issues as religious 
education and Jewish nationalism, only that he believed the differences should not be allowed to devolve 
into factionalism. 
   
38 Yosef Salmon, “Orthodox Judaism in Eastern Europe,” in The Gaon of Vilnius and the Annals of Jewish 
Culture, 105. In addition to the reform gatherings organized by Jews in Germany, Hungary and America, 
the Russian government held highly publicized hearings on reforming Jewish society, the most prominent 
of which were in Vilna from 1866 through 1869.  
  
39 Ibid., 106-114. The debate initially focused on the theological issue raised by M.L. Lilienblum’s famous 
1868 article Orhot ha-Talmud — was halakha fixed or should it evolve within the framework of rabbinic 
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Not only were many of the participants in this debate prominent Lithuanians, but the 
vitriolic exchanges that played out among traditionalists, often in the pages of the nascent 
popular Jewish press, were indicative of “a new style of argumentation based on 
defamation of character.”40 
Likwise, Stanislawski says the orthodoxy embraced by “the vast majority of East 
European Jews” in the mid-nineteenth century resulted in “a self-conscious society 
battling its enemies on their own ground, often with their own tools, organized by leaders 
armed with a vigilant new strategy and militant new ideology.”41 The haskalah 
represented a new heresy, and the need to guard against any hint of it put an end to a 
certain fluidity that had existed between maskilim and Lithuanian traditionalists during 
the early years of the haskalah.42 While Stanislawski differs from Salmon in that he 
emphasizes the significance of events during the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855), this 
does not negate the importance of the debate among traditionalists that occurred between 
1868 and 1878, especially its impact on Jewish public discourse.  
As the preferred medium for this debate,43 the Jewish periodical press amplified 
the “new style of argumentation based on public defamation” and broadened it to other 
                                                                                                                                            
authority in response to contemporary circumstances. However, the debate shifted to specific halakhic 
issues, making even arcane legal disputes among traditionalists a test of proper Jewish identity.  
 
40 Ibid., 113.  
 
41 Stanislawski, Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews, 149. 
  
42 Ibid., p. 55. 
 
43 The primary publications for the principles in the debate were two Hebrew journals, Ha-Melitz, which 
was sympathetic to religious reform within the framework of rabbinic authority, and Ha-Levanon, an outlet 
for traditionalists who opposed any reform whatsoever. Although the former was published in Odessa and 
the latter in Paris, both circulated widely in Lithuania and throughout Eastern Europe. The exchanges also 
were covered to some extent in other popular Jewish publications such as the Ha-Karmel, a Hebrew journal 
published in Vilna; Kol Mevaser, the Yiddish sister publication of Ha-Metlitz also published in Odessa, and 
Ha-Magid, another traditionalist outlet published in Prussia. 
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issues. Discourse on important matters — not just religious reform but also communal 
leadership, corruption, social and economic malaise — became hard-edged and public in 
a way that had not been possible before. Furthermore, newspapers and journals in both 
Hebrew and Yiddish opened public discourse to voices beyond traditional centers of 
authority, helping Jews “equip themselves to operate within the public sphere that was 
opening up in Russia.”44  
 
As an arena for public debate, the press re-defined Jewish politics. Added 
to the external dimension that was traditionally handled by shtadlanim (a 
Jew who, whether officially or unofficially, represents Jewish interests to 
non-Jewish authorities) and the domestic aspect of community affairs, 
there was now a new internal factor that was independent of both the local 
communal structure and the notables of St. Petersburg.45 
  
We should not conclude that that the publication of Sefer Chafetz Chaim in the 
middle of this critical period indicates that Kagan was resisting the emerging orthodoxy 
or that he opposed the public condemnation of reformers in defense of it. As we shall in 
the next chapter, he clearly encourages the latter. I contend, however, that the concern 
about the prevalence of lashon ha-ra expressed in Sefer Chafetz Chaim reflects the fact 
that the new style of argumentation and its amplification in the popular press was 
influencing how traditional Jews thought and talked about each other as well. It was this 
new mode of discourse that Kagan viewed as a threat to Jewish unity.  
 In covering controversial issues and events such as the hearings of the Vilna 
Commission, the popular Jewish press routinely carried stories in which Jews talked 
                                                                                                                                            
  
44 Klier, “Traditions of the Commonwealth,” 12. 
 
45 Eli Lederhendler, “Modernity without emancipation or assimilation?” In Assimilation and Community: 
The Jews in Nineteenth Century Europe,” eds. Jonathan Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstein (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press, 1992), 332.  
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badly about other Jews, Jewish institutions or Jewish society in general. As Salmon 
observes, even the renowned Lithuanian traditionalists Rabbi Isaac Spektor was not 
immune from vitriolic criticism in print when he intervened in the dispute over the kosher 
status of Corfu citrons.46 And regardless of the fact that a number of these publications 
were run by russified Jewish who embraced at least some reform ideas, tens of thousands 
of ordinary Jews read them eagerly. This may explain why Kagan spends so much time 
discussing the prohibition against listening to and believing lashon ha-ra. It also adds to 
our understanding of his complaint in the introduction about the prevalence of Jews 
gathering to discuss “worldly matters” instead of “Torah and the God of Life.” The 
Jewish popular press was providing the grist for these discussions.  
 
                                                
46 Salmon, “Orthodox Judaism in Eastern Europe,” 112-113. I explore this dispute more fully in Chapter 
VI. For now, however, the significance of this incident has less to do with the arguments of Spektor’s 
opponents than with their willingness to publicly condemn a prominent traditional rabbi.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE BOUNDARIES OF JEWISH SOCIETY 
 
Introduction 
In the first sentence of Chapter I of Sefer Chafetz Chaim, Kagan defines lashon 
hara as l’sapeir bignut chavero — relating something that demeans or disgraces one’s 
chaver (companion or friend). Elsewhere he says, “The entire prohibition against lashon 
hara applies specifically to [speech about] a person who, according to Torah law, is still 
amitekha (your colleague).” He then defines amitekha as  “someone who is with you in 
Torah and mitzvot.”1 
  Levy treats chaver and amit as synonyms and translates them as “fellow Jew” or 
“brother Jew.” However, these translations are not quite adequate. While it’s true that in 
the context of nineteenth century Lithuania both terms refer to another Jew, they signify a 
special relationship that does not include all Jews. Kagan explains that one of the most 
pernicious effects of lashon hara is that it undermines solidarity among Jews by wrongly 
implying that the subject of the remark is no longer amitekha. Although still a Jew, this 
person “is not part of the community of Israel (hu einu bi-klal yisrael).”2 Amitekha, then, 
is a term that identifies a Jew who is a member in good standing of klal yisrael and 
reflects certain ideas about what it means to be a proper Jew.  
 My goal in this chapter is to examine which Jews Kagan excludes from the 
category of amitekha and why. Determining how he delimits klal yisrael will give us an 
                                                
1 Kagan, 8.5: 104; Levy, 3: 197. 
  
2 Kagan, Introduction (Lav 6):  17; Levy, 1: 151.  
 154 
idea of where he stood in the contemporary debate about the boundaries of Jewish 
collective identity. The evidence will show that while Kagan resists even the slightest 
challenge to the centrality of traditional religious texts in Jewish life and the authority of 
rabbis to interpret them, he nevertheless tolerates a considerable level of difference — 
even what he would have considered deviance — within the traditional communal and 
religious framework. 
 This does not mean that we should read Kagan as validating difference and 
deviance. Certainly he was not embracing the contemporary ideology of multiculturalism 
that views diversity as a value. Rather we should read him as responding pragmatically to 
the forces of divergence described in the previous chapter. However, while recognizing 
that some difference must be tolerated within the traditional framework in order to 
preserve Jewish social cohesion, Kagan emphatically draws the line at the haskalah 
ideology that sought to de-emphasize the role of traditional texts and the authority of 
rabbis in Jewish life. 
 
The apostate, the heretic and the informant 
The first indication of which Jews are not amitekha comes during the discussion 
cited above about the harmful effect of lashon hara on solidarity within klal yisrael. If 
someone who is amitekha is admonished privately after inadvertently eating pork, Kagan 
asks rhetorically, is it reasonable to believe that he would then turn around and brazenly 
eat a piece of the pork in front of the person who reprimanded him? On the contrary, one 
must assume that after a reprimand he would be remorseful and especially careful not to 
eat the pork. Thus telling others about the one-time offense of someone who is amitekha 
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accomplishes nothing useful. It merely demeans a fellow Jew and diminishes his status as 
a member in good standing of klal yisrael.   
Kagan then adds: “Unless he is someone who converted his faith (sh’heimir dato), 
God forbid, and has left klal yisrael completely. We are not talking about a person such 
as this.”3 Kagan seems to be describing an apostate — someone who has converted and 
no longer identifies himself as Jew. In this case, the opposite of amitekha is not a gentile 
— that is, someone who has never been a Jew — but rather a person who has renounced 
his Jewish identity in favor of another and no longer considers himself part of Jewish 
society.4  
 Kagan identifies another kind of Jew who is not amitekha in a discussion of how 
the prohibition against lashon hara limits what one may say about a fellow Jew who has 
committed a sin against God.5 In an accompanying hagahah, he says: “But if it becomes 
apparent that he sins because of heresy (mifnei sh’yeish bo apikorsut), God forbid, in 
regard to a person like this who is not in the category of amitekha, we are not bound by 
the prohibition not to peddle gossip.”6 
 Kagan also contrasts the heretic with amitekha in the clause cited above in which 
he defines the latter as “someone who is with you in Torah and mitzvot.” Here he not only 
                                                
3 Ibid.  
 
4 Kagan does not describe the person who “converts his faith” as a mumar, a word often translated as 
“apostate.” As I argue below, in Kagan’s view a mumar is not what we commonly refer to as an apostate, 
i.e. someone who rejects his religious tradition, often in favor of another. Instead a mumar is similar to if 
not synonymous with what Kagan calls a rasha (evil person), a habitual sinner.  
 
5 Rabbinic tradition recognizes two major categories of sin — offenses against God (bein adam l’makom) 
and offenses against a fellow Jew (bein adam l’chavero). To some extent these categories are self-evident. 
Idol worship is a sin against God. Stealing is an interpersonal sin. However, not all offenses are classified 
intuitively. For example, although adultery certainly victimizes another person, many authorities, including 
Kagan, describe it a sin against God. The proof text is Gen. 39: 9. When Potiphar’s wife tries to seduce 
Joseph, he responds, “How could I commit this great evil and sin against God?”  
 
6 Kagan, 4.1 (h): 62; Levy, 3: 137.  
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reminds his readers that the heretic is not amitekha but also tells them they have a holy 
obligation to denounce him publicly.  
 
But [regarding] those people who are heretics (sh’yeish ba-hem apikorsut), 
it is a mitzvah to denounce and scorn them — whether in their presence or 
not — for anything one sees or hears about them. It is written, “do not 
oppress amito (one’s colleague)” and “do not be a talebearer among 
amekha (your people).” But [these commandments] do not apply to those 
who do not do as your people do. It is written, “Those who hate you, God, 
I will hate. And [those who] rebel against you I will battle.”7  
   
   
In the same clause, Kagan defines this Jew who is no longer amitekha and must be hated 
and condemned. “Someone is called an apikoreis if he disavows Torah and the prophecy 
of Israel, whether the written Torah or the oral Torah, even if he says the entire Torah is 
sent from heaven except one sentence or one deduction or even a single distinction or 
point of grammar.”8 
  We find a similar description in a paragraph added at the end of the last chapter 
in the 1877 edition. Although he does not use the word apikoreis, Kagan emphatically 
excludes those who deny the primacy of Torah from the ranks of amitekha by 
emphasizing the sinfulness of speaking badly about the latter and the holy obligation to 
denounce the former.  
 
Understand that everything we have written in this book about the 
profound importance of being careful to avoid the sin of lashon hara 
applies to those who are counted as amitekha. But regarding the people 
who deny God’s Torah — even a single letter — and who mock the words 
                                                
7 Kagan, 8.5: 104; Levy, 3: 197. The first two Biblical references are to Leviticus 25:17 and 19: 16, the 
scriptural foundations for the prohibition against lashon hara. The third is to Psalms 139:21. 
  
8 Ibid. By written Torah, Kagan means the Pentateuch and the rest of the Tanakh (Hebrew Bible). The oral 
Torah refers to the interpretations of the written Torah said to have been passed down orally through the 
generations after Sinai and finally codified in the Mishnah, the two Talmuds and other early rabbinic 
literature. 
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of chazal,9 it is a mitzvah to publicize their false opinions (daitam ha-
cozevet) for everyone to see and to condemn them so that we (those who 
are amitekha) will not emulate their evil ways.10 
   
 These passages reveal several significant characteristics of the heretic. First, 
unlike the convert, the apikoreis has not renounced his Jewish identity. Rather he is a 
self-identified Jew who does not conform — “does not do as his people does.”11 Second, 
his non-conformity stems from his “false opinions” about the centrality of the Bible and 
early rabbinic literature in Jewish life. The implication is that these opinions pose the real 
danger to Jewish society, which is why they must be condemned forcefully and publicly. 
Third, to be considered an apikoreis, one need not deny the authority of the traditional 
texts altogether. Rejecting the relevance of even a single clause, no matter how obscure, 
is sufficient. 
Finally, Kagan emphasizes that one is obligated to publicly condemn the 
apikoreis. In regard to the convert, he says only that the laws of lashon hara do not apply, 
which implies that denouncing this person is merely permissible. The distinction 
indicates that Kagan viewed Jews who challenged the preeminence of traditional 
religious texts and rabbinic authority as a greater threat than converts who simply 
renounced their Jewish identity. It is because the heretic continues to portray himself as a 
Jew that he must be condemned so forcefully. Doing so eliminates any doubt about the 
illegitimacy of his “false opinions.”  
                                                
9 Chazal is a rabbinic acronym referring to all of the sages of the Mishnaic and Talmudic periods. Thus 
“words of chazal” refers to the Mishnah, the two Talmuds and other early rabbinic literature. 
   
10 Israel Meir Kagan, Sefer Chafetz Chaim (Warsaw, 1877), R9.15: 149; Levy, 4: 363. 
 
11 See also Kagan, 8.13: 107; Levy, 3: 225 and 227. While the heretic is not amitekha, Kagan still refers to 
him as adam m’yisrael (a person of Israel).   
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 Another kind of Jew who is no longer amitekha is the person who “goes and 
informs on Israel to gentiles (holeich v’malshin al yisrael bifnei nakhrim).” About this 
person Kagan says,  “Most certainly his sin is terrible and hateful. As a result he enters 
the ranks of informants (nikhnas al y’dai zeh bi-klal ha-malshinim) and is equal to the 
apikoreis and those who deny Torah and the resurrection of the dead.” As I explained in 
the previous section, Kagan explicitly distinguishes the malshin from someone who 
merely “denounces [his fellow Jews] before gentiles” (m’ganeihu bifnei nakhrim). 
Although both commit lashon hara, the former’s sin is greater than the latter’s. The 
malshin is “considered to have abused and cursed and raised his hand against Torah and 
Moses our teacher.”12  
According to Levy, the malshin is not someone who merely speaks badly about a 
Jew to a gentile. Rather he reports derogatory or harmful information about another Jew 
to a gentile authority.13 In that sense, his offense does more than endanger an individual. 
By approaching an authority representing the gentile collective, he commits an affront 
against the Jewish collective. Kagan says explicitly that the malshin is not amitekha. No 
Jew may believe lashon hara about any adam m’yisrael “except for apikorsim and 
malshinim and the like who have left the ranks of amitekha.”14 Although Kagan does not 
                                                
12 Kagan, 8.12: 106-107; Levy, 3: 221.  
 
13 See also Kagan, R6.3: 140; R6.10: 143-144, and R7.4: 145; Levy, Vol. 4: 211 and 213, 245 and 247, and 
257. All three clauses deal with the prohibition against believing r’khilut. The first two involve a 
businessman who is told that he lost an exclusive government contract because another Jew informed 
(halshin) on him. The law forbids the businessman from retaliating by informing on the person whom he 
believes informed on him. The third clause involves a Jew who tells a gentile that the merchandise or work 
he purchased from a Jewish merchant or craftsman is flawed. Though this speaker also commits the sin of 
r’khilut, Kagan does not characterize him as a malshin. The difference seems to be that the first speaker 
revealed damaging or derogatory information about the subject to gentile authorities while the second did 
not.  
 
14 Kagan, 8.13: 107; Levy, 3: 227. As I pointed out, the wording here implies that the heretic and the 
informant, although not amitekha, are still Jews. 
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say explicitly that one must denounce the informant, he strongly implies such an 
obligation by linking the malshin and the apikoreis and by equating the informant’s sin to 
denying Torah and the fundamental belief in resurrection.  
 
The rasha 
Another kind of Jew who is not amitekha is the rasha — the evil person. We are 
introduced to the rasha in the chapter that explains how the laws of lashon hara apply to 
speech about someone who has committed a sin against God. The restrictions on what 
one may say about a fellow Jew who has committed such a sin do not apply to someone 
whose lifestyle indicates that he “has no fear of opposing God in his affairs and always 
acts in a manner that is not right.”   
 
For example, ha-poreik15 who breaks faith with the kingdom of heaven or 
isn’t careful about one [particular] aveirah (halakhic violation) that all the 
rest of his people recognize as an aveirah (asher kol sh’ar amo yod-im 
shehi aveirah), whether the sin he committed on purpose several times is 
the same aveirah [the observer] wants to disclose or whether the sin he 
committed on purpose several times is another aveirah well known by 
everyone to be an aveirah (ham’pursemet la-kol sh’hi aveirah). [In either 
case] he has demonstrated that he did not stray from God’s path because 
his yetzer hara overcame him but rather that he acted willfully (im 
bishrirut livo hu holeikh) and is not afraid to oppose God in his affairs. As 
a result, it is permissible to shame him and relate his disgrace, whether in 
his presence or not. And if this person does or says something 
[ambiguous] that can be judged favorably or unfavorably, one must judge 
it unfavorably since he has shown himself to be an utter rasha in the rest 
of his affairs. . . It is permissible to shame him for his actions, make 
known his abominations and heap scorn upon him. And if he was 
admonished to give up [his sinful behavior] and did not, all the more is it 
                                                                                                                                            
 
15 In rabbinic literature, a poreik is someone who brazenly casts off the yoke of Torah. The Yiddish term 
poreik ol refers to someone who contemptuously refuses to live according to the mitzvot.  
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permitted to publicize his identity, disclose his sins publicly and heap 
scorn upon him until he reverts to a better lifestyle.16   
 
 While Kagan’s condemnation of the rasha is harsh and unambiguous, we must 
take into account how narrowly he defines this person. The rasha is not someone who has 
bad personal habits — a quick temper, for example. Rather he is someone who commits 
an aveirah, a violation of religious law.17 But in Kagan’s view this cannot be any 
violation of religious law. Twice he says it must be an act that is widely if not universally 
acknowledged to be sinful — eating pork, for example. We should also take note that in 
the first reference to this condition, Kagan says the violation must be one “that all the rest 
of his people recognize as a aveirah” — not “your people” or “our people.” This wording 
seems to acknowledge that there were groups within traditional Jewish society whose 
legal standards varied. It implies that such differences did not necessarily warrant 
labeling members of another group reshaim. Instead individuals were to be judged 
according to the standards of their own group or community. (By contrast, in speaking of 
the heretic, he says the prohibition against lashon hara “does not apply to those who do 
not do as your people do.”)  
 More important, in Kagan’s view committing a widely recognized sin only once 
does not make someone a rasha. Even the person who repeatedly commits such a sin is 
not necessarily a rasha. Rather a rasha is someone who routinely commits at least one 
widely recognized offense and does so out of defiance rather than merely being unaware 
that he is sinning or unable to control his emotions or appetites. In other words, a rasha is 
                                                
16 Kagan, 4.7: 67-68; Levy, 2: 191 and 193. 
  
17 The term aveirah refers to violations not just of biblical law (i.e. the Torah’s 613 mitzvot) but to rabbinic 
law as well, possibly even to customs and traditions established by communal rabbis.  
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defined less by his deviant behavior than by his defiant attitude. He intentionally thumbs 
his nose at a law that his entire community recognizes as divine. (Thus Kagan describes 
him as being unafraid to “oppose God.”) Having demonstrated this defiant attitude, the 
rasha no longer deserves the benefit of the doubt accorded to those who are amitekha. 
This explains why someone identified as a rasha for repeatedly violating one widely 
recognized law may be publicly denounced even for the one-time violation of another.  
We find a similar description of the rasha in Kagan’s discussion of the 
prohibition against believing lashon hara: “But if it is already established that he is an 
evil person (adam ra) because it is well known that he often contemptuously (bishat 
nefesh) violates prohibitions such as adultery that are acknowledged by all of Israel, then 
it is permissible to believe lashon hara about him.”18 The rasha doesn’t just violate a 
particular law or laws. He violates a law recognized by all Jews, and he does so with 
contempt and without fear. In the be’er related to this clause, Kagan says that such 
persistent and willful disobedience of a widely accepted law means the person is no 
longer amitekha. As a result, one can believe a report about his sinful behavior even if it 
comes from just one witness and even if it concerns an aveirah that he previously had not 
been known to commit. 
We should take note here of the similarity between Kagan’s descriptions of the 
rasha and the mumar.  
The person who routinely (margil atzmo bit’midut) and contemptuously 
(bishat nefesh) commits even a minor sin (chata kal) is called by this 
disgraceful name (mumar). . . Anyone who is not careful to avoid a known 
sin (chata yadu’a) and does not take it upon his soul to refrain from it, 
even if it is a minor sin and he is careful to avoid all the other sins 
mentioned in the Torah, the Sages of Israel call him a mumar in regard to 
                                                
18 Kagan, 7.5: 95; Levy, 3: 119. 
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this one sin and he is counted among the criminals, and the extent of his 
sinfulness is enormous.19 
 
There is no easy translation for mumar. Levi uses “apostate,” which is common. 
However, the English word “apostate” is not adequate because it carries the connotation 
of someone who has converted to another faith or at least abandoned his own. Not only 
does Kagan not use mumar in connection with the person who “converts his faith,” it is 
clear in this passage that he is referring to someone who still identifies himself as a Jew 
and is identified that way by other Jews as well. Given that the key criterion in his 
definitions of both the mumar and the rasha is the routine and willful commission of at 
least one widely recognized sin, it appears that the two are similar if not identical.20  
  The issue of willful disobedience comes up again in Kagan’s discussion of the 
“foolish person” who resists rebuke. As explained previously, one may discreetly report 
the stubborn fool’s one-time sin against God to his rabbi or a member of his family. The 
rationale is that a rebuke by someone the offender views as influential will cause him to 
accept the fact that the behavior in question is sinful. Therefore, he will be less likely to 
repeat the offense. (One may not shame or denounce him publicly, however.)  
In the be’er Kagan distinguishes the fool from someone who is “no longer 
considered amitekha” because he repeatedly commits an act “well known by everyone to 
be prohibited.” The former stubbornly insists that his behavior was not sinful but is 
                                                
19 Kagan, Introduction (Curse 3): 35; Levy, 1: 275. 
 
20 Rabbinic tradition differentiates between a mumar who violates the law out defiance and a mumar who 
violates the law l’tei’abon (as a result of his “appetite,” meaning he is unable to restrain himself.) In this 
case, Kagan uses the term mumar to describe someone who willfully (bishat nefesh) ignores a single 
commandment. According to rabbinic tradition, this is the same as denying the entire Torah. As we will 
see, Kagan makes the same distinction when it comes to the rasha. Only a rasha who sins bishat nefesh 
loses his status as amitekha. This is further indication that, in Kagan’s view, there is little if any difference 
between the rasha and the mumar. 
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remorseful when he finally sees the light. The latter is quite aware that his behavior 
violated the law and feels no remorse. The prohibition against lashon hara does not 
protect the willful sinner’s honor and standing in klal yisrael as it does the fool’s. It is a 
mitzvah to publicly denounce him, even for a sin he isn’t known to have committed 
before.21  
The issue of defiance also comes up in Kagan’s discussion of the individual who 
does not follow instructions from the beit din relating to a legal case in which he is a 
party. If the person gives no explanation for his behavior, he is to be publicly denounced 
and his condemnation recorded “[in communal records] for posterity.”  
 
But if he gives an explanation that hinges on the faithfulness of the heart, 
then the law is contingent. If we believe the answer is not true and is only 
meant to change our opinion, then we do not have to believe him and it is 
permissible to publicly condemn him and inscribe his condemnation [in 
communal records] for posterity. But if there is any doubt, it is forbidden 
to condemn him.22   
 
It becomes clear in the be’er that Kagan is referring to a situation in which 
someone claims either that he did not understand the court’s order or that he was 
overcome by his yetzer hara but has since repented and steeled himself against future 
temptation. However, “such [an explanation] is relevant for going against the beit din 
                                                
21 Kagan, 4.5.23: 65; Levy, 2: 177. In this passage, Kagan is citing, paraphrasing and endorsing the position 
of Rabbeinu Yonah in Sha’are Teshuvah. Elsewhere, however, Kagan says only that condemning a rasha is 
permissible, not that it is obligatory.  
 
22 Kagan, 4.8: 68-69; Levy, 2: 203 and 205. Although this clause appears in the chapter dealing with sins 
against God, Kagan’s says it pertains to any ruling of the beit din, whether the issue involves a sin against 
God or a sin against another person. 
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only once. It does not pertain to ongoing acts that show [the offender] does not want to 
abide by words of Torah.”23  
Obviously this clause is intended to defend the authority of the beit din. The 
religious court’s rulings are “words of Torah.” The litigant who defies a ruling is a rasha 
and subject to the severest of public condemnations. However, even in this case Kagan 
attaches a restriction: The person who does not obey the beit din gets one chance to 
convince the court that his heart remained faithful even if his actions were not — that he 
did not intend to flout communal authorities but rather was confused or overcome by 
temptation.  
Kagan makes this distinction again in a discussion about the prohibition against 
listening to or accepting a derogatory report about a fellow Jew even if the information is 
true. In principle, doing either violates the prohibition against lashon hara. As we will 
see in the next chapter, however, if the information is pertinent (or might be in the 
future), a person may listen to it, suspect that it is true, make discreet inquiries about 
whether it is, and take appropriate steps to protect himself or others as long as there is no 
attempt to publicly shame or unduly harm the subject. However, Kagan emphasizes that 
this should in no way diminish the standing of the subject in Jewish society. Even in 
cases where a person may listen, suspect and investigate, he remains “obligated to do 
well by the accused in regard to all the benefits the Torah commands us to extend to the 
people of Israel.” In addition to giving the benefit of the doubt to a fellow Jew who is the 
                                                
23 Kagan, 4.8.33 and 4.8.34: 68-69; Levy, 2: 207.  
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subject of a negative report, the obligations include returning lost articles, making loans 
to the needy and redeeming captives.24  
In the be’er we learn that these obligations remain in effect even if the report is so 
damning that, if it were true, the subject would no longer be amitekha. (The implied 
rational is that one may not believe that derogatory information about a fellow Jew is 
true.) What’s relevant to my argument, however, is that in some cases the perquisites 
apply even to someone already known as an adam rasha (evil person) because of his 
repeated sins. This person “is still not removed entirely from the rest of the people of 
Israel (lo yatza adayin l’gamrei miklal sh’ar anshim m’yisrael).”25  
 
For example. . . the person who is a mumar as a result of eating non-
kosher food because of his appetite (s’hu mumar okhel navilot l’tei’abon) 
is still among the ranks of klal yisrael in all other respects . . . Therefore it 
could very well be that even if it were already well established that he 
regularly ate non-kosher food because he couldn’t control his appetite and 
now people are saying about him — not in the beit din (that is, on the 
street rather than in official court testimony) — that he ate [non-kosher 
food] in defiance [of religious law], then there is doubt [about whether he 
was defiant] and his status is unchanged. If he is not able to redeem 
himself, we are obligated to redeem him.”26 
 
 
Here again Kagan distinguishes between the evil person who repeatedly violates a well-
known religious law because he can’t control himself and the evil person who repeatedly 
                                                
24 Kagan summarizes this obligation in 6.11: 88-90, Levy, 2: 377 and 379. He emphasizes that it applies 
regardless of whether the report alleges a major violation or a minor one. The subject is still due all the 
benefits of a member of klal yisreal. 
  
25 Kagan, 6.10 (h): 87; Levy, Vol. II, p. 367. 
 
26 Kagan, 6:10.27 and 6.10.28: 87-88; Levy, 2: 369-373. He is referring to the Torah commandment called 
pidyon sh’vuyim (ransoming captives), which obligates Jewish communities to ransom or rescue any Jew 
captured by an enemy. This mitzvah epitomizes the solidarity that should exist among Jews, and Kagan 
uses it here to represent all the halakhic perquisites that Jews owe to a member in good standing of klal 
yisrael. Note also that in this passage, adam rasha is synonymous with mumar. The issue is whether the 
rasha/mumar sinned in defiance of communal standards or because he couldn’t control his appetite. Only 
the former is excluded from the ranks of amitekha. 
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violates the same law as an act of defiance. The former retains enough standing within 
klal yisrael that he keeps the perquisites due its members. The latter does not.  
Kagan acknowledges in the be’er that authorities are divided on this issue. Some, 
including Rashi, take a stricter position regarding those who sin because of their 
appetites. According to the stricter view, these offenders are no longer considered 
amitekha. Therefore, they do not deserve the perquisites accorded to members of klal 
yisrael, which include the benefit of the doubt and protection against lashon hara. Still, 
Kagan says, “My opinion inclines more toward [the other side].”  However tenuously, he 
takes a position that sharply limits the exclusion of Jews from klal yisrael based solely on 
their non-conforming behavior. For Kagan a defiant attitude and the intent to flout 
communal standards determine whether someone is removed from the category amitekha, 
not the non-conforming behavior itself.  
It also is also quite significant that in Kagan’s view a person becomes a rasha 
only by committing sins against God (bein adam l’makom), not interpersonal sins (bein 
adam l’chavero). As we shall see in the next chapter, in some circumstances the 
prohibition against lashon hara is less strict in regard to remarks about someone who has 
sinned against a fellow Jew. What’s important here, however, is that Kagan insists that no 
Jew loses his status as amitekha for committing an interpersonal sin, regardless of how 
widely recognized the offense or how often it is committed.  
 
In regard to [sins] bein adam l’chavero, even if [the offender] violates 
them many times, we are obligated to rebuke him [privately, not denounce 
him publicly] because he does not leave the ranks of amitekha. Only for 
the sin of lashon hara does Rabbeinu Yonah permit [denouncing the 
speaker/offender publicly]. But this is not because [the speaker/offender] 
is no longer amitekha but rather only for the sake of truth and to help 
demonstrate that [the speaker/offender] is guilty [as opposed to the subject 
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of his remarks].  But in regard to privately rebuking and loving one’s 
companions (ra’im) and the rest of the obligations we owe to our fellow 
Jew (amitanu), we must also extend them to [those who commit 
interpersonal sins].27  
 
Thus Kagan eliminates one of the two major categories of sin as a basis for 
excluding a Jew from the ranks of amitekha. To understand his rationale we must keep in 
mind that a rasha loses his status as amitekha only because he sins with a willful heart, 
not because he doesn’t understand the law or has succumbed to his yetzer hara. His 
defiant attitude excludes him from klal yisrael, not his behavior per se. Citing Rabbeinu 
Yonah, Kagan contends that people commit interpersonal sins almost exclusively because 
their yetzer hara misleads them into thinking they are justified in mistreating a particular 
fellow Jew.28 The fact that they don’t treat everyone in such a manner indicates that they 
do not intend to defy communal standards.  
 
Often [the offender’s] yetzer seduces him into believing that [mistreating a 
particular fellow Jew] is actually a mitzvah. . . Thus we see that it is 
merely his yetzer that blinds him into saying that all the obligations [to 
other Jews] commanded by the Torah do not apply to this other person. . . 
So how can it be permitted to say he (the offender) is not among the ranks 
of amitekha, except if it is apparent to everyone that this is in no way 
merely a matter of straying [from lawful behavior] but rather that this 
sinner is a thief or robber.29  
 
Despite the caveat in the last phrase, it’s clear that Kagan is making an important 
distinction between interpersonal sins and sins against God. The former are not criteria 
                                                
27 Kagan, 10.10.30: 120; Levy, 3: 345. 
  
28 He refers specifically to three broad categories of interpersonal sins — gezel (those that cause a financial 
loss), nezek (those that cause damage or injury) and tza’ar (those that cause emotional suffering). 
   
29 Ibid. 
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for identifying someone as a rasha and excluding him from the ranks of amitekha. He 
makes a similar point in a discussion of what Levy calls  “passive” interpersonal sins, 
arguing that one may not publicly denounce the person who routinely refuses to lend 
money to needy fellow Jews or denies them similar perquisites commanded by the Torah. 
While these actions violate Torah, nevertheless “he did not [actually] harm him (lo asah 
lo ra’ah).”30  
In the be’er Kagan acknowledges that some authorities, including Rabbeinu 
Yonah, hold that not lending money to a needy fellow Jew is a sin against God.31 If that 
position were correct, an individual who willfully and repeatedly violated this 
commandment would no longer be amitekha. Therefore, it would be permissible to 
publicly denounce him. Kagan argues, however, that even if refusing to lend money is a 
sin against God, one may not denounce a person who repeatedly commits it. He cites two 
reasons. First, the violation is passive (ein bo ma’aseh). As a result, “he (the offender) is 
not removed from the category of amitekha.” Second, “many people do not understand 
the parameters of this mitzvah (to lend money) or they think it is merely a midah tovah 
(good attribute, i.e. optional) rather than an absolute commandment like not eating pork 
or the like.”  
The significance of this passage is not just that Kagan believes that a Jew who 
refuses to lend money remains amitekha. Just as revealing is how he deals with the legal 
difficulty presented by the fact that some authorities categorize the refusal to lend money 
                                                
30 Kagan, 5.1: 73-74; Levy, 2: 245 and 247. Presumably, however, one should admonish the offender in 
private.  
 
31 The rationale offered by Rabbeinu Yonah is that in Ex. 22:24 God speaks about “lending money to my 
people.” Likewise, Deut. 15: 9 admonishes the Israelites to care for the poor lest they “cry out to the Lord 
and you incur guilt.” Because of God’s special interest in the poor, denying them loans or other aid is also a 
sin against Him.   
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as a sin against God. Only if that is true does it become necessary to argue that the 
offense stems primarily from a misunderstanding of the law, not defiance of it. This is 
because for Kagan, the distinction is not relevant when discussing interpersonal sins, 
which he argues are committed only out of passion or ignorance.  
Legal distinctions between sins bein adam l’makom and those bein adam 
l’chavero are quite common in rabbinic literature.  And it is certainly true that Kagan’s 
position on this issue — that even repeated interpersonal sins do not exclude someone 
from the category of amitekha because such sins are driven by emotion, desire or 
misunderstanding — is not without precedent. However, it is not undisputed either. As 
Kagan observes, Rashi and others exclude from klal yisrael those who are induced by 
their yetzer to sin repeatedly, regardless of whether the offenses are against God or their 
fellow Jews.  
To be clear, we should not conclude that Kagan condones or accepts as valid 
behavior that he believes violates religious law. Indeed he contends that one must 
privately rebuke those who sin, whether against God or another person. And in the next 
chapter we will see that in his view the Torah commandment to protect a fellow Jew from 
harm or injustice is so important that in rare circumstances it even justifies publicly 
denouncing someone who is amitekha. My contention is only that Kagan sharply restricts 
excluding Jews from the ranks of amitekha solely on the basis of non-conforming 
behavior, even when it involves repeated violations of religious law. In that sense, he can 
be described as tolerating a certain degree of difference within Jewish society.32 
                                                
32 See also Brown, “Soft Stringency,” 1-2. He identifies Kagan’s approach to halachah in the Mishna 
Berurah as a quintessential example of what he defines as “soft stringency.” Rather than making a 
definitive ruling on controversial issues, it is a “democratic text” that identifies a range of stringent and 
permissive options and “empowers the individual to decide where on the leniency-stringency spectrum he 
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On the other hand, he shows no tolerance for anyone who challenges the primacy 
of Torah or the authority of those who interpret. The person who suggests that even a 
single letter of the traditional texts is irrelevant is an apikoreis and excluded from the 
ranks of amitekha. The difference in Kagan’s attitude toward non-conforming practice on 
the one hand and beliefs that challenge the primacy of Torah and rabbinic authority on 
the other is also apparent in how the apikoreis and rasha are to be treated. Condemning 
the heretic is a mitzvah, a holy obligation. The only time Kagan uses the word mitzvah in 
connection with denouncing the rasha is when he cites a ruling by Rabbeinu Yonah in 
Sha’are Teshuvah. In every other instance, he describes it as mutar — permissible. 
What’s more, Kagan establishes a number of conditions that must be met before publicly 
denouncing a rasha for a sin against God:33   
• Not only must the speaker be sure that the offender has been rebuked privately 
(and given a chance to repent) but he also must consider the authority of the person who 
rebuked him. If that person is not nikhbad (venerable), “even if he tells him that such-
and-such is not proper and, therefore, he should not do it again, and even if he (the 
subject) does it again intentionally, he (the observer) may not shame him or denounce 
him publicly for this [offense]. Perhaps [the subject] thought [the rebuker] was wrong 
about the law.” Instead the observer should notify “important people” whose rebuke 
                                                                                                                                            
wishes to place himself.” According to Brown, this approach was a pragmatic response to a contemporary 
reality —many Jews who wished to be observant couldn’t or wouldn’t consult rabbinic authorities on 
halakhic issues. “The phrasing pattern of soft stringency enables these sorts of readers to learn quickly what 
is the best performance of the law and what is the necessary minium.” This is further evidence that Kagan 
recognized the increasing divergence among traditional Jews and was willing to tolerate it for the sake of 
social cohesion.  
 
33 Kagan, 4.7.32: 68; Levy, 2: 201 and 203.  
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might be more effective. Only if the offender does not listen to them is it permissible to 
denounce him publicly.34 
• If a person does not have an established reputation as a rasha (im lo nitchazak 
ba-ir la-ish rasha), then the speaker must have witnessed the willful and repeated 
offenses that justify condemning him. Publicly denouncing someone who does not have a 
reputation as a rasha based on second-hand information is lashon ha-ra.   
• Likewise, “if [the act] is not pashut (plain, obvious or recognizable) . . . except 
to the person who rebukes him, then one must consider carefully whether this is actually 
a sin according to Torah and not make a snap judgment.” In other words, one must take 
into account whether the rebuker has misinterpreted the subject’s actions. Not only must 
the alleged behavior be widely acknowledged as sinful, but also the act itself must be an 
unambiguous example of the forbidden behavior.35  
• In denouncing a rasha, one may not exaggerate his offense. 
• One may denounce a rasha only to achieve a to’elet  (legitimate benefit)  — 
either to warn society to “stay far from his evil lifestyle” or to induce the rasha to repent. 
“One may not relate the information for pleasure or out of hatred — only for the truth.” 
• One may not denounce a rasha secretly while flattering him to his face. The 
disclosure should be b’parsum (public).36 Although Kagan does not offer a rationale for 
this condition, elsewhere he argues that denouncing someone publicly demonstrates that 
                                                
34 This condition echoes the approach that one must take in regard to a foolish person who resists rebuke. 
Although Kagan does no say so, it is apparently to ensure that the offender is not merely a foolish person.  
 
35 This does not contradict his position cited above in 4.7, where he says the rasha does not deserve the 
benefit of the doubt if his actions are ambiguous. In that case, he was referring to someone already known 
to be a rasha. In this case he is referring to someone without an established reputation as a rasha.  
 
36 Unless the person making the disclosure has legitimate reason to fear that the subject will harm him or 
that the disclosure will cause controversy. Under such circumstances one may condemn him privately to 
one person at a time. But the intent is still the same — to diminish the subject’s status in the community.  
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one’s motives are legitimate. In the context of the previous condition that the speaker be 
seeking a to’elet, this appears to be his reasoning here too. 
While denouncing the rasha is highly conditional, Kagan cites no conditions for 
denouncing the heretic. Indeed he indicates just the opposite in a discussion of how the 
laws governing r’khilut would apply in a situation in which the father of a bride-to-be is 
unaware that his daughter’s fiancé has a “serious shortcoming” (chesron atzum) — an 
undisclosed illness, for example, that would nullify the marriage contract. The person 
who becomes aware of this situation may inform the bride’s father but only if he meets 
five conditions listed in R9.2: He must be sure the situation is truly dire. He must not 
exaggerate. He must be trying to achieve a to’elet — in this case preventing someone 
from entering into a bad marriage arrangement unawares. He must be sure the father will 
heed his warning. (In other words, it’s not enough to seek a to’elet. The speaker must be 
confident he can actually achieve it.) Finally, he must be sure the to’elet cannot be 
achieved through any other means — for example, trying to persuade the groom’s family 
either to reveal the information or to end the arrangement on their own. 
Heresy is a different situation altogether. In the face of this grave danger, Kagan 
argues, the commandment not to stand idle while a fellow Jew is harmed supersedes the 
commandment against peddling gossip.37 Elaborating in the be’er, he says, “It is not 
necessary [to fulfill] a single condition (b’zeh ein tzarik shum p’rat)” in order to reveal 
information indicating that the groom is a heretic. Explaining that “even the slightest bit 
of this (m’at min ha-m’at mazeh)” means the groom is no longer amitekha, Kagan 
                                                
37 Kagan, A1.6: 159; Levy, 4: 383. 
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explicitly exempts the speaker from each of the conditions in R9.2, including the 
prohibition against exaggeration.38  
That the speaker must be trying to achieve a to’elet when warning others about a 
rasha but not when warning about an apikoreis is significant for two related reasons. 
First, as we will see in the next chapter, achieving a to’elet is an essential condition for 
any leniency that permits speaking negatively about a Jew who is amitekha. Second, a 
legitimate to’elet precludes speaking out of hatred or personal satisfaction. Kagan never 
mentions this restriction in regard to speaking about the heretic or the informant. While 
he does say that the heretic should be denounced unequivocally so that society will know 
that his “evil opinions” about Torah and rabbinic authority are not acceptable, he does not 
exclude hate as a motive. On the contrary, the fact that his definition of the apikoreis cites 
the Biblical commandment to hate those who hate God indicates that hating the heretic is 
a holy obligation, not merely permissible.  
In addition, Kagan mentions two potential benefits in connection with denouncing 
a rasha. Not only does publicly condemning him warn society to avoid his defiant 
behavior, but it also might induce the rasha to repent.39 The second benefit is another 
indication that the rasha retains a connection with klal yisrael and, at least in some cases, 
the perquisites that come with it. At the very least it expresses ambivalence about the 
status of the rasha by indicating that he is redeemable. In contrast, Kagan does not 
                                                
38 Kagan, A1.6.9: 159; Levy, 4: 387. While the speaker may relate second-hand information to the bride’s 
father indicating that the would-be groom is a heretic, he must make it clear that he is doing so. 
 
39 Kagan, 4.7.30: 67-68; Levy, 2: 197. Kagan argues that the reference in b. Pesachim 113b to “publicizing 
his disgrace” refers to a rasha — that is, someone who willfully violates a law several times — not to a 
one-time sinner. However, denouncing this person is permissible only if the speaker intends to warn society 
against emulating his behavior, not to humiliate him. In the same discussion, he notes that a public 
denunciation also ensures that word will get back to the subject and perhaps cause him to repent. Here 
again Kagan implies that the rasha can restore his standing as amitekha. 
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suggest that one reason to condemn the apikoreis is to induce him to give up his “evil 
opinions,” help him regain his status as amitekha or benefit him in any other way. Unlike 
the rasha, the apikoreis is completely and permanently separated from klal yisrael. He is 
irredeemable.  
 
The leniency of public opinion 
Another distinction between speaking against the apikoreis as opposed to the 
rasha involves the role of public opinion. As we already have seen, a core principle of the 
prohibition against lashon hara is that a Jew may not m’kabel (accept) derogatory 
information he hears about a fellow Jew. Following other authorities, Kagan explains that 
this prohibits “believing in one’s heart” — that is, making a definitive determination that 
the information is true. For that reason, one may condemn fellow Jews as heretics only 
“if he heard heretical words from them himself. But if others told him, it is forbidden to 
rely on this to denounce them (l’ganotam).”40  
However, the restriction against believing second-hand information that an 
individual is a heretic applies only to incidental or unsubstantiated reports (sh’mi’ah 
b’alma). “But it they have established reputations in the community as heretics 
(muchzakin ba-ir l’apikorsim), that is as good as seeing it yourself.”41 In other words, 
there is a tipping point at which public opinion becomes as conclusive as first-hand 
                                                
40 Kagan, 8.6: 104; Levy, 3: 201. However, as is the case with any relevant negative information, the 
listener may suspect that it is true, investigate and take steps to protect himself or others. This includes 
“warning others ba-seiter (secretly or discreetly) so that they will not associate with [the alleged heretic] 
until the matter is resolved.” Also, note that one identifies a heretic by what he says, not by what he does. It 
is not the heretic’s behavior that is so troubling but rather his ideas regarding Torah and rabbinic authority. 
    
41 Ibid. Levy translates sh’mi’ah b’alma as “a generalized rumor circulating in society” and muchzakin ba-
ir as “well-established reputation.” 
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observation. When that occurs, even a person who does not have first-hand knowledge 
may believe that a fellow Jew is a heretic and publicly denounce him.  
In the next clause we learn that the same exception applies to a rasha. However, 
when it comes to the rasha, Kagan expresses reservations about the leniency of public 
opinion and seeks to limit its application. For example, he explains that muchzakin ba-ir 
means “the entire city agrees beyond a doubt that he is a rasha owing to the many evil 
stories circulating about him all the time concerning acts like adultery that are known 
throughout Israel to be prohibited.”42  
Elsewhere Kagan elaborates on what it means to have a well-established 
reputation as a rasha in the context of a Talmudic ruling that permits the public 
humiliation of anyone who has a “hateful reputation (sani shumei’anyah).” It takes more 
than a single rumor (yatza kol al echad, literally “a noise or voice emerging about 
someone”) to establish such a reputation, even if it is a widespread rumor. Rather a 
person acquires a hateful reputation as a result of persistent reports over time about a 
variety of offenses.  
 
It is obvious that a hateful reputation refers to someone about whom there 
are evil rumors that he has committed sins many times. One time a rumor 
circulates about him (yotza alei’o kol) that he did this and another time 
that he did that until as a result [of so many rumors] it becomes nitchazak 
ba-ir to suspect him of these sins. Certainly everyone in the city can’t be 
wrong [about the subject] all the time. Therefore it is permissible to agree 
and to decide that he is evil and to denounce him, even if one doesn’t 
know him personally. But this is not the case if one hears incidentally that 
a person did something improper but [the subject] does not yet have an 
established reputation [as a rasha], even if one hears [the same report] 
from many people. It is forbidden to trust this [report] and hate him, and 
                                                
42 Kagan, 8.7: 104-105; Levy, 3: 201 and 203. He distinguishes muchzakin ba-ir from kol b’alma bilbad (an 
incidental “voice,’ or rumor).  
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even more so to speak lashon hara about him and denounce him 
[publicly].43  
  
 In a related hagahah, Kagan concedes the possibility that a single, widespread 
report about a one-time offense by an individual not previously known as a rasha is 
sufficient to establish a “hateful reputation.”  
 
If we heard once that [this person] committed a sin like adultery that is 
well known by everyone to be prohibited, and it was a persistent rumor, 
that is the whole city was insolent towards him for a day a half, and he 
didn’t have enemies who might have circulated the rumor, then it is 
necessary to consider whether [this person] should be considered to have a 
terrible reputation, in which case it would be permitted to humiliate him 
for this sin, and even to accept the report about him and believe in one’s 
heart that it is true.44   
 
It’s clear, however, that Kagan is reluctant to endorse this leniency when it comes to 
identifying someone as a rasha and denouncing him publicly. In the same hagahah he 
warns that a single, widespread rumor may be considered believable45 only if “many 
[people] affirm it openly” and there is no evidence that it was initiated or circulated by 
one person. In other words, it must be expressed openly and without reservation by many 
people, leaving no doubt that it is truly public opinion.46 
What’s more, even when public opinion allows one to believe a report and 
denounce a rasha, he may not be harmed, either financially or physically. For this, no 
                                                
43 Kagan, 7.4.8: 94; Levy, 3: 113 and 115. 
  
44 Kagan, 7.5.10 (h): 95; Levy, 3: 121. 
  
45 What makes it believable is that it is both persistent and widespread. The Bavli says a persistent rumor — 
or what it calls “a voice that doesn’t stop” — is sufficient to create a “terrible reputation,” which means that 
one is obligated to hate and denounce the subject. 
   
46 Kagan, 7.5.10 (h): 95; Levy, 3: 127. 
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rumor suffices, regardless of how persistent and widespread, only the official testimony 
of two witnesses before the beit din. Kagan is no doubt defending the authority of the beit 
din by prohibiting regular citizens from taking the law into their own hands and exacting 
physical or financial punishments against the rasha. My point, however, is that he does 
not explicitly extend this protection to either the apikoreis or the malshin. 
Kagan casts further doubt on the leniency of public opinion as it regards reshaim 
by emphasizing the subjective nature of determining whether a rumor is persistent or the 
point at which someone acquires an established reputation. Because these determinations 
are open to interpretation, the leniency of public opinion is easily abused. Kagan 
expresses concern that ba’alei lashon hara will misuse the leniency to label their enemies 
reshaim and unfairly denounce and humiliate them. 
 
I was quite fearful about bringing up this law because when ba’alei lashon 
hara hear one little [leniency] they often will [use it to] maintain that a 
certain person has an established reputation as a rasha in order to 
denounce him, [thereby] mocking the warnings in this book. Even so, I did 
not omit it . . .47 
 
These passages indicate that while Kagan acknowledges the role of public 
opinion, he does not treat it equally when it comes to identifying reshaim and apikorsim. 
In regard to former, he expresses reservations about the leniency, establishes conditions 
for its use and warns readers not to abuse it. He cites no such reservations or conditions 
and makes no such warnings in regard to the heretic. This is further indication of his 
reluctance to exclude the former from the ranks of amitekha compared to the latter. 
 
 
                                                
47 Kagan: 8.7: 105; Levy, 3: 203. 
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Socio-historical explanation 
The preceding analysis demonstrates how the concept of lashon hara inevitably 
involves identifying the boundaries of Jewish society — who is a member in good 
standing of klal yisrael and who is not. My aim in the remainder of this chapter is to 
suggest what the analysis tells us about where Kagan stood in the contemporary debate 
about this issue.  
In the previous two chapters I argued that the discourse that so alarmed Kagan 
was due in part to public disputes among traditional Lithuanian Jews over halakhic issues 
and the competency of communal rabbis. I argued further that these disputes reflected the 
growth of both religious diversity and competition for religious authority associated with 
a decline in the status of communal rabbis and the rise of the musar movement and an 
independent class of Torah scholars within the Yeshiva movement.  
I would argue that in limiting halakhic deviancy per se as the basis for exclusion 
from klal yisrael, Kagan was responding to public disputes among these traditionalist 
groups. While they may have disagreed on issues of religious practice and competed for 
communal authority, none of these groups either disputed the central place of the Torah 
in Jewish society or challenged the legitimacy of the rabbinate and rabbinic courts. Kagan 
himself embodied the fundamental connections that existed among the rabbinate, the 
yeshiva movement and musar. As noted previously, he expresses tolerance if not outright 
sympathy for musar and twice forbids publicly condemning a fellow Jew for having a lax 
attitude toward Torah study, the most serious criticism of musar among Lithuanian 
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traditionalists.48 Kagan also was both a rosh yeshiva and, like many other roshei yeshivot, 
a rabbinic decisor.   
We should also consider the possibility that Kagan’s reluctance to permit 
denunciations aimed at defending halakhic principles or enforcing specific religious 
behavior reflects the evolution of a less hostile attitude among traditional Lithuanian Jews 
toward their Hasidic rivals. The Vilna Gaon’s condemnations of Hasidism and the bans 
of excommunication issued against its leaders a century earlier depicted it not merely as 
an aberrant spiritual/religious sect but also as an existential threat to traditional 
institutions and social order. As Gershon Hundert and others point out, however, despite 
its innovations in theology and practice, Hasidism proved to be neither revolutionary nor 
even dramatically reformist from a political or social standpoint. While its followers 
worshipped separately, they nevertheless accepted Torah as the foundation of Jewish life. 
Just as important, their leaders acknowledged the authority of and worked within the 
rabbinate, the kahal and other communal institutions. “The Hasidic masters did not 
preach rebellion against the communal establishment . . . [and] a number of Hasidic 
leaders were identified with or actually were part of the kahal administration.”49 
Likewise, Israel Bartal says: 
                                                
48 Kagan: 4.2:. 62; Levy, 3: 147. The clause explains that one may not denounce a fellow Jew for violating 
a religious law that most people are not careful to observe. In other words, the prohibition applies even if 
the remarks would not harm the subject’s reputation because most people do not consider the behavior 
sinful. According to Kagan, laxness in Torah study falls into this category. Thus it is an offense for which 
one may not publicly criticize a fellow Jew. In the related be’er (4.2.6: 62; Levy, 2: 147), he endorses 
Rabbeinu Yonah’s position that public denunciation is appropriate only if a person violates a widely 
acknowledged law in a way that demonstrates that he has “no fear of heaven” — in other words, in open 
defiance of communal standards. Kagan then adds, “Because of our many sins, [contemporary Jewish 
society] is lax in regard to Torah study . . . Therefore, any [public criticism] about this is certainly lashon 
hara, even if it is true.”  
   
49 Gershon Hundert, Jews in Poland-Lithuania in the Eighteenth Century: A Genealogy of Modernity 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), 208. See also Elijah Schochet, The 
Hasidic Movement and the Gaon of Vilna (Northvale NJ: Jason Aronson Inc., 1994). Although he gives 
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[Hasidic leaders] did not openly challenge the power of the community 
leadership but rather offered to serve as a supplemental authority. In many 
cases . . . not only did the influential tzaddik (Hasidic spiritual leader) 
refrain from challenging the existence of the community institutions or 
trying to change anything in the structure of the kahal or the functions it 
filled, but he placed his followers in key positions in the community.50 
 
 
Hundert also points out that the vehement early opposition to Hasidism had as 
much to do with power relations as with religious ideology.51 This means we must take 
into account how those relations had changed. By the mid-1870s, Hasidism had become 
the dominant form of traditional Judaism in Eastern Europe, making inroads even in 
Lithuania. From a socio-political standpoint, it would have been problematic to continue 
insisting that millions of Hasidim were not legitimate Jews. In light of the perceived 
common threat from the haskalah, it makes sense that Litvaks like Kagan would seek a 
détente if not a rapprochement with Hasidism.52 In that sense Sefer Chafetz Chaim 
anticipates his prominent role 50 years later in unifying ultra-Orthodox Jews under the 
political banner of Agudat Yisrael. 
To be clear, I am arguing only that Kagan did not view Hasidism, musar or other 
expressions of Jewish traditionalism as so deviant that they had to be excluded from klal 
                                                                                                                                            
more weight to the socio-political implications of the conflict between Hasidism and Lithuanian 
traditionalism, Schochet describes them as two legitimate “religious personalities” that influenced each 
other and eventually reached a balance. His point is not that no differences remained or that the differences 
were unimportant but rather that the differences were no longer categorical. 
 
50 Israel Bartal, The Jews of Eastern Europe, 1772-1881, trans. Chaya Naor (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 52. 
 
51 Hundert, Jews in Poland-Lithuania, 147-149. 
 
52 See Allan Nadler, “Misnagdim,” in The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe,” accessed Sept. 
13, 2011, http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Misnagdim. “The enmity of the misnagdim toward 
Hasidism lessened as both groups were forced, over the course of the nineteenth century, to confront a 
common and far greater threat to traditional Judaism: namely, the European Enlightenment and the 
assimilation and religious reform that it ultimately generated among Jews.” 
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yisrael. This toleration of difference does not requires us to believe that he accepted their 
theological beliefs and religious practices as valid, or that he approved of their ecstatic 
worship styles and attitudes toward Torah study. He describes laxness in Torah study as a 
midot m’gunot and says explicitly that it is permissible not only to warn one’s children 
and students to avoid an individual who is so inclined but to exaggerate his shameful 
attribute to make sure they do. Likewise, his rulings indicate that he might have 
considered it a mitzvah to warn Torah sages or other individuals about the religious 
practices of non-conforming groups within traditional Lithuanian Jewish society. But in 
his view these derogatory remarks had to be made discreetly so as not to shame the 
subjects or diminish their status as members of klal yisrael. Despite their questionable 
practices, they remained amitekha as long as they accepted the centrality of Torah and the 
authority of rabbis to interpret it.  
In contrast, my analysis shows that Kagan encourages public condemnation of 
those who challenged traditional texts and communal authority — either by undermining 
the primacy of the Torah and its rabbinic interpreters in Jewish life or by informing on 
Jews to gentile authorities and thereby circumventing communal authority. Given the 
contemporary socio-historical context, I would argue that Kagan intended to permit the 
marginalization of adherents of the haskalah, the Jewish enlightenment movement.  
The haskalah was a complex movement, and the attitude of its adherents toward 
Jewish society and traditional institutions varied and evolved. In the early nineteenth 
century there was a measure of affinity between maskilim and traditional Lithuanian Jews 
based on their mutual disdain for Hasidism and their proclivity for rationalism over 
mysticism. But that affinity dissipated as Russian maskilim sought de-emphasize the role 
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of the Talmud and other halakhic literature in determining Jewish life in favor of the 
Bible as an expression of universal human values. They also challenged the role of the 
rabbinate in Jewish society, particularly in establishing minhagim, special customs that 
often gained the status of law and that many reformers viewed as unnecessarily restrictive 
and harmful. 
 
Tension and animosity arose [between maskilim and traditional Lithuanian 
Jews] as the tendency toward secularization, which was inherent in the 
haskalah, took on more open and pronounced expression. Opposition 
between these two camps broke out in full force in the 1840s, against the 
background of the episode known as haskalah mi-ta‘am (government-
sponsored haskalah).”53 
 
It was during this period that traditionalists came to perceive maskilim as being in 
league with the Russian government’s effort to modernize Jewish culture, mainly through 
the creation of a state-sponsored education system and the weakening of the rabbinate. 
Etkes notes that government officials often described reform as an attempt to rid Jewish 
society of the “damaging influence of the Talmud.” Even if this was not the language or 
intent of all Russian maskilim, in they eyes of many traditionalists they not only “mocked 
words of chazal” but also were in league with Russian authorities in undermining the 
centrality of Torah in Jewish society. By Kagan’s criteria, then, this would have qualified 
them as malshinim as well as heretics, removed them from the category of amitekha and 
permitted their public condemnation. 
                                                
53 Immanuel Etkes, “Haskalah,” The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, accessed on Sept. 13, 
2011, http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/printarticle.aspx?id=10. As Etkes notes, many of the most 
prominent maskilic writers were Lithuanian. 
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We should also note that Sefer Chafetz Chaim was published during the so-called 
“radical haskalah” of the 1860s and ‘70s when criticism of Jewish society and 
institutions by maskilic novelists and journalists became quite harsh.54  
 
Among other things, they criticized traditional education, patterns of 
marriage in the community, economic behavior, and the actions of 
communal leaders. The literary genre frequently used by haskalah authors 
to express social criticism was the novel. Their novels were represented as 
reflecting the entire gamut of Jewish life in Russia; but in fact they were 
didactic, with stereotypical characters. The melamed (traditional 
schoolteacher) was always described as an ignorant and coarse man; the 
community functionary was aggressive and violent; and the rabbi a fanatic 
who tended to issue inappropriately severe rulings. . . . A special place in 
haskalah literature, both imaginative and journalistic, was reserved for 
rabbis — the more so because they still enjoyed high status in the general 
community. Authors of the haskalah repeatedly accused rabbis of not 
doing their jobs properly. Since they lacked general education, rabbis were 
unable to represent the community before the authorities; and their 
isolation from the real life of the masses of the people kept them from 
alleviating Jews’ distress. Not only were rabbis unable to lighten the 
burden resting on the shoulders of the community, but they also actually 
made it heavier with their severe halakhic rulings.55 
 
 Two hagahot that appear in the clause dealing with the malshin are relevant here. 
I have already mentioned the first. It refers to Jews who “hire witnesses and slander their 
fellow Jews to take their wealth unjustly and disgrace them before the government’s 
judges.”56 As I argued in a previous chapter, this passage can be understood in the 
context of the collapse of traditional communal authority and the increasing propensity of 
even traditional Jews to take their internal economic, political and legal grievances to 
Russian authorities.   
                                                
54 Ibid.  
   
55 Ibid. 
  
56 Kagan, 8:12: (h), p. 107; Levy, 3: 223.  
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The second hagagah addresses a different phenomenon — mocking a fellow Jew 
in a seemingly clever or wise manner so that derogatory nature of one’s words becomes 
apparent “only after observation (hitbonut)” and the subject is unable to respond. “Not 
only does his chaver remain scorned and disgraced . . . but also as a result, when the 
report is published (yitparseim) everyone will agree that [the speaker] is wise 
(chakham).”57  
The key to understanding this cryptic passage is to keep in mind that Kagan 
inserted it in his discussion of the malshin. One explanation is that he was referring to 
maskilic writing, particularly the serialized Yiddish satires of Jewish society and 
institutions that became popular during the radical haskalah of the 1860s and ‘70s. 
Because maskilim were seen as allies of the government, many traditional Jews assumed 
that Russian authorities read or were influenced by their works — even those in Hebrew 
and Yiddish. Thus maskilic writers were seen as airing their criticism not just within 
Jewish society but to gentile authorities as well, which made them even more dangerous. 
What’s more, satire and other social criticism by maskilic writers appeared in 
publications that did not offer an opportunity for response. These works also were widely 
read, indicating that a many traditional Jews considered them entertaining, clever and 
insightful.  The writers were making themselves appear chakham by publicly ridiculing 
true chakhamim.  
Finally, while Kagan condemns these “wise” speakers, his main purpose is to 
criticize those who admire or encourage them. “The one who praises this bitterness (ha-
                                                
57 Kagan, 8.12 (h): 107; Levy, 3: 223 and 225. Kagan says this offense “is not within the scope of this 
book, which is specifically about the prohibition against lashon hara.” This clever speaker is guilty of the 
sins of buffoonery (leitznut), oppressive language (ona-at d’varim) and embarrassing a fellow Jew in public 
(malvin p’nei chavero ba-ravim). 
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m’haleil et ha-boteh ha-zeh) as words of wisdom has blasphemed (ni’eitz) against God. 
At the very least we fail to fulfill the mitzvah to rebuke [the speaker] for this evil deceit. 
Will we also offer acclaim in response to it?”58 As we might expect given his target 
audience, Kagan’s rebuke was aimed not at maskilim, who were unlikely to read or be 
influenced by his book, but rather at the thousands of traditional Jews who were reading 
and talking about maskilic critiques. (This also explains why he would describe this 
offense as one that causes “many people to stumble.”)
                                                
58 Ibid.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
SPEAKING BADLY ABOUT AMITEKHA 
 
 Having identified where Kagan draws the boundaries of klal yisrael, I now want to 
look at the circumstances in which Kagan permits the disclosure of negative or harmful 
information about those who are amitekha. My analysis will show that the leniencies 
primarily permit private or discreet remarks as distinguished from the public 
condemnation of those who are not amitekha. The leniencies also hinge entirely on the 
speaker’s intent. In relating negative information about a fellow Jew, the speaker must be 
trying to achieve a to’elet, a legitimate benefit that excludes speaking mi-tzad sinah (out 
of hatred) or shaming or otherwise harming the subject. In general, these benefits have to 
do less with defending halakhic principles or enforcing religious beliefs and behaviors 
than with preventing or rectifying specific injustices or conducting routine affairs such as 
running a business, arranging a marriage, raising children or instructing students. In other 
words, they are based on ethical or practical considerations, not religious orthodoxy or 
orthopraxy.  
 
Discretion and legitimate benefit 
 According to Kagan, the essential principle of the prohibition against lashon hara is 
that a Jew may not say anything that demeans or harms someone who is amitekha. It 
makes no difference whether the remark is true or false, whether it is made to one person 
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(privately) or in front of many (publicly), or whether the subject is present or not.1 The 
corollary to this principle is that one may not believe such a remark (or tell others), 
regardless of whether it is made in public or private, whether one hears it from one 
person or from many, or whether the subject is present or not.2  
 Yet we already have identified a number of exceptions that permit derogatory or 
harmful remarks about someone who is amitekha — for example, the situation in which a 
person sees his chaver commit a sin against God. The witness must tell certain 
individuals about the sin if doing so “benefits [them] by separating [them] from 
something prohibited (im hu mo’il l’afroshei mei’isura).”3  
An eyewitness is obligated to inform a man that his wife has committed adultery, 
for example, so that he will not defile himself by having contact with her.4  For a similar 
reason, one must warn Torah sages about a colleague who has eaten non-kosher food. 
And while a lone witness to a sin against God is prohibited from testifying or making a 
formal complaint to the beit din, he is “not altogether prohibited” from unofficially 
informing members of the court.5 In this case, the benefit is that the beit din knows not to 
take testimony from the subject until it can be sure that he is no longer in a state of sin.  
In summarizing this leniency, Kagan says, “It hinges on whether the speaker 
intends to denounce him (lignuto) . . . or to achieve a legitimate benefit (l’to’elet ha-
yotzei’a mazeh).” The former violates the prohibition against lashon hara; the latter does 
                                                
1 Kagan, 1.1: 37, 2.1: 41, and 3.1: 55; Levy, 1: 283 and 381, and 2: 81. 
 
2 Kagan, 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3: 91-93, and 8.13: 107; Levy, 3: 85, 87, 99 and 225.  
 
3 Kagan, 4.4 (h): 65; Levy, 2: 159. The speaker must have witnessed the act himself and be sure that the 
person he tells will not simply reject the warning. 
  
4 Strictly speaking, the issue here involves r’khilut.  
 
5 Kagan, 4.4.16: 64; Levy, 2:165 and 167.  
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not. Kagan proscribes the kind of public censure permitted or required about those who 
are not amitekha. Instead of ginah (denounce or condemn), he uses gilah (reveal or 
disclose) to describe how one may speak about a chaver who has committed a sin against 
God. Thus the leniency depends on two related conditions. The speaker must be discreet, 
disclosing the information only to certain individuals who, while they can protect 
themselves, are enjoined from telling others.6 And the speaker must intend to achieve a 
to’elet, which explicitly excludes trying to discredit, embarrass or otherwise harm the 
subject.  
To be clear, this does not mean that Kagan believes one should tolerate halakhic 
violations. Indeed the witness is required to rebuke the offender gently and discreetly. 
Having fulfilled this obligation, however, the witness must assume the sin will not recur. 
So the purpose of his discreet revelations is to protect a third party, not to punish the 
offender or influence his behavior. In some cases, the offender might not even be aware 
of the remarks.  
The situation is slightly more complicated if the offender is what Kagan refers to 
as a foolish person who resists rebuke. As we have seen, in this case the witness should 
report the sin to the offender’s rabbi or a member of his family, who acts as a kind of 
surrogate rebuker. The rationale is that this person person is more likely to accept an 
admonition from an authority figure or family member. While this leniency does involve 
enforcing certain religious behaviors, Kagan emphasizes that the disclosure must not be 
made b’sinato (out of hatred for him) and that the whole affair must be handled discreetly 
                                                
6 This is because they did not witness the sin themselves. 
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(b’hatznei’a) so as not to embarrass or dishonor the subject publicly (lo yalbinu panei 
b’ravim).7 He may be a “stubborn fool,” but in Kagan’s view he is still amitekha.   
 The leniency pertaining to revealing negative information about someone who is 
amitekha implies a corresponding leniency when it comes to listening to and believing 
such information. Otherwise a talmid chacham would have no basis for avoiding the 
person who ate non-kosher food or the rabbi for privately admonishing the fool who 
resists rebuke. This leniency derives from the aforementioned passage in b. Niddah 61a: 
“While one may not accept [lishna bisha], one should be mindful of it.” Following other 
authorities, Kagan interprets this ruling to mean that a person may listen to negative 
information about a fellow Jew “if the report is relevant to him (the listener) now or in 
the future (im ha-davar nogei’a lo al l’haba).” Not only may he listen but he also may 
suspect that the information is true, make inquiries to determine whether it is, and take 
appropriate steps to protect himself or others.  
 
For example, if the listener sees from the outset that the speaker wants to 
show him that so-and-so is not a responsible person or something like that, 
and [the listener] was thinking about hiring [so-and-so] or going into 
partnership with him or arranging a marriage with him or the like, [the 
listener] is permitted to listen from the outset in order to suspect (lachush) 
and to safeguard himself. The reason [for this leniency] is that he does not 
listen because he is interested in hearing his chaver disgraced. He only 
wants to protect himself from harm or prevent a dispute in the future . . . 
The law is the same even when listening has no legitimate relevance to 
[the listener] but will benefit others. [In that case] listening is also 
permitted. For instance, someone wants to listen to this report in order to 
make inquiries about whether it is true and admonish so-and-so about it. 
                                                
7 Kagan, 4.5: 65-66; Levy, 2: 175. As noted in Chapter III, it is so important not to embarrass the subject or 
harm his reputation that the speaker must take into account whether the rabbi is discreet. If he is not, then 
the speaker may reveal the information only if he is absolutely sure the subject respects the rabbi enough to 
heed his rebuke. In this case, the benefit of preventing the subject from repeating his sin outweighs the 
potential harm to his reputation. 
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Perhaps this will result in the sinner repenting or returning stolen 
merchandise or apologizing to someone he disgraced or cursed.8  
 
In some circumstances, it is a mitzvah to listen to lashon hara — if, for example, the 
listener can help create “peace in Israel” by convincing the speaker and others who 
believe him that they are wrong about the subject.9 “This is obvious,” Kagan says in the 
be’er, “because even r’khilut is proper (gufa) if it rectifies damages or resolves a 
dispute.”10 Like the passage in b. Niddah 61a and subsequent authorities, however, Kagan 
distinguishes between listening to negative information and suspecting that it might be 
true on the one hand and believing that it is true on the other. “But to accept (l’kabeil) — 
that is to determine in one’s heart that the matter is true (l’hachlit ha-davar b’livo sh’hu 
emet) — is prohibited in all circumstances.”11  
Being allowed to suspect but not believe limits how the listener may respond. 
While he may take steps to protect himself or others from harm, the information “should 
not cause even the slightest doubt about the status and legitimacy of [the subject],” which 
means the listener must “do well by him” in regard to all the obligations Jews owe to one 
another.12 “[One may not] take any action against him or cause him any harm or shame, 
                                                
8 Kagan, 6.2: 77-79; Levy, 2: 283 and 285. 
  
9 Kagan, 6.4: 79; Levy, 2: 303. 
   
10 Kagan, 6.4.6: 79; Levy, 2: 305. 
  
11 Kagan, 6.2: 79; Levy, 2: 285. 
 
12 Kagan, 6.10: 86-88; Levy, 2: 359 and 361. 
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great or small, even if the lishna bisha came from a reliable witness who testified before 
the beit din . . . Even hating him [secretly] in one’s heart is prohibited by Torah.”13 
Elsewhere Kagan responds to the concerns of a hypothetical businessman who 
worries that the commandment not to listen to or believe lashon hara precludes the kind 
of due diligence necessary in routine commercial activities. If it becomes apparent that 
someone is about to denigrate a fellow Jew, Kagan says, the listener should interrupt him 
and ask whether the information is relevant to his affairs “now or in the future” or 
whether it will it enable him “to fix a situation.” The latter reference is to a situation in 
which the listener might prevent someone else from being harmed or rectify an injustice 
by rebuking or otherwise influencing a third party.  
 
[If either circumstance pertains] it is permissible to listen, but not to 
believe at that moment, only to suspect until the matter becomes clear. But 
if [the listener] sees from his answer that there will be no to’elet from 
[listening] or he sees [that the remarks consist] only of hateful and 
insulting words, that [the speaker] slanders [the subject] sinfully and 
denounces him because he has a great hatred of him, then it is forbidden 
even to listen.14 
 
The passages above demonstrate how the leniency for listening and responding to 
negative information about a fellow Jew corresponds to the leniency for relating such 
information. Just as the speaker must be trying to achieve a to’elet, so too must the 
listener. And just as a legitimate to’elet precludes revealing the information out of hatred, 
it also precludes responding out of hatred. What’s more, as was the case for the speaker, 
the benefit may accrue even to the subject of the remarks, who is still amitekha. Finally, 
                                                
13 Kagan, 6.11: 88-90; Levy, 2: 377. While the testimony of a single witness is not enough to convict, the 
beit din can use it to require someone to swear an oath. The point here is that even such testimony does not 
permit concluding that the information is true. 
 
14 Kagan, 6.3: 79; Levy, 2: 301. 
 
 192 
and most significant, neither the speaker nor the listener may do anything that harms or 
humiliates someone who is amitekha, which precludes denouncing him publicly or telling 
any non-interested party about the matter. The matter must be handled discreetly on a 
need-to-known basis.15  
 
The leniency of circumstantial evidence 
  One may not m’kabeil (accept as true) negative or demeaning information about a 
fellow Jew, regardless of how many people say it. The subject must be judged favorably 
even if there is circumstantial evidence (d’varim nikarim, literally “recognizable things”) 
supporting the report. However, Kagan cites a leniency regarding d’varim nikarim. If the 
circumstantial evidence is so strong as to preclude doubt, then “it is permissible to 
believe and to accept (l’ha-amin u-l’kabeil).”16  
 This leniency is based on the exegesis in b. Shabbat 56a of the Biblical story in 
which King David believes and acts on a report that Mephiboshet, one of Saul’s sons, 
was disloyal to him. The passage exonerates David of the sin of lashon hara because he 
previously had observed circumstantial evidence that supported the accusation. Noting 
that the leniency is endorsed by a number of subsequent authorities, including Rabbeinu 
Yonah in Sha’are Teshuvah, Kagan concludes that one may believe a report supported by 
                                                
15 This is why, as noted previously, a speaker may not reveal negative information to a person who might 
tell someone else or otherwise harm the subject. The one exception is the leniency that permits telling an 
indiscreet rabbi about a foolish person who won’t otherwise accept rebuke for a sin against God. 
  
16 Kagan, 7.10: 99-100; Levy, 3: 157. 
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“substantial circumstantial evidence” (d’varim nikarim mamash), even if the speaker is 
known to have lied previously.17  
 Though he acknowledges the leniency regarding circumstantial evidence, Kagan 
cites a number of limitations. Before believing a negative report about a fellow Jew based 
on d’varim nikarim, one must “carefully investigate” to make sure the evidence is true 
and meets certain criteria: It must be substantial rather than flimsy (d’varim nikarim 
mamash, not davar ha-nikar k’tza). It must relate directly to the substance of the remarks. 
And the speaker must have observed the evidence first-hand.18 In addition, one can 
believe the report only if it results in a legitimate benefit such as allowing a person to 
distance himself from the subject until he has atoned or changed his lifestyle.19 It is 
strictly forbidden to rely on the leniency of strong circumstantial evidence to harm the 
subject or cause him a financial loss. And while a person who hears a report supported by 
substantial circumstantial evidence may take steps to distance himself from sin, he may 
not tell others what he heard.20  
In regard to the last condition, however, Kagan cites two exceptions. The first, 
which we have already discussed, is if the subject is someone who has a well-established 
reputation as a rasha. The second applies if  “the information concerns an interpersonal 
sin and it is necessary to be jealous for the truth and assist the victim.”  
                                                
17 Kagan, 7.10.22: 101; Levy, 3: 165. See also Kagan, 7.10.25: 101, Levy, 3: 169. One can also believe a 
slave or a woman. In the context of the ancient rabbis, these classes of people were less credible, which is 
why they were not allowed to testify before a beit din. Kagan makes this point in order to emphasize the 
credibility that can be accorded to strong circumstantial evidence.   
 
18 Kagan, 7.11: 101; Levy, 3: 171. 
 
19 Kagan, 7.10.25: 101; Levy, 3: 169. 
  
20 Kagan, 7.12: 101; Levy, 3: 173. 
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In that case, even if [the speaker] did not witness the event himself but 
only heard that so-and-so committed an offense against so-and-so, and 
there is strong circumstantial evidence indicating that this report is true, it 
seems to me that it is permitted to relate this information to others and 
explain to them why this seems to be true in order to encourage them to 
help the victim and be jealous for the truth.21  
 
For Kagan, the leniency of circumstantial evidence does not pertain to defending halakhic 
principles or even punishing certain behavior. Rather it is primarily an ethical concession 
that allows the exchange of information in order to assist the victim of a specific 
injustice.  
Significantly, Kagan exempts the beit din from one important restriction 
regarding circumstantial evidence. In the face of exigent circumstances (mifnei tzoreich 
sha’at), the religious court can mete out punishment based on strong circumstantial 
evidence.  
 
For example, say someone whose money has been stolen appears before 
them and alleges with certainty based on strong circumstantial evidence 
that so-and-so robbed him of his livelihood, and the beit din either sees the 
circumstantial evidence itself or hears [independent] testimony about it. 
They have permission to punish [the accused person] so that he will 
confess. But an individual does not have this prerogative. Nor does the 
beit din have it if the circumstantial evidence is not clearly proven by 
testimony beyond that of the victim.22 
 
It is not surprising that Kagan privileges the religious court when it comes to 
circumstantial evidence. However, the fact that the court may punish someone based on 
                                                
21 Kagan, 7:12.28: 101; Levy, 3: 175. 
 
22 Kagan, 7.13: 102: Levy, 3: 181. In the next clause he laments the fact that it was common for city 
officials (tovei ha-ir) to condemn and punish an alleged thief based only on the victim’s testimony about 
circumstantial evidence. This is forbidden even if “the city officials have the status of a religious court 
(tovei ha-ir chashivi k’mo beit din).” Before acting on circumstantial evidence, they must either see it 
themselves or hear independent testimony that confirms it.  
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such evidence only serves to emphasize that individuals may not. What’s more, even in 
this circumstance, “believing” a negative report based on circumstantial evidence does 
not permit the beit din to publicly condemn the subject and diminish his status as 
amitekha. Thus, it has to do less with inculcating certain normative beliefs or behavior 
and more with rectifying a specific interpersonal offense. I would also point out that the 
phrase “robbed him of his livelihood” indicates that Kagan is referring to financial 
offenses.  
   
Shameful attributes and personal shortcomings 
Kagan sharply restricts speaking about another Jew’s midot ha-m’gunot — 
shameful attributes. His description of these attributes — “someone who is haughty or 
becomes angry over nothing” — indicates that he is referring to behavior or personality 
traits that are undesirable but do not amount to halakhic violations. The person who sees 
another Jew exhibit a shameful attribute is obligated to reprove him privately. But even if 
the behavior continues, “it is forbidden to characterize him as a rasha and to tell [others] 
about him.”23  
In the next clause, however, Kagan identifies a significant leniency: “If someone 
sees a person with a midah m’gunah — for example haughtiness or a quick temper or 
some other evil attribute, or he is lazy in regard to Torah study or the like — it is proper 
for the observer to relate this matter to his son or students in order to warn them not to 
                                                
23 Kagan, 4.9: 69-70; Levy, 2: 209 and 211. While Kagan acknowledges that b. Ta’anit 7b characterizes an 
insolent person as a rasha and permits denouncing him publicly, he notes that Rashi and the tosafot argue 
that this leniency pertains only to “this especially bad attribute,” not to any others. He then qualifies the 
leniency further: Even regarding someone who is insolent, “it is necessary to [carefully] consider when to 
call him a rasha.”  
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associate with him or emulate his behavior.” His rationale is that the prohibition against 
lashon hara is intended to prevent Jews from intentionally humiliating a chaver and 
rejoicing in his dishonor. However, if one’s only intent is to warn others discreetly not to 
emulate a fellow Jew’s bad character trait, “it is obviously permissible and a mitzvah” to 
do so.24 In other words, while the speaker may do nothing to harm or shame someone for 
exhibiting a bad character trait, he nevertheless is obligated to warn those under his 
tutelage to stay away from the person and refrain from his boorish behavior.  
In the be’er, Kagan expands the leniency in several notable ways. Not only is it 
proper for a person to tell his sons and students about another person’s midot m’gunot, he 
may do so even if he has not witnessed the improper behavior himself.25 Even more 
interesting, Kagan says “it is possible he (the speaker) is allowed to exaggerate” if he 
believes that doing so is the only way to ensure that the individuals he is warning will not 
associate with the subject or emulate the offensive behavior. “The main principle here is 
that [the speaker] intends to uphold the honor of God’s name, meaning he sees that 
speaking will produce a to’elet and there is no hatred involved.”26  
In the context of speaking about the halakhic violations of a fellow Jew, Kagan 
forbids exaggeration in any circumstance. Doing so is the same as lying and amounts to 
motzi shem ra (slander), the gravest kind of lashon hara.27 The prohibition against 
                                                
24 Kagan, 4.10: 70; Levy, 2: 215. For this reason the speaker must make his intent clear.  
 
25 Kagan, 4:10.43: 70-71; Levy, 2: 221. As long as he relates the information in a way that indicates it is 
second hand. For example: “I heard such-and-such about [the subject], therefore there is very much reason 
to suspect him and to guard yourself from him.”  
 
26 Ibid. 
  
27 See, for example, Kagan, 10.2.9: 113; Levy, 3: 285. This clause deals with the leniency (discussed 
below) that permits publicly denouncing someone who is amitekha for an interpersonal sin. It establishes 
several conditions, one of which prohibits exaggeration. “Obviously [the speaker who exaggerates] is 
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exaggeration applies even when publicly condemning a rasha who is no longer amitekha. 
Yet in the private context of educating one’s family or students to avoid unseemly 
behavior, Kagan permits exaggerating the bad habits of a chaver. We should note that the 
speech permitted by the leniency regarding shameful attributes must be discreet and is 
intended to promote certain behavior within a select group of listeners, not to force the 
subject to change his behavior.   
A similar leniency applies to speaking about another person’s chesron sh’laimut 
ha-ma’alot — “defects of merit” or what we might call personal shortcomings. Examples 
of such defects are poor intellectual ability, particularly when it comes to studying Torah; 
a lack of financial resources and/or business acumen, and bad health or physical 
weakness. In contrast to shameful attributes, defects of merit are inadequacies over which 
a person has little or no control. Being disdainful toward Torah study or profligate with a 
business partner’s money is a shameful attribute. Being a poor Torah student or an inept 
merchant is a defect of merit.  
In three consecutive clauses, Kagan emphasizes the sinfulness of shaming a 
chaver for his lack of merit.28 Apparently one may not even discreetly talk about a fellow 
Jew’s defects, much less exaggerate them, in order to teach one’s sons or students about 
proper behavior. This is reasonable position in view of the fact that personal defects 
cannot be avoided in the same sense as bad habits. On the other hand, one may reveal a 
                                                                                                                                            
categorized as a liar and is seen as committing motzi shem ra.” And as we saw in Chapter V, one of the five 
conditions for denouncing a rasha is that the speaker not exaggerate his offense.  
 
28 Kagan, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4: 74-76; Levy, 2: 253-265. It the first clause, Kagan describes violations of this 
prohibition as “quite common.” In the last clause he emphasizes the sin of denigrating a chakham for his 
lack of Torah knowledge and explicitly forbids the citizens of a community from criticizing their rabbi for 
having limited Torah knowledge. “Even if it is true, it is absolute lashon hara from the perspective of 
Torah because it completely dishonors him, reduces his livelihood and diminishes respect for Torah and the 
observance of mitzvot.” The implication is that such criticism was common. 
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person’s defects in order to protect others from harm and as long as there is no intent to 
disgrace the subject. For example, while it is “absolute lashon hara” to tell a group of 
people that a certain craftsman does shoddy work, warning an individual not to hire him 
is permitted “if (the speaker) does not intend to denigrate [the craftsman], only to achieve 
a to’elet” — that is, warn someone who is about to hire a craftsman whose work is 
substandard.29 In the be’er, we learn that this leniency even permits speaking publicly 
about a person’s lack of Torah knowledge if one sees that the subject’s imminent 
appointment to a communal post would be “ a big mistake.”30   
Elsewhere Kagan says, “Sometimes the prohibition against lashon hara applies 
even to [remarks about] a young child (katan).”31 The wording implies that this is not 
always the case. While one must not speak badly about a child if doing so will result in 
undue harm or anguish — causing an orphan to be evicted from a home, for example32 — 
such remarks are permitted as long as the speaker is sure the information is true and his 
intent is to rectify harm caused by the child or to ensure that the child is instructed on 
proper behavior.  
None of the other conditions that normally must be met to justify a negative report 
appear to apply in regard to small children. The speaker is not required to give the child 
                                                
29 Kagan, 5.4: 76; Levy, 2: 265. 
 
30 Kagan, 5.4.8: 76; Levy, 2: 267. To be fair, in the next clause (MH: 5.5: 76; Levy, 2: 269), Kagan 
admonishes his readers to be “very, very careful not to rush to this leniency and say, ‘My intention is not to 
condemn the accused, only to achieve a legitimate benefit.”  
 
31 Kagan, 8:3: 103-104; Levy, 3: 193. 
 
32 Ibid. Kagan refers to orphans twice more in the be’er of this clause. He notes their special vulnerability 
to lashon hara compared to children living with their natural parents. The latter are unlikely to be cast out 
of their homes or suffer unfair punishment. What’s more, the potential consequences of eviction are grave. 
“Many times it will endanger the child’s soul or push him into corruption.” While Kagan’s concern reflects 
rabbinic literature’s traditional emphasis on caring for orphans, it may also have been a response to 
contemporary circumstances. This does not, however, negate my point about the leniency of speaking 
lahon hara about small children in general. 
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the benefit of the doubt by assuming he has atoned or didn’t realize he was doing 
something wrong. Nor must he first rebuke the child or explore other options before 
making the report. What’s more, while in other contexts Kagan explicitly prohibits 
making a negative report if it will result in greater harm than the subject’s offense 
warrants, here he says only that the speaker must make an effort to understand the 
possible consequences. 
The passages above indicate that, in Kagan’s view, negative comments about a 
chaver — whether they pertain to halakhic violations or to bad character traits and 
personal shortcomings — are permissible as long as they result in a legitimate benefit and 
the speaker is discreet, i.e. his remarks do not unduly harm or publicly shame the subject. 
In contrast to public condemnations, which signify that a person is no longer amitekha, 
Kagan permits the private exchange of negative information about chevarim that prevents 
or rectifies harm or that is necessary for conducting routine affairs. A shop owner, for 
example, may tell his wife about a customer’s bad credit history so that she won’t extend 
him credit.33 To ensure that he is making a good deal, a businessman may inquire 
discreetly about a prospective partner. Likewise, a father may inquire about his 
prospective son-in-law.34 In such situations  
it is permitted and quite appropriate to inquire and investigate from the 
outset (i.e., even without a basis for suspecting impropriety). There is 
nothing at all in this that comes to lashon hara . . . To say otherwise 
would be impractical (literally: “require us to abandon life”), and it is not 
                                                
33 Kagan, 8.10: 106; Levy 3: 215. 
  
34 Kgan, 4.11: 70-71; Levy, 2: 221 and 223. It is important, however, that the inquirer make his purpose 
clear so that no one misunderstands his intent and thinks he is simply fishing for negative information about 
the subject. He also cautions against making such inquiries of someone who is a known enemy of the 
subject.  
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logical that Torah would compel us to a associate with someone whose 
nature is unknown to us without inquiring about him.35 
 
Public information 
 As we saw in Chapter III, Kagan forbids deliberately repeating remarks heard 
bifneit t’lata even if the speaker does not intend to disseminate the information to people 
who don’t already know it. He is stricter than Maimonides who, while not excusing the 
original speaker, appears to permit the deliberate discussion of negative or derogatory 
information about an individual that one can fairly assume to be widely known. 
According to Kagan, such remarks may be repeated only b’derech akrai (inadvertently 
and incidental to the conversation) and only by someone who heard them first-hand.  
However, he adds a caveat. Those who do not actually hear derogatory remarks 
made bifnei t’lata may repeat them if “the information is already publicized and known to 
everyone (k’var nitparseim divar v’noda l’kol).”36 What’s more, it appears that the 
information can be repeated deliberately. The implicit rationale is that in such a 
circumstance there is no possibility of further defaming or harming the subject.  
In distinguishing between remarks made bifnei t’lata and information that is 
nitparseim v’noda l’kol, Kagan’s position seems to be that one may not repeat a 
derogatory remark based on the presumption that it eventually will become common 
knowledge. Rather one must be virtually certain that it already is common knowledge. 
                                                
35 Kagan, 4.11.44: 72; Levy, 2: 233. And the respondent is obligated to provide relevant negative 
information as long his remarks do not publicly shame the subject or cause him undue harm.  
 
36 Kagan, 2.4: 48; Levy, 1: 397. See also the related be’er entry 2.4.10: 48; Levy, 1: 401. Kagan cites a 
ruling by the yad ketana that one may repeat only the derogatory or harmful information, not the identity of 
the person who originally revealed it. This is because it is impossible to determine whether the original 
speaker did, in fact, reveal it to at least three people, thereby indicating that he intended both the remarks 
and his identity to become widely known. This ruling emphasizes the public nature of the information by 
dissociating it from a specific source.  
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While this narrows the definition of public information, it nevertheless recognizes that at 
some point information becomes so widespread that precluding its discussion serves no 
legitimate social or ethical purpose.  
In the same chapter, Kagan argues that the leniency of bifnei t’lata does not apply 
if the speaker explicitly instructs the listeners not to tell anyone else about his remarks. 
However, this restriction also has an exception. If the speaker merely instructs his 
listeners not to tell the subject of the remarks “it’s possible that it is permissible to reveal 
[the information] to another [person].” 
 
If his (the speaker’s) warning [not to reveal the information to the subject] 
does not mention the community, the report is something that is likely to 
emerge eventually (l’hitgalot l’basof). And the Torah would not prohibit 
this altogether as lashon hara (lo asra ha’torah bazeh mishum lashon 
hara) as long as there is no intent to denounce [the subject]. [But] further 
consideration [of this position] is necessary.37 
 
This exception apparently hinges on the speaker’s implied lack of concern about whether 
his remarks become known to anyone other than the subject. While clearly ambivalent 
about endorsing this exception, Kagan nevertheless is unwilling to label as sinful those 
who, without malice, repeat information they hear under such circumstances.    
Kagan also says that if an individual discloses information in front of three people 
about his own business or financial affairs  — even if it is information that might cause 
him financial loss if it becomes widely known  — the listeners may tell others about it. 
The reason is that the speaker, by revealing the information in front of three people, 
obviously does not care if it becomes widely known.38 In the be’er Kagan makes it clear 
                                                
37 Kagan, 2.8 (h): 52; Levy, 1: 431. 
  
38 Kagan, 2.13: 55-56; Levy, 1: 459.  
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that he is referring only to financial information (davar shel mammon). “But if it is 
another matter that eventually could embarrass him — such as telling three people about 
a sin he once committed, then it is forbidden because he [the listener who repeats it] 
intends to embarrass him.”39 This leniency, then, is aimed specifically at allowing the 
discussion of relevant financial information about someone who ostensibly does not care 
if it is known. Thus, despite his restrictive position on remarks bifnei t’lata, Kagan 
recognizes that some harmful or derogatory information falls into the public domain and 
may be discussed and even disseminated as long as there is no malicious intent.   
 
Privileging rabbis and rabbinic courts 
We have already seen several leniencies that privilege rabbis and the beit din 
when it comes to relating, listening to or acting on negative reports about those who are 
amitekha. For instance, not only may an eye-witness unofficially report a fellow Jew’s 
one-time sin against God to the beit din, but also the religious court may act on that 
information, if only discreetly. Someone not previously known as a rasha can be publicly 
condemned for refusing to follow a single order of the religious court. And the beit din 
also has more latitude when it comes to acting on circumstantial evidence: Unlike 
individuals, it can punish someone for committing an interpersonal offense such as theft 
based solely on strong circumstantial evidence.  
Elsewhere, Kagan argues that the person who denigrates widows or orphans also 
violates the Biblical commandment not to oppress these two vulnerable groups.40 In the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
39 Kagan, 2.13.28: 55; Levy, 1: 465. 
 
40 Kagan, Introduction (Lav 15): 23; Levy, 1: 189.  
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be’er, however, he cites a leniency that pertains to rabbis: “But if a rabbi [verbally] 
oppresses them to teach them Torah or a trade or how to conduct themselves properly, 
this is permitted.”41 The context is not clear, but rabbis often were integral figures in the 
instruction of orphans at communal schools. Kagan appears to be giving them 
dispensation to use abusive language in this role.  
Although this is the only instance in which Kagan addresses the issue of abusive 
rhetoric by rabbis in a contemporary context, elsewhere he offers a traditional defense of 
such rhetoric in ancient rabbinic literature: Sages who are recorded as having ridiculed 
their colleagues were not guilty of speaking lashon hara because their intent was not to 
demean. Instead they were fulfilling their obligation to argue strenuously “for the sake of 
heaven” — that is, to make clear the legal precepts of God’s Torah.  
 
That which we sometimes find in the writings of the ga’onim, that one of 
them taunts his chaver, that was only in the context of debating words of 
Torah for the sake of Heaven because he saw that [the other’s position] 
did not agree with the law and he didn’t want society to follow [a faulty 
opinion] . . . But it was never the intent, God forbid, of one [sage] to mock 
and make sport of his chaver. Because even if the mockery were true, he 
would know that it was forbidden to denounce his chaver.42 
  
 Thus, when it comes to defending halakhic principles, it appears that rabbis are 
allowed to speak about one another in a manner that would otherwise be considered 
lashon ha-ra. Kagan also explains that he has included in Sefer Chafetz Chaim a 
responsum by the seventeenth century German rabbi Yair Chayim Bacharach “so that the 
reader will not wonder in amazement why, given the great sin of lashon hara, there are 
                                                                                                                                            
 
41 Kagan, Introduction (Lav 15), p. 23, Levy, Vol. I, p. 191.  
 
42 Kagan, 8.9.23: 106; Levy, 3: 213 and 215. 
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several instances in the gemara where one amora appears to belittle his chaver.”43 
Bacharach gives three explanations for the abusive language found in early rabbinic 
literature.44 The first reiterates Kagan’s explanation: The sages in question were 
vigorously and appropriately defending legal positions and did not intend to insult their 
colleagues. In some cases, the responsum argues, remarks intended as praise have been 
misinterpreted as demeaning.45 And in still others the remarks, though indeed demeaning, 
were justified because a rabbi is obligated to correct a student or younger colleague who 
errs or to rebuke him for not performing up to his ability. Regardless of whether these 
explanations are strained or misrepresent the meaning of the texts, they privilege the 
literary rabbis by justifying speech that would otherwise be considered lashon hara. Both 
the responsum and Kagan’s own position in 8.9.23 — that the sages recorded as taunting 
their opponents were speaking “for the sake of Heaven” — imply that rabbis, unlike other 
Jews, are permitted some leniency in using harsh and abusive rhetoric to defend religious 
ideals and legal principles.   
In addition to privileging rabbis and Torah scholars when it comes to listening to 
and speaking lashon hara, Kagan also cites special obligations to defend chakhamim 
against such speech. For instance, an observer is obligated to publicize an instance of 
                                                
43 Kagan, Introduction: 36; Levy, 1: 279. Although this is his only reference to the responsum, it seems fair 
to infer that it represents his view on the issue. 
 
44 Two pages, apparently those with the responsum, are missing from some copies of the 1873 edition, 
including the version available at http://www.hebrewbooks.org. The responsum can be found in the 1877 
edition on pages 5-6; Levy, 4: 405-419.  
 
45 The responsum cites two instances in which apparent insults were actually intended as praise. One of 
them comprises almost half the text. It concerns a passage in b. Sanhedrin 59b in which a rabbi, responding 
to a colleague who has asked a silly question, calls him a ya’arod nah’alah. The meaning is obscure, but 
Rashi interprets it as “a demented bird who is always in mourning.” According to the responsum, this 
description refers to the fact that elsewhere in rabbinic literature the subject is portrayed as constantly 
worrying about his sins and shortcomings. It should be read, therefore, not as an insult but rather as an 
acknowledgment of the subject’s piety.   
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lashon hara and denounce the speaker unless the subject of the derogatory remarks is 
unaware of them. As explained above, the rationale for this stringency is that publicizing 
the speaker’s sin would indirectly inform the victim and, therefore, constitute r’khilut. 
The risk of controversy and hatred outweighs the obligation to warn the victim. “This is 
absolute r’khilut even if an inferior person mocks an important person of Israel, even if it 
is his father or his rabbi.”46  
In the be’er, however, Kagan mitigates this prohibition in regard to Torah 
scholars: “In regard to repeating the remarks to others, if he sees that a to’elet will result 
— that he would be defending (literally, “being jealous for”) the honor of a talmid 
chacham — it is permitted.”47 The obligation to defend Torah scholars is a logical 
consequence of their special status and the protection traditionally afforded them against 
abusive speech. In one clause, for example, Kagan explains that the prohibition against 
speaking lashon hara applies “even [if the subject] is an unlearned person (am ha-aretz) 
because he is also part of the people God freed from slavery in Egypt.” However, he 
devotes the rest of the clause to emphasizing how much more sinful it is to speak lashon 
hara against a Torah sage.48 
                                                
46 Kagan, 10.5:; Levy, 3: 313 and 315. He qualifies this restriction somewhat in the next clause. If the 
observer believes the subject of the derogatory remarks might be harmed, he is permitted to denounce the 
speaker even if the subject is unaware of the incident. In addition to potential physical or financial harm, 
this leniency includes potential harm to the subject’s reputation. However, unlike the leniency that permits 
defending the honor of a Torah sage, this one applies only if the speaker is likely to repeat the derogatory 
comments. 
  
47 Kagan, 10.5.20: 117; Levy, 3: 319. He cites a ruling in the Shulkhan Aruch regarding a situation in which 
someone mocks (liglag) a talmid chakham who is not present. Although it is forbidden to tell the victim 
directly that this person has ridiculed him, it is permissible to excommunicate the speaker (l’nidoto) 
“without concern that this will reveal [the information] to the victim.”  
 
48 Kagan, 8.4: 104; Levy, 3: 195 and 197. See also Kagan, 6.8: 84; Levy, 2: 347, where he makes a similar 
argument in regard to believing lashon hara.  
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Finally, the authority of the beit din also appears to be at issue in Kagan’s warning 
to carefully consider the potential ramifications before fulfilling the “very great mitzvah” 
of telling a fellow Jew that someone intends to harm him. “What often happens is that 
when someone is told that so-and-so has in mind to shame him (or otherwise harm him), 
he will be overcome with anger at so-and-so and do something first that leads to great 
controversy.”49  
In the next two clauses it becomes clear that Kagan is referring to offenses 
involving commercial or financial matters in which the aggrieved party is likely to 
circumvent traditional communal authorities and seek redress himself. In the first clause 
he forbids a single witness from alerting a fellow Jew that he has been cheated if “[the 
victim’s] nature is that he will immediately determine with absolute certainty that [the 
report] is true  . . . and as a result will decide the law on his own and do something, 
namely renege on this deal or otherwise harm [the offender’s] business.” Such warnings 
must be made by at least two people, both of whom must have first-hand knowledge of 
the offense. In addition they must be sure that the victim will not do anything that will 
cause more harm to the subject than the penalty the beit din would assess for the same 
offense.”50  
 In the next clause he discourages even two eyewitnesses from warning someone 
“whose nature is to take the law into his own hands.” Even if the witnesses do not violate 
the prohibition against richilut, they still would be guilty of “abetting the commission of 
                                                
49 Kagan, R9.4: 150; Levy, 4: 305. 
 
50 Kagan, R9.5: 150-153; Levy, 4: 307 and 309. The beit din may not punish someone based on the 
testimony of a single witness. The point is that warning a fellow Jew does not take precedence over 
halakhic rules of evidence and punishment. As I noted in Chapter III, this clause and the one that follows 
imply that it was common for traditional Jews to circumvent the rabbinic courts in this manner.  
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a sin” if the person they warn were to act on his own authority to unduly defame or 
otherwise harm the subject. It is “very uncommon” to find people who not only are 
familiar enough with the pertinent laws but also can foresee the consequences of warning 
such a person. “Therefore one must be careful not to reveal anything to a person whose 
nature is to act without the consent of the beit din so that one avoids the trap of ba’alei 
ha-lashon” (masters of the tongue). 51  
 It’s clear that the main purpose of these clauses is to insist that aggrieved 
individuals adhere to the rules of testimony and punishment that govern the beit din. But 
their effect is also to afford less protection from interpersonal offenses to individuals who 
are likely to circumvent the religious court. In doing so, they also defend the court’s 
authority.  
 
Public denunciations  
According to Kagan, there are two circumstances in which it is permissible to 
publicly condemn someone who is amitekha. To understand the first, we must go back to 
the distinction he makes between sins bein adam l’makom and sins bein adam l’chavero. 
On the one hand, it is never permissible to denounce someone who is amitekha for 
committing a sin against God. At some point, however, the person who repeatedly and 
willfully does something widely acknowledged as a sin against God loses his status as 
amitekha and becomes subject to public condemnation. On the other hand, Kagan argues 
that even repeated interpersonal sins do not remove a person from the category of 
                                                
51 Kagan, R9.6: 153; Levy, 4: 323. See also Kagan, R9.13: 155-156, Levy, 4: 347 where he makes the same 
argument in regard to someone who has been swindled in a commercial deal and is likely to “seize 
[compensation] or return the merchandize or not pay his bill without the authority of the beit din.” Because 
such a response would be illegal, “one must be very careful in revealing information to a person whose 
nature is to take the law into his own hands without the authority of the beit din.”  
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amitekha. As a consequence, however, it becomes necessary to publicly denounce a 
chaver who commits an interpersonal sin if doing so is the only way to rectify the 
injustice.  
 
If one knows that a person committed an injustice (asah avlah) against his 
chaver — for example, he stole from him or exploited him or harmed him, 
whether or not [the victim] is aware of the loss or harm, or he shamed him 
or caused him sorrow or deceived him — and if [the observer] knows with 
certainty that [the subject] has not returned what he stole or compensated 
[the victim] for the damages or asked the victim to forgive his sin, even if 
[the observer] saw this incident by himself, he can relate (l’sapeir) the 
information to the general public (b’nei adam)52 in order to help confirm 
[the offender’s] guilt and to condemn (l’ganut) the evil deeds before the 
people (bifnei ha-biriot).53  
 
In the be’er, Kagan acknowledges that the two non-Talmudic authorities he cites 
most frequently — Maimonides and Rabbeinu Yonah — disagree on this issue. 
Maimonides says that the person who commits a sin against God may be publicly 
denounced if he refuses to respond to a private rebuke. But he does not mention sins bein 
adam l’chavero, implying that the leniency does not pertain to interpersonal offenses. 
Yonah, however, explicitly permits condemning the perpetrator or would-be perpetrator 
of an interpersonal sin if doing so is the only way to “arrive at the truth” and thereby 
rectify or prevent an injustice.54 In resolving this disagreement, Kagan argues that 
                                                
52 Levy translates b’nei adam as “other people.” However, the phrase implies a more public disclosure, 
which is why I have chosen “general public.” This is supported by the subsequent obligation to denounce 
the offender’s evil deeds bifnei ha’biriot.  
 
53 Kagan, 10.1: 111-112; Levy, 3: 261 and 263. In “relating” the information, one condemns only the deed, 
not the person who committed it. In a situation involving someone who is not amitekha, the subject himself 
is condemned as well. The subtle but important distinction reflects the fact that the subject in this situation 
remains amitekha.  
 
54 For example, Yonah says even a lone witness to a theft or other financial offense must inform the beit din 
in order to compel the offender to swear an oath.  
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Maimonides did not intend to proscribe publicizing interpersonal sins in every 
circumstance, only when doing so will not help rectify the wrong. Thus, Kagan 
concludes, if exposing a chaver through public condemnation is the only way to force 
him to return what he stole or make good on the damage he caused, “certainly it is 
necessary to do so, and nothing about this amounts to lashon hara or r’khilut.”55 
It is clear, however, that Kagan views this as an extreme measure that should be 
undertaken only in rare circumstances. As I noted in Chapter III, he insists that before 
taking the drastic step of publicly denouncing someone who is amitekha for committing 
an interpersonal sin, the speaker must meet no fewer than nine conditions. He must have 
witnessed the act first-hand.56 He must not hastily conclude that the act involved “theft, 
exploitation, harm or the like.” Instead he must carefully review the circumstances to be 
sure that the subject was indeed legally responsible for causing financial loss or damage 
(im hu al pei din biklal gezel o hezek). He must first rebuke the offender privately and in 
a non-confrontational manner.57 He must be trying to achieve a to’elet, which specifically 
precludes speaking out of hatred or for personal benefit. Before speaking, he must 
consider whether the to’elet can be achieved through means other than publicly 
disclosing the offense. If it cannot, then he must be sure his disclosure will not result in 
greater harm to the subject than the punishment a beit din would mete out for the offense 
                                                
55 Kagan, 10.1.1: 111-112; Levy, 3: 263-267. 
  
56 “Unless it is proven (nitbareir) later that the report is true.” Kagan does not explain this leniency. 
However, as noted above, he allows second-hand information about an interpersonal sin to be repeated if it 
is supported by strong circumstantial evidence.  
 
57 Unless he is certain a private rebuke would be useless. In that case, the speaker should make the 
denunciation to at least three people so that it is clear he is not speaking behind the subject’s back.  
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in question.58 And he must not exaggerate the offense. Even if the would-be speaker 
meets these seven conditions, he may not denounce the subject if he is guilty of the same 
kind of offense or if those listening are ba’alei rasha (masters of evil) who routinely 
commit the same offense and do not consider it sinful.59  
These conditions clearly are intended to restrict public denunciations of those who 
are amitekha for interpersonal sins. In addition, their wording indicates that Kagan 
associated this leniency with helping the victims of financial offenses as opposed to 
defending religious ideals or enforcing legal precepts. (As we have already observed, he 
argues that interpersonal offenses do not involve defiance of communal standards.)  
This becomes more apparent in his extended discussion of the to’elet, which is 
first and foremost “to help the person who has been robbed, exploited, harmed or 
shamed.”60 Kagan does mention two other legitimate benefits that justify publicly 
condemning a chaver who refuses to acknowledge an interpersonal sin and make 
restitution — “so that people will refrain from an evil lifestyle when they hear how 
forcefully society denounces sin, and perhaps [the subject] will change his evil lifestyle 
and correct his behavior.” 61 However, these benefits — both aimed at enforcing certain 
desired behavior — are ancillary. For instance, unlike the obligation to rectify an 
injustice, they do not apply if the victim is unaware of the offense. This restriction stems 
                                                
58 Kagan, 10.2: 112-114; Levy, 3: 271 and 273. See also Kagan, 10.7: 118-119; Levy, 3: 327 and 329. 
While those who listen to such a public denunciation may not accept the information as true, they are 
obligated to suspect that it might be, investigate and, if the circumstances warrant, rebuke the subject or 
take other appropriate action.  
 
59 Kagan, 10.3 and 10.4 : 115-116; Levy, 3: 297- 301. In the first case, the speaker’s hypocrisy indicates 
that his motive for speaking is not legitimate. In the second, his remarks are unlikely to achieve the 
intended benefit. Instead, they are likely to create controversy.  
 
60 Kagan, 10.4: 115-116; Levy, 3: 299 and 301. 
 
61 Ibid.  
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from the fact that condemning someone in public would indirectly inform the victim, 
which would constitute r’khilut. Kagan’s position is that while helping the victim gain 
restitution justifies the animosity and controversy that results from r’khilut, inducing the 
offender to change his behavior or warning society to avoid sin does not.62  
Not only must the speaker be trying to prevent or rectify an offense against a 
specific individual, he also must be quite certain that his disclosure will have the intended 
effect. Even if the speaker is sure an offense has occurred, “it is forbidden to say a word” 
if doing so will not rectify the injustice but only create controversy.63 This is further 
evidence that in Kagan’s view not only is publicly denouncing a fellow Jew for an 
interpersonal sin an act of last resort but also its primary purpose is to help the victim of 
an injustice, not to defend a legal principle or enforce normative behavior.  
The paramount importance of rectifying an injustice is also apparent in Kagan’s 
discussion about the circumstances in which one is obligated to say something what 
would normally be considered r’khilut — that is, informing one fellow Jew that another 
has said or done something to harm him. The only to’elet he mentions in this context is 
l’saleik hanzakin (to prevent damages or restore a loss).64 This makes sense, given that 
the issue at stake is whether to reveal the information to one particular individual — the 
victim or potential victim of the offense. In this context, public disclosure — either to 
warn society to avoid sin or to put public pressure on the subject to change his behavior 
— is not relevant.  
                                                
62 10.4 (h): 116; Levy, 3: 303. See also his legal explanation in Kagan, 10.4.18: 116; Levy, 3: 311 and 313. 
  
63 Kagan, 10.4: 116; Levy, 3: 301. Thus he explicitly prohibits denouncing an offender to people who 
would not consider the subject’s behavior sinful. 
  
64 Kagan, R9 (Introduction): 147; Levy, 4: 271. See also Kagan, R9.2: 148; Levy, 4: 283 and 285.  
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Kagan is more lenient when it comes to informing the victim of an interpersonal 
offense (an act that would normally be r’khilut) than he is in regard to publicly 
denouncing a chaver (an act that would normally be lashon hara). As we have seen, there 
are only five conditions for revealing the interpersonal offense (or potential offense) to 
the victim (or potential victim) compared to nine for denouncing the offender in public.  
For instance, Kagan argues that one must inform a fellow Jew that someone has 
cheated him (or is about to), even if the information is second hand.65 He also goes out of 
his way to mitigate the requirement that one not speak out of hatred. This condition does 
not absolve the observer/speaker from fulfilling the commandment in Leviticus 19:16: 
“Do not stand idle by your fellow’s blood.” The obligation to not stand idle applies “even 
in a matter involving money (af b’aniyan mamon).” Therefore, the observer “must force 
himself as he speaks to believe that he is motivated only by a to’elet (that is, to prevent 
harm or rectify an injustice) and not hatred. By doing this, he prevents himself from 
violating the prohibition against r’khilut.”66 In Kagan’s view preventing harm or 
rectifying an injustice is so important that the observer must, at least for the moment, 
bracket his animosity for the subject and pretend that this is his sole motivation for 
warning the victim or potential victim of an interpersonal offense. He does not make this 
argument in the context of relating information about the rasha who commits a sin 
against God.  
Kagan also mitigates the condition that permits speaking r’khilut only if the 
to’elet cannot be achieved through other means. Discussing a shop owner “whose nature 
                                                
65 Kagan, R9.2.9: 149; Levy, 4: 293. He qualifies this somewhat in R9.2.9 (h): 149; Levy, 4: 295. It cannot 
be an incidental rumor (sh’mi-ah b’alma). Rather “it must be clear to him that it is true (nitbareir lo s’hu 
emet).  
 
66 Kagan, R9.2.3: 148; Levy, 4: 285 and 287.  
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is to always deceive everyone,” he says it is permissible “in all circumstances” to warn a 
customer about the owner’s dishonesty — even if there is another way to protect the 
customer from making a bad deal. However, the purpose is not to defend a legal principle 
or punish the shop owner but rather “to publicize the flatters so that they will not deceive 
others.”67  
 The fact that Kagan permits the public denunciation of a fellow Jew to assist the 
victim or potential victim of an injustice rather than to defend a legal principle does not 
mean that the speaker can ignore halakhic standards. Before telling one Jew that another 
has taken advantage of him, a speaker must be sure the victim has a legitimate legal 
claim.  
 
If according to Torah law there is no [legal] claim anymore, either 
because the deception amounted to less than a sixth of the purchase value 
or [the buyer] had enough time to show [the goods] to a merchant or a 
relative or he forfeited his right to a claim for another reason, even if [the 
merchant] cheated him, [telling the buyer] violates the prohibition against 
r’khilut.68    
 
There are two important points in this passage. First, Kagan again discusses interpersonal 
sins in the context of a financial loss related to commerce.69 Second, before informing the 
victim of a business deal that has already been consummated, the speaker must consider 
religious laws governing commercial transactions. (Of the two mentioned here, the first 
                                                
67 R9.10.28 (h): 154; Levy, 4: 335. 
 
68 Kagan, R9.11: 154; Levy, 4: 335.  
 
69 Consider also Kagan, R9.1: 147; Levy, 4: 275. “If a person sees a fellow Jew about to form a business 
partnership with someone and surmises that this will definitely turn out bad for him, he must tell him in 
order to save him from this bad deal.” The related be’er discusses the obligation to warn someone who is 
about to hire a thief as a caretaker. The obligation to warn extends even to the single witness speaking 
outside the auspices of the beit din. While Kagan does caution readers “not to rely on this leniency [too] 
quickly,” he clearly intends to permit the exchange of relevant information that individuals need to protect 
themselves and others in routine business and financial transactions.  
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protects the buyer by prohibiting markups greater than one-sixth of the wholesale price 
while the second protects the seller by preventing a disgruntled buyer from seeking to 
nullify an unfavorable deal if he had enough time to seek advice before agreeing to it.) 
The point is that even if someone knows that a seller has deceived a customer, he may not 
tell the buyer unless there is a legitimate halakhic basis on which to challenge the 
transaction. Otherwise the report is pointless.  
Another chaver who may be publicly denounced is the ba’al ha-machloket 
(master of controversy). This term refers not to anyone who starts a controversy but 
rather to those who routinely do so. In the be’er, Kagan acknowledges that rabbinic 
authorities disagree about this leniency. Based on a ruling in y. Pe’ah 1.1.23,70 it is 
supported by thirteenth century Rabbi Moses ben Jacob of Coucy. But other authorities, 
including Maimonides, do not cite the ruling in the Yerushalmi. According to Kagan, this 
indicates that they do not support it.71 Kagan’s own ambivalence is clear. He introduces 
the leniency with a significant qualification:  
 
Understand that what is said about it being permissible to speak lashon 
hara about ba-alei ha-machloket applies only if by revealing to people the 
enormity of their deceit, the public will see that the law is not with them 
and the controversy will subside. But if not (that is, if the controversy will 
                                                
70 As explained in the section on the early rabbis, y. Pe’ah 1.1.23 deals with the story in I Kings 1:14 in 
which Nathan and Bathsheba tell David about his son Adoniyah’s plan to usurp the throne promised to 
Solomon. From this, the un-attributed ruling says, we know that one may speak lashon hara against ba’alei 
machloket.  
 
71 Kagan, 8.8.16: 105, Levy, 3: 209. Kagan notes that Rabbi Raphael of Hamburg, a disciple of the Vilna 
Gaon, used this rationale to argue that Maimonides did not support the leniency allowing public 
condemnation of ba’alei machloket. Kagan agrees, although he says in an accompanying hagahah that 
Maimonides and others who don’t mention y. Pe’ah 1.1.23 may actually hold a stricter position — that it is 
permissible to denounce anyone who promotes controversy, not just those who do so habitually. 
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not subside), there is absolutely no difference in the matter (ein shum 
chiluk ba-davar).72  
 
There are two important points in this passage. First, while the controversies he refers to 
appear to involve halakhic violations, Kagan’s primary concern is not that correct legal 
principles be upheld. Quelling the controversy is more important than determining which 
side is right.73 Even if an observer knows for certain that a ba’al machloket is in the 
wrong, he must remain silent unless he is sure that speaking out will settle the dispute or 
otherwise quell the controversy. Like the fellow Jew who commits an interpersonal 
offense, the ba’al machloket may not be publicly denounced simply to defend a point of 
law.  
Second, even if denouncing the ba’al machloket will avert or quell a controversy, 
Kagan adds several more restrictions: The speaker must know first hand that the person is 
trying to provoke controversy (or have confirmed it as true). The speaker’s only motive 
must be to achieve a to’elet, which means that he may not speak out of hatred or personal 
gain. Finally, the speaker must first explore other means of quelling the controversy 
before speaking out against the ba-al machloket.74  
 Most important, Kagan never suggests that the ba-al machloket is not amitekha. 
Indeed the requirement that the speaker be trying to achieve a to’elet indicates that he is. 
                                                
72 Kagan, 8.8: 105; Levy, 3: 205 and 207. In other words, the exception that permits speaking against the 
ba’al machloket applies only if doing so prevents or resolves the controversy at hand. Otherwise it is 
lashon ha-ra. 
  
73 As I pointed out in Chapter III, he warns that intervening in a controversy requires “great wisdom” and 
advises against “rushing to label one side ba’alei machloket.” If the issue is unclear, “it is preferable to do 
nothing.”  
 
74 Kagan, 8.8: 105; Levy, 3: 207. The last restriction is qualified somewhat. The speaker does not have to 
privately reprimand the subject if doing so will prevent him from quelling the controversy through some 
other means. Still, the aim is to stop the controversy, not defend a legal principle. 
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Elsewhere Kagan says that it is possible (efshar) that the prohibition against believing 
lashon hara about a chaver extends to ba’alei machloket. The reason: “They do not leave 
the category of amitekha as a result of [provoking controversy], even though it violates a 
very important prohibition.”75 In this sense, they are like ba’alei lashon hara. One might 
even infer that in his view these two groups were the same or at least overlapped to a 
great extent.  
Kagan’s position, then, is that one may denounce a ba’al machloket only if doing 
so will quell a controversy and only if the aforementioned conditions are met. However, 
because they remain amitekha, it is not permissible to believe derogatory information 
about ba-alei machloket that is unrelated to the controversy at hand. The opposite is true 
when it comes to believing negative comments about heretics and rshaim who are no 
longer amitekha.  
 All of this supports the argument I made in Chapters III and IV that Sefer Chafetz 
Chaim is a prescriptive response to a social fact — frequent public disputes among 
traditional Lithuanian Jews, particularly over issues of halakha and financial matters. 
While Kagan is disturbed by and seeks to limit these disputes by permitting the public 
denunciation of those who regularly instigate them, he is reluctant to exclude the 
instigators from klal yisrael.  
 
Socio-historical explanation 
The preceding analysis reveals two major conditions for speaking negatively 
about someone who is amitekha. First, the remarks almost always should be private. The 
major exceptions — publicly denouncing a chaver in order to rectify an injustice or stop 
                                                
75 Kagan, 8.13.26: 107; Levy, 3: 227.  
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a controversy — are highly conditional, indicating that Kagan viewed such 
condemnations as an extreme measure that should be employed only rarely. For Kagan 
public condemnation (ginah) was the mode of discourse used to marginalize or exclude 
heretics, informants and certain reshaim. This is consistent with the traditional use of 
bans of excommunication and other forms of public censure in East European Jewish 
society to shame those who challenged authority or defied communal standards. On the 
other hand, in circumstances when it is necessary to say something about an individual 
who has committed an illegal or improper act but is still amitekha, one should speak 
privately, or at least reveal (gilah) the information discreetly to a limited group of people 
who might be affected.  
The second condition for speaking negatively about a chaver is that one must be 
trying to achieve a to’elet, a legitimate benefit. Not only does Kagan follow authorities in 
ruling that this precludes speaking out of hatred or self-interest, but he also describes a 
to’elet primarily in terms of rectifying an injustice or preventing harm to a fellow Jew. 
Thus a witness must privately inform certain individuals about another Jew’s sin against 
God if doing so “benefits [them] by separating [them] from something prohibited (im hu 
mo’il l’afroshei mei’isura).” A teacher (or father) is permitted to talk about the bad 
character traits of a fellow Jew — even to the point of exaggeration — if his only purpose 
is to make sure his students (or children) avoid them. As I pointed out, these discreet 
revelations are not intended to shame the subject or punish their behavior. In many 
circumstances the subject wouldn’t even be aware of the comments. Rather the remarks 
are intended to prevent an individual or limited group from doing something improper.   
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Far more often, however, Kagan describes the to’elet as rectifying or preventing 
harm resulting from interpersonal offenses, particularly those involving financial loss or 
damage (or potential loss or damage). The prohibition against lashon hara does not 
require that a Jew “abandon [the practicalities] of life.” Thus one may make and respond 
honestly to discreet inquiries about a prospective business partner or spouse, or warn a 
business associate not to extend credit to a customer with a bad credit history. Nor does 
the prohibition against lashon hara and r’khilut supersede the Torah commandment to 
“not stand idle by your fellow’s blood,” which Kagan makes a point of saying includes 
financial harm. So important is this commandment that one must inform a fellow Jew 
when another has cheated or stolen from him (or plans to) — even if the information is 
second hand and even if the speaker has to pretend he is not speaking out of hatred for the 
subject. 
Finally, it is not enough just to seek a to’elet. The speaker must be confident that 
his comments will help achieve it. Thus he may not tell a fellow Jew that he has been 
cheated if there is no legal recourse for the victim to recoup his loss. Nor may he 
condemn a ba’al machloket if doing so will not quiet the controversy. For Kagan, then, 
these leniencies derive primarily from a socio-ethical obligation to prevent actual harm or 
injustice, especially financial harm or injustice. They have little to do with enforcing 
conformity by defending abstract legal principles or religious ideals.76  
                                                
76 This does not mean that one can ignore legal principles when speaking against a fellow Jew in order to 
prevent harm or right a wrong. I have noted several instances in which Kagan forbids such speech if it is 
likely to result in greater harm to the subject than the law allows for the offense in question. In such a case, 
the speaker must remember that “this one’s blood is not more precious than that one’s.” (Kagan, 6.11.30: 
89; Levy, 2: 385). See also Kagan, Introduction (Asah 4): 28; Levy, 1: 221 where the same tension is at 
play. Kagan forbids “humiliating (hashfil) a fellow Jew to the point where he loses his livelihood.” In the 
be’er, he adds a caveat: “If the speaker intended to achieve a to’elet and was not speaking out of hatred, 
this is a different situation.” He recognizes that in many cases speaking badly about a fellow Jew in order to 
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To put these positions into socio-historical perspective, we should recall that this 
was a period of extreme economic distress for many East European Jews. As explained in 
Chapter IV, the collapse of the old feudal economic system had displaced Jews from 
leasehold arrangements into less lucrative and more competitive vocations. The result 
was a steep decline in income, a sharp increase in poverty and what Ettinger describes as 
“bitter internal competition” among Jewish tradesmen, merchants and shopkeepers.77 
As we saw in Chapter III, Kagan also makes several references to widespread 
impropriety among Jews in their financial dealings with one another, and there is ample 
textual evidence that he thought it was imperative to confront such impropriety. Most of 
the situations cited in chapters 10 and 9R  — which deal with circumstances in which it is 
permissible to speak lashon hara and r’khilut respectively — involve interpersonal 
offenses resulting in financial loss. Likewise, the addendum explaining how the laws of 
r’khilut apply in real life situations uses two tzi’urim (illustrations). One involves a 
prospective business partnership, the other a prospective marriage.78  
In Kagan’s view these offenses must always be handled according to halakha — 
privately (or at least discreetly) whenever possible, publicly only as a last resort. This 
explains why he encourages and places fewer restrictions on informing the victim of an 
interpersonal offense than he does on denouncing the offender in public. The former 
allows the issue to be handled discreetly. Of course, he discourages informing victims or 
                                                                                                                                            
rectify an injustice will result in a financial loss to the subject. His concern is that such losses be within 
halakhic standards for the offense in question. 
  
77 See also Dov Levin, The Litvaks: A Short History of the Jews of Lithuania (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 
2000), 83. By 1870, the expulsion of Lithuanian Jews from their traditional livelihoods as innkeepers and 
producers and distributors of alcohol had led to severe poverty and overcrowding, the kind of social 
conditions that breed financial crime and malfeasance. 
  
78 See Kagan, A1: 157-161, Levy, 4: 365-403. As I explained in Chapter III, a marriage arrangement would 
have been viewed as a financial agreement between the families. 
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potential victims of harm if they are likely to act on their own and create a controversy or 
seek redress that the law doesn’t allow. But this does not diminish my argument that the 
leniencies Kagan cites in regard to speaking badly about a chaver are aimed primarily at 
allowing individuals to prevent or rectify financial loss in a private or discreet manner.  
 The preceding analysis shows that Kagan is stricter when it comes to speaking 
badly about someone who is amitekha in order to defend an abstract legal principle or 
ideal. Not only does this support my argument that he was willing to tolerate a certain 
level of non-conforming behavior and religious practice among Jews, but it also indicates 
that he may have been ambivalent about if not troubled by the rhetoric of halakhic 
militancy associated with Lithuania’s emerging orthodoxy. Salmon describes this rhetoric 
as “a new style of argumentation based on defamation of character,” and traces it back to 
the establishment in 1870 of the chevrat matzdikei ha-rabim, a traditionalist group whose 
purpose was to defend Jewish society and institutions against maskilim, nationalists and 
any traditionalist who was seen as sympathizing with them.79  
 
Through the publication of satiric pamphlets . . . severe criticism was 
directed against the rabbi who had anything to do with modernity, and 
step-by-step a distinct line was drawn between two types of Jewish 
orthodoxy: the ultra-orthodox who totally rejected modernity, and the 
religious nationalists who accepted modernity in part.80  
 
Salmon cites as a prime example an 1875 article by Rabbi Bezalel Cohen, a 
prominent Vilna rabbinic decisor and rosh yeshiva. Although it appeared shortly after the 
                                                
79 Yosef Salmon, “Orthodox Judaism in Eastern Europe,” in The Gaon of Vilnius and the Annals of Jewish 
Culture (Vilnius: Vilnius University Publishing House, 1998), 113. 
  
80 Ibid., 111. 
 221 
publication of Kagan’s book, Cohen’s article represents the kind of harsh, condemnatory 
rhetoric that traditionalists had been directing not just at maskilim but also at each other.  
Cohen’s piece was a response to a halakhic ruling by Rabbi Yitzhak Spektor of Kovno, 
who had traveled to Corfu and declared that the island’s citrons were grafted and, 
therefore, not kosher for ritual use on Sukkot.81 The status of Corfu citrons had been in 
dispute for decades, but the issue took on new political and economic implications in the 
mid-1870s when Corfu growers raised their prices dramatically. Cohen accused Spektor 
of disallowing the Corfu citrons based on irrelevant, non-legal factors. The ruling was in 
his view an unacceptable capitulation to the maskilic criticism that rabbinic rulings on 
halakha and minhagim were unnecessarily onerous because they did not take into account 
their impact on the Jewish masses.82 
The article has some relevance for us not just because it is an example of public 
acrimony between two reknowned traditionalists but also because Kagan had a literary 
connection to both figures. Cohen co-authored the longest of four approbations that 
                                                
81 See Yosef Salmon, “Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor,” in The YIVO Institute Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern 
Europe, accessed on Sept. 14, 2011, 
http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Spektor_Yitshak_Elhanan. Salmon describes Spektor as a 
moderate traditionalist whose responsa and halakhic rulings were widely considered authoritative. “As a 
religious leader, Spektor maneuvered between competing factions in Lithuanian Jewish society, taking care 
not to side with one against the other. Thus, he identified with the traditional rabbinate of his day, but 
refrained from entering into confrontation with maskilim.”  
 
82 For example, in an 1869 article with the satiric title “By the Merits of the Rabbis,” the Lithuanian writer 
and poet Y. L. Gordon skewered rabbinic rulings that, among other things, prohibited the use of olive oil 
and the consumption of legumes on Passover despite a famine and established regulations for ritual 
slaughter that resulted in kosher meat shortages. His point was that rabbis were not considering the impact 
of their rulings on the Jewish populace. Cohen was incensed at Spektor’s ruling on the Corfu citrons 
because, in his eyes, it implicitly accepted the argument made by Gordon and other maskilim. Spektor’s 
ruling would have been a financial benefit for many East European Jews who, because the especially 
beautiful Corfu citrons were preferred for Sukkot, felt compelled to pay the exorbitant prices for them. His 
ruling also would have benefited Jewish growers in Palestine, which Cohen viewed as a sop to nationalists 
seeking to improve the economy of Jewish communities there. Thus he accused Spektor of basing his 
ruling not on legal criteria but rather on improper economic and political considerations. This is an example 
of how the ideological dispute between traditionalists and maskilim gave rise to a halakhic militancy that 
played out in vitriolic legal disputes among traditionalists.  
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appear in the forward to Sefer Chafetz Chaim. And as noted above, the latter was one of 
two main contributors to Sefer ‘Ez-Peri (Vilna, 1881), for which Kagan wrote the 
introduction. Given Cohen’s approbation, it would be problematic to argue that Kagan 
viewed the article condemning Spektor as improper.83 (Indeed Kagan’s justification of 
abusive rhetoric by Talmudic sages indicates that he believed rabbis had leeway to speak 
harshly to and about one another “in defense of heaven.”) On the other hand, the fact that 
Kagan respected Spektor enough to write the introduction to Sefer ‘Ez-Peri gives us 
reason to believe that he would have been troubled by his public denigration. 
It would be simplistic to suggest that Kagan rejected out of hand the defamatory 
rhetoric of halachic militancy exemplified by Cohen’s article. This does not mean, 
however, that he wasn’t concerned that such rhetoric was being abused, both because it 
was being employed too cavalierly among those competing for religious authority and 
because it was being disseminated outside rabbinic circles by the nascent popular press 
and adopted by the general populace. It was one thing for the scholarly elite to speak 
harshly among themselves as part of legal disputations. It was quite another for the 
Jewish masses to be doing so. This ambivalence is reminiscent of the tension we saw in 
the early rabbinic texts between the obligation to speak (words of Torah) and the 
obligation to not speak (words that demean or harm a fellow Jew).  It is a tension that I 
have argued is inherent in the concept of lashon hara.  
                                                
83 Cohen’s approbation is also in the 1877 edition, which was published after the article condemning 
Spektor.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The editors of Contemporary Jewries: Convergence and Divergence say the aim 
of their collection of essays is to explore whether, given the forces of divergence and 
convergence at work among Jews in the modern era, “one can still, at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, speak of one Jewish people encompassing all Jews in the world 
and based on shared principles of collective identity.”1 Not surprisingly they conclude 
that there are multiple collective Jewish identities. While these identities might comprise 
an “extended family,” some are so different from others that they can be described only 
as “distant cousins.” Such difference inevitably leads to contention. Some family 
members respond to difference by trying to “exclude those who deny their truths from the 
community they define as the Jewish people.” Others exhibit a pluralistic attitude, “a 
willingness to see Jewry partitioned into divergent sectors.”2  
   While the editors of Contemporary Jewries may be right that the forces of 
divergence are greater and the parameters of Jewish collective identity more extreme in 
the “post-traditional” modern era, the problem of difference and the responses to it are 
not new.3 My aim in this dissertation has been to explore how the concept of lashon ha-
ra reflects the tension between the impulses to tolerate difference within Jewish society 
                                                
1 Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yosef Gorny and Yaakov Ro’i, Introduction to Contemporary Jewries: Convergence 
and Divergence (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003), 1. They identify five ideological, political and cultural 
“crossroads” for Jewish collective identity in the past 200 years: emancipation, secularism, the Holocaust, 
the creation of the state of Israel and advent of transnational multi-culturalism.  
   
2 Eliezer Ben-Rafael, “The Space and Dilemmas of Contemporary Jewish Identities,” in Contemporary 
Jewries, 358.  
 
3 Ibid., 344. Pre-modern Jewish collective identity stressed religious faith and halakhic observance above 
all else, but as Ben-Rafael notes, “Along the continuum of time and space . . . even this identity has not 
been homogenous.”   
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on the one hand and to exclude or marginalize it on the other. To this end I have looked at 
rabbinic texts from two very different socio-historical contexts — the ancient Talmudic 
milieu of Palestine and Babylonia in which the concept of lashon ha-ra arose, and 
nineteenth-century Lithuania where the laws regarding the prohibition were codified in 
detail.  
Although the approaches to lashon har-ra in these texts took shape under 
different circumstances, they have two overarching commonalities. First, in each case the 
notion that lashon ha-ra is a grave sin that must be sharply restricted was a prescriptive 
response to a social reality — the presence of divisive discourse among Jews related to 
issues of collective identity and authority. For some of the early rabbis, it was the 
sectarian rhetoric of slander associated with the Roman war and the loss of nationhood. 
For Kagan it was rancorous speech and public disputes resulting from religious 
divergence, economic dislocation and competition for communal authority. Like the 
Republican eleventh commandment, these expressions of concern about lashon ha-ra 
reflect an effort to preserve Jewish social cohesion by limiting rhetorical attacks against 
difference and autonomy.  
The second commonality between Sefer Chafetz Chaim and the Talmudic texts is 
that expressions of concern about lashon ha-ra seem to have arisen during periods of 
social instability or among those who felt socially or politically vulnerable. Palestinian 
Jews were relatively less secure than Babylonian Jews, and Palestinian rabbis had a lower 
social status and less authority in Jewish society than their Babylonian counterparts. That 
Palestinian notions of lashon ha-ra tended to be more restrictive and to place greater 
emphasis on its gravity reflects the fact that Palestinian rabbis were more concerned 
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about rhetoric that might endanger them or diminish their position in Jewish society. 
Because the more secure Babylonian rabbis were less concerned about such rhetoric, they 
tended to voice narrower notions of lashon ha-ra that were less restrictive.   
Likewise, Sefer Chafetz Chaim was written by a traditional Lithuanian rabbi at a 
time when traditional Lithuanian Jewry was in turmoil. The status and authority of the 
rabbinate and other communal institutions were in decline and solidarity among Jews 
eroding. Traditional Lithuanian Jews like Kagan felt vulnerable to the power of the 
Russian state and its perceived allies, the maskilim. His emphasis on the danger of lashon 
ha-ra represents a pragmatic response to divisive discourse among traditionalists during a 
time of crisis, a willingness to tolerate difference for the sake of social stability.  
We should be careful to think of these characterizations as tendencies rather than 
absolute positions. There is an un-resolvable dialectical tension inherent in the question 
of how much difference can be tolerated within a social unity. Even for Kagan, who 
unambiguously portrays lashon ha-ra as a grave sin and a threat to Jewish society, there 
were limits to his concern about divisive, authoritarian speech. His willingness to accept 
difference in order to preserve social cohesion does not mean that acceptable differences 
are good or even valid. And it certainly doesn’t mean that all differences are acceptable. 
At some point, difference and autonomy becomes a threat that cannot be tolerated, which 
is evident in Kagan’s attitude toward heretics, informants and reshaim. To paraphrase 
Kimelman, when the ideal of klal yisrael (the convergent community of Israel) takes 
precedence over the reality of am yisrael (divergent Jewish communities), it becomes 
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easier — even necessary — to employ the rhetoric of exclusion.4 This tension — whether 
Jewish unity requires tolerating difference and autonomy or excising them — can be 
found in every expression of lashon ha-ra. 
I will conclude by considering what these historical iterations of the concept of 
lashon ha-ra might tell us about the resurgent emphasis on its prohibition in 
contemporary Jewish society, particularly in light of Ben-Rafael’s observation that 
contemporary Jewry is typified by a “rivalry for hegemony” among and within various 
models of Jewish collective identity.5 The shmirat ha-lashon movement is primarily a 
phenomenon of the American ultra-Orthodox Jewish community, which tends to view 
itself as a beleaguered minority within American Jewish society, indeed within society in 
general. The renewed focus on the danger of lashon ha-ra, then, has arisen within a group 
that, like the early rabbis and traditionalists in late nineteenth-century Lithuania, feels 
particularly vulnerable to the kind of rivalry described by Ben-Rafael.  
One response to such feelings, of course, is to exclude or marginalize those who 
are different, to reject the reality of a divergent am yisrael in favor of the ideal of a 
convergent klal yisrael. This has often been described as a characteristic of modern ultra-
orthodoxy — and of religious fundamentalism in general. But given the dialectical nature 
of the issue of unity, I would argue that the renewed emphasis on the prohibition against 
lashon ha-ra among American ultra-Orthodox Jews could very well represent a 
pragmatic response, one that is more accepting of difference and seeks to preserve a place 
                                                
4 Reuven Kimelman, “Judaism and Pluralism,” Modern Judaism 7, no. 2 (May, 1987): 131. Usually, he 
adds, this has resulted in a larger, more powerful group excluding or marginalizing a smaller, weaker 
group.  
 
5 Ben-Rafael, “The Space and Dilemmas of Contemporary Jewish Identities,” 358. 
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for their model of Jewish identity within the imagined collective consciousness that 
circumscribes klal yisrael. 
 
 228 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Primary Sources 
 
Brooks, Roger, trans. Yerushalmi Pe’ah. Vol. 2 of The Talmud of the Land of Israel: A 
Preliminary Translation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
 
Danby, Herbert, trans. The Mishnah. London: Oxford University Press, 1933. 
 
Ebor, Donald, supervising ed. The New English Bible. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1971.  
 
Epstein, Isidore, supervising ed. and trans. The Babylonian Talmud. Quincentenary ed. 
London: The Soncino Press, 1978. 
 
Goldwurm, Hersh, general ed. Talmud Bavli. Schottenstein ed. Brooklyn: Masorah 
Publications, 1997-2001. 
 
Guggenheimer, Heinrich W., trans. The Jerusalem Talmud: First Order: Zeraim, 
Tractates Pe’ah and Demay. Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 2000. 
 
Kagan, Israel Meir. Sefer Chafetz Chaim. Vilna: 1873. 
 
Kagan, Israel Meir, Sefer Chafetz Chaim. 2nd ed. Warsaw: 1877. 
 
Kagan, Israel Meir, Sefer Chafetz Chaim. Translated by Yedidya Levy. Nanuet NY: 
Feldheim Publishers, 2008.  
 
Tanakh, Hebrew text with new JPS English translation. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: The Jewish 
Publication Society, 1999. 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Aleksandravicius, Egidijus. “Jews in Lithuanian Historiography.” In The Gaon of Vilnius 
and the Annals of Jewish Culture, edited by Izraelis Lempertas and Larisa Lempertiene, 
9-17. Vilnius: Vilnius University Publishing House, 1998. 
 
Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. 2nd ed.  Edited by J.O. Urmson and Marina 
Sbisà. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975. 
 
Bartal, Israel. The Jews of Eastern Europe, 1772-1881. Translated by Chaya Naor. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. 
 229 
 
Baumgarten, Albert L. “Ancient Jewish Sectarianism.” Judaism 47, no. 4 (1998): 387-
403. 
 
Beckford, James A. Social Theory and Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003. 
 
Ben-Rafael, Eliezer; Gorny, Yosef, and Ro’i, Yaakov, eds. Contemporary Jewries: 
Convergence and Divergence. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003. 
 
Ben-Sasson, H.H. “The Middle Ages.” In A History of the Jewish People, edited by H. H. 
Ben-Sasson and translated by George Weidenfeld, 385-691. Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1976.  
 
Berger, Peter. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. 
Garden City NJ: Doubleday & Co., 1967. 
 
Biale, David. Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History. New York: Schocken Books, 
1986. 
 
Boyarin, Daniel. Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism. 
Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
 
Boyarin, Daniel. “Justin Martyr Invents Judaism.” Church History 70, no. 3 (2001), 427-
461. 
 
Boyarin, Daniel. Borderlines: The Partition of Judeo-Christianity. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.  
 
Brown, Benjamin. “Soft Stringency in the Mishnah Brurah: Jurisprudential, Social, and 
Ideological Aspects of a Halachic Formulation.” Contemporary Jewry 27 (2007), 1-41. 
 
Brown, Benjamin. “Yisrael Me’ir ha-Kohen.” In The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in 
Eastern Europe. Accessed Aug. 31, 2011. 
http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Yisrael_Meir_ha-Kohen. 
  
Cohen, Shaye J. D. The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties. 
Berkeley CA, Los Angeles and London: The University of California Press, 1999.  
 
Cohen, Shaye. “The Significance of Yavneh: Pharisees, Rabbis and the End of Jewish 
Sectarianism.” Accessed Aug. 31, 2011 at the Center for Online Judaic Studies.  
http://cojs.org/cojswiki/The_Significance_of_Yavneh:_Pharisees,_Rabbis,_and_the_End_o
f_Jewish_Sectarianism,_Shaye_J.D._Cohen,_Hebrew_Union_College_Annual_55. 
Originally published in the Hebrew Union College Annual, Vol. 55 (Cincinnati: HUC 
 230 
Press, 1984).  
 
Dan, Joseph. The Teachings of the Hasidim. New York: Behrman House Inc., 1983. 
 
Eisen, Arnold. Rethinking Modern Judaism: Ritual, Commandment, Community. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
Etkes, Immanuel. The Gaon of Vilna: The Man and his Image. Berkeley CA and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
Etkes, Immanuel. “Haskalah.” In The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe.  
Translated by Jeffrey Green. Accessed Aug. 31, 2011. 
http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Haskalah. 
 
Etkes, Immanual. Israel Salanter and the Mussar Movement: Seeking the Torah of Truth. 
Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1997. 
 
Ettinger, Shmuel. “The Modern Period.” In A History of the Jewish People, 727-1075.  
 
Ferziger, Adam. Exclusion and Hierarchy: Orthodoxy, Nonobservance and the 
Emergence of Modern Jewish Identity. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2005.  
 
Fish, Stanley. Is There a Text in This Class? Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1980. 
 
Fonrobert, Charlotte E. and Jaffee, Martin S. The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud 
and Rabbinic Literature. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Fredriksen, Paula and Reinhartz, Adele, eds. Jesus, Judaism and Christian Anti-Judaism: 
Reading the New Testament after the Holocaust. Louisville KY and London: Westminister 
John Knox Press, 2002. 
 
Frankel, Johnathan. “Assimilation and the Jews of Nineteenth Century Europe: Toward a 
New Historiography?” In Assimilation and Community: The Jews of Nineteenth Century 
Europe, edited by Johnathan Frankel and Steven Zipperstein, 1-37. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992.  
 
Ginzberg, Louis and Rosenthal, Herman. “Jacob Barit.” Jewishencyclopedia.com. 
Accessed Aug. 31, 2011. 
www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?artid=293&letter=B&search=Barit. 
 
Hatala, John-Paul. “Social Network Analysis in Human Resource Development: A New 
Methodology.” Human Resource Development Review 5, no. 1 (2006): 45-71. 
 
 231 
Heilman, Samuel. Defenders of the Faith: Inside Ultra-Orthodox Jewry. New York: 
Schocken Books, 1992. 
 
Hezser, Catherine. The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine. 
Atlanta: Mohr Siebeck, 1997. 
 
Hundert, Gershon D. Jews in Poland-Lithuania in the Eighteenth Century: A Genealogy 
of Modernity. Berkeley CA and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004. 
 
Janowitz, Naomi. “Rabbis and their Opponents: The Construction of the ‘Min’ in 
Rabbinic Anecdotes.” Journal of Early Christian Studies 6, no. 3 (1998): 449-462. 
 
Jassen, Alex P. “Religion in the Dead Sea Scrolls.” Religion Compass 1, no. 1 (2007): 1-
25. 
 
Jastrow, Marcus. A Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Bavli, Yerushalmi, and the 
Midrashic Literature. Peabody MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2005. 
 
Johnson, Luke T. “The New Testament’s Anti-Jewish Slander and the Conventions of 
Ancient Polemic.” Journal of Biblical Literature 108, no. 3 (1989): 419-441. 
 
Kalmin, Richard. Jewish Babylonia between Persia and Roman Palestine. Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Kalmin, Richard. The Sage in Jewish Society of Late Antiquity. London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999. 
 
Kalmin, Richard. Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia. Brown 
Judaic Series, no. 300. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994. 
 
Katz, Jacob. A House Divided: Orthodoxy and Schism in Nineteenth Century Central 
Europe. Hanover NH: University Press of New England, 1998.  
 
Kimelman, Rueven. “Judaism and Pluralism.” Modern Judaism 7, no. 2 (1987): 131-150. 
 
Klier, John D. “Traditions of the Commonwealth: Lithuanian Jewry and the Exercise of 
Power in Tsarist Russia.” In The Vanished World of Lithuanian Jews, edited by Alvydas 
Nikzentaitis, Stefan Shreiner and Darius Staliuna, 5-20. Amsterdam and New York: 
Rodopi, 2004. 
 
Klier, John D. “The Kahal in the Russian Empire: Birth, death and afterlife of a Jewish 
Institution, 1772-1882.” In the Yearbook of the Simon Dubnow Institute, Vol. 5, edited by 
Dan Diner, 33-50.  Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006. 
 
 232 
Lederhendler, Eli. “Modernity without Emancipation or Assimilation? The Case of 
Russian Jewry.” In Assimilation and Community: The Jews in Nineteenth Century 
Europe,” 324-343. 
 
Levin, Dov. The Litvaks: A Short History of the Jews of Lithuani, translated by Adam  
Teller. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2000. 
 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. The Savage Mind, translated by Doreen Weightman and Don 
Weightman. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966. 
 
Mandel, Paul. “The Loss of Center: Changing Attitudes Towards the Temple in Aggadic 
Literature.” Harvard Theological Review 99, no. 1 (2006): 17-35. 
 
Mirsky, Yehuda. “The Musar Movement.” In The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern 
Europe. Accessed on Sept., 3, 2011. 
http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Musar_Movement. 
 
Mittleman, Alan. The Politics of Torah: The Jewish Political Tradition and the Founding 
of Agudat Israel. Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1996. 
 
Nadler, Allan. Faith of the Mithnagdim: Rabbinic Response to Hasidic Rapture. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
 
Nadler, Allan. “Misnagdim.” In The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe. 
Accessed on Sept. 4, 2011. http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Misnagdim. 
 
Orbach, Alexander. New Voices of Russian Jewry: A Study of the Russian-Jewish Press 
of Odessa in the Era of the Great Reforms, 1860-1871. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980. 
 
Salmon, Yosef. “Orthodox Judaism in Eastern Europe.” In The Gaon of Vilnius and the 
Annals of Jewish Culture, 104-115. 
 
Schäfer, Peter. Jesus in the Talmud. Princeton NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2007. 
 
Schochet, Elijah. The Hasidic Movement and the Gaon of Vilna. Northvale NJ: Jason 
Aronson Inc, 1994. 
 
Schofer, Jonathan Wyn. The Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics. Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. 
 
Schwartz, Seth. Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E. Princeton NJ and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
 
Soloveitchik, Haym.  “Rupture and Reconstruction: The Transformation of 
 233 
Contemporary Orthodoxy.” Tradition 28, no. 4 (1994): 64-130. 
 
Stampfer, Shaul. “The Yeshiva after 1800.” In The YIVO Institute Encyclopedia of Jews 
in Eastern Europe. Accessed on Sept. 4, 2011. 
http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Yeshiva/The_Yeshiva_after_1800. 
 
Stampfer, Shaul. Families, Rabbis and Education: Traditional Jewish Society in 
Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe. Oxford and Portland OR: The Littman Library of 
Jewish Civilization, 2010.  
 
Stanislawski, Michael. Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish 
Society in Russia, 1825-1855. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983. 
 
Stern, Sacha. Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writing. New York: Brill, 1994. 
 
Strack, H. L. and Stemberger, G. Introduction to the Talmud and the Midrash. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992. 
 
Teller, Adam. “The Gaon of Vilna and the Communal Rabbinate in 18th Century Poland-
Lithuania.” In The Gaon of Vilnius and the Annals of Jewish Culture, 142-153. 
 
Uffenheimer, Rivka Schatz. Hasidism as Mysticism: Quietistic Elements in 18th Century 
Hasidic Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.  
 
Zalkin, Mordechai. “Who Wields the Power? The Kahal and the Chevrot in Vilna at the 
Beginning of the 19th Century.” In The Gaon of Vilnius and the Annals of Jewish Culture, 
354-360. 
 
